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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Monire Jalili
Doctor of Philosophy
Operations and Business Analytics
June 2017
Title: Consumption Preferences, Time and Uncertainty: Impacts on Retail Pricing
Tactics
My dissertation is a collection of three essays with analytical models at the
interface of marketing and operations with a focus on pricing. A unifying theme
in this dissertation is the emphasis on understanding how consumer purchase
behaviors impact the optimal pricing decisions of a firm. This dissertation includes
co-authored material. In my first essay, I study the role of consumers’ opposing
perceptions of green quality on the optimal product line decisions, i.e., products,
prices and quality by analyzing the firm’s optimization problem and incorporating
an endogenous demand model that emerges from the consumers’ preferences while
considering the cost implications of introducing a green product. My second essay
is on optimal timing of price discounts. Delaying discounts, i.e., giving discounts on
future spending based on current spending is a prevalent retail discounting practice.
For a market of rational and forward-looking consumers who repeatedly visit and
purchase with the firm, we analyze the relative efficacy of delayed credits vs. a
natural alternative of immediate discounts. In my third essay, I explore a firm’s
optimal pricing strategy when it simultaneously rents and sells a product for which
consumers have a priori valuation uncertainty.
This dissertation includes previously unpublished coauthored material.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
My dissertation is a collection of three essays with analytical models at the
interface of marketing and operations, with a focus on pricing and retail operations.
A unifying theme in this dissertation is the emphasis on understanding how
consumer purchase behaviors impact the optimal pricing decisions of a firm. This
dissertation includes co-authored material. In my first essay, a coauthored work
with Dr. Tolga Aydinliyim and Dr. Nagesh Murthy, I study the role of consumers’
opposing perceptions of green quality on the optimal product line decisions, i.e.,
products, prices, and quality. In this model, we study the firm’s optimization
problem by incorporating an endogenous demand model that emerges from the
consumers’ preferences while considering the cost implications of introducing
a green product i.e., the material cost savings and the dis-economies of scope
in production. My second essay, coauthored with Dr. Michael Pangburn, is on
optimal timing of price discounts. Delaying discounts, i.e., giving discounts on
future spending based on current spending is a prevalent retail discounting practice.
For a market of rational and forward-looking consumers who repeatedly visit and
purchase with the firm, we analyze the relative efficacy of delayed credits vs. a
natural alternative of immediate discounts. In my third essay, coauthored with
Dr. Michael Pangburn, I explore the role of consumer valuation uncertainty in
determining how a firm should set its rental and selling prices, including when
to offer a discount for converting trials to purchases. I hereby present a summary
abstract of each work.
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Essay 1: Key Factors for Green Product Line Design
Ever-increasing pressure to cut back the anti-environmental practices, from a
growing group of consumers, have pushed the firms to rethink the type of products
to manufacture or sell. Inclusion of a green variant - that has some recycled
content - in the product line can contribute to virgin raw material saving and
thus reduction of the firm’s impact on the environment. The price and quality of
the green variant not only affect the market demand, but also bear processing and
material cost implications that notably influence the firm’s profit and thus should
not be overlooked. In this essay, we consider the price and quality optimization
(i.e., product line design) problem of a monopolist selling at most two product
variants, a base product and a green variant that comprises recycled/reused
content, to a market of two distinct consumer types with heterogeneous valuations.
We seek to answer couple of managerial questions. Firstly, should the firm target
each customer type with a unique product, i.e., offer a green product with some
recycled content for those who are willing to pay a higher price for green products
(i.e, as we refer to them as naturalites), and a base product with no recycled
content for those whose willingness-to-pay is lower for a green product (as we
refer to them as conventionals); or should the firm offer only one product, and
price appropriately to attract some demand from the segment with the opposing
perception? Secondly, if the firm chooses to offer a green variant, just by itself,
or, in addition to the base product, what should be the optimal percentage of
recycled content used in the green variant? Using an endogenous demand model
and non-linear programming theory, we characterize the economic conditions under
which a monopolist can profitably serve both consumer types by maintaining
a uniformly green product line, i.e., by selling only the green product variant.
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When such equilibrium outcomes result, the firm’s traditional profit maximization
objective coincides with an environmentally-conscious outcome. We also assess
the demand segmentation and firm profit consequences of underestimating the
naturalites’ (conventionals’) marginal utility (dis-utility) for a green variant with
more recycled/reused content, and show that such missteps may yield adverse
implications for both firm profits and the environment.
Essay 2: Delayed vs. Immediate Price Discounts
Price discounts, sometime called as rewards, are a ubiquitous practice to
stimulate consumer demand. Of critical decisions with respect to rewards are
the frequency, size and the timing of the discounts, which are highly correlated
with each other. Recurring reward programs are a particular form of discount
mechanism that have become prominent specially in retail and service sector.
Generally, these programs fall into one of two varieties: delayed or immediate
rewards. Delayed discounts are calculated based on today’s spending yet
redeemable only toward future purchases, and immediate discounts are applied
instantaneously. In this paper, we contrast the immediate and delayed credit
alternatives for a firm serving rational, forward-looking customers who repeatedly
visit and purchase with the firm. We employ dynamic programming to construct
the consumer surplus and the firm profits over an infinite horizon and subsequently
optimize the firm’s expected NPV of profit to determine the optimal size of
immediate vs. delayed discounts. From the firm’s perspective, paying out a
discount later rather than sooner is naturally appealing, all other things being
equal. However, the customers are rational and forward looking and rightfully
account for the time-value of money and hence prefer immediate discounts, ceteris
paribus. For the same reason, as we establish in our findings, the firm optimally
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scales up the size of a delayed discount (proportional to time value of money) to
compensate the customer for the wait before redeeming their credit. To further the
analysis and address the main question of long-term relative profitability of delayed
vs. immediate discounts, we consider two main scenarios: 1) when the posted prices
are steady over time and 2) when there is random occasional sales. We study the
problem under each scenario for both a homogeneous and heterogeneous market.
With steady prices, we find that the two tactics are equally profitable, regardless of
the type of the market. Given price fluctuation and a homogeneous market, we find
that delaying discounts increases the profits only if the representative customer’s
valuation falls within a specific middle range, otherwise both tactics yield equal
profits and surplus. However, we continue to analysis to study a heterogeneous
market (and non-customized discount percentage) and prove that delayed discounts
segment the market more efficiently such that not only the achieved profits are
higher, but also a larger portion of the marker shop frequently and this in turn
leads to higher aggregate market surplus as well.
Essay 3: Try Before You Buy Pricing
Many products/services exhibit the nature of experience goods, for which
the true quality and fit to a customer’s taste and willingness to pay can only be
learned via consumption. To mitigate customers’ reluctance to purchase when
facing uncertainty, firms follow various strategies such as different return policies,
money-back guarantees, and trials. In this chapter, we analyze try-before-you-
buy pricing tactic for a single firm that offers an experience good to consumers
facing valuation uncertainty. By offering a low-cost trial (rental) option to its
customers, the firm facilitates the resolution of valuation uncertainty — through
learning via consumption — and therefore might want to charge a higher selling
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price to customers once they have realized a high valuation and are contemplating
to upgrade to a purchase. However, a consumer’s willingness to pay may decrease
noticeably after the first consumption. This in turn might prompt the firm to
lower the post-rental selling price to mitigate the risk of losing potential profitable
sales to those who rented the product once. For some products, consumers may
experience a significant drop in post-first-usage utility. For example, rewatching a
thriller movie or rewearing a prom dress is much less enjoyable than the first time.
However, products like ski gear and bikes don’t suffer that much from this decrease
in utility after the first usage. We analyze how to set rental and selling prices, and
also consider the conditions under which a firm should refund — fully or partially
— rental fees in order to optimally stimulate customer trials and subsequent
purchase conversions. We conduct our analysis both for an ex-ante homogeneous
and heterogeneous market. Among our findings, we establish that a small renal cost
to selling cost ratio on the firm’s side is necessary to practice try before you buy
pricing and that the magnitude of rental utility relative to lifetime utility heavily
affects the optimality of conversion discounts, especially in a heterogeneous market.
We find that if the conditions are right, firms can sometimes benefit by charging a
higher selling price after trial.
5
CHAPTER II
KEY FACTORS FOR GREEN PRODUCT LINE DESIGN
The excerpt to be included is co-authored material, a joint work with Dr.
Tolga Aydinliyim and Dr. Nagesh Murthy.
Introduction
Over time, a continuously expanding consumer base and non-government
organizations have pushed firms’ operations and products to be less taxing on
the environment. Despite the increasing pressure, firms have responded to such
demands cautiously (especially when there is no binding legislation in place), as
it is unclear whether the inclusion of products with less environmental impact
in a firm’s product line supports traditional profit measures. Take, for example,
products with recycled content. On the cost side, provided unit collection costs
are not excessive, using recycled materials may reduce variable input costs as
recycled materials are typically procured at a lower cost compared to virgin
materials. However, using recycled instead of virgin material may require a different
production technology, modifying or upgrading existing equipment, or having to
run existing equipment at a slower rate, thus implying an increase in production
costs yielding diseconomies-in-scope. For example, Starbucks’ white paper cups
contain an industry-standard liner, which makes the hot beverage cups non-
recyclable in most paper recycling systems, thus requiring Starbucks to subsidize
recyclers’ third-party’s investment in necessary technologies. Even after such
investments, if Starbucks procures fully recyclable cups from its suppliers, the
unit cost for a cup would more than quadruple compared to the current design
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with only 10% recycled content, thus making this proposition economically hard
to justify.1 The net cost effect of including a green variant in a product line might
be significant to justify the firm charging a premium for that product. As a case
in point, consider Nike’s “Reuse-a-shoe” and “Nike Grind” programs, where Nike
re-purposes recycled materials by incorporating them in various products, such
as Air Jordan XX3 and Nike Pegasus 25., which Nike sells at premium prices
relative to other similar Nike shoes. On the demand side, some consumers are
more environmentally conscious and, in some cases, are willing to pay more for
green product variants. Recent surveys in Europe reveals that 30% of consumers
in the United Kingdom say they plan to spend more, and 49% plan to spend the
same amount on green products. In contrast, many other consumers, arguably the
majority in the United States, perceive products with recycled (or reused) content
inferior to those with no recycled content. This latter segment would not consider
purchasing the green product unless that variant is available at a sufficiently high
discount.
In this paper, we consider the price and quality optimization (i.e., product
line design) problem of a monopolist selling (at most) two product variants, a
base product and a green variant that comprises recycled content, to a market of
two distinct consumer types with heterogeneous valuations. Our setting features
three distinguishing elements, which had hitherto not been considered together in
the literature: (i) Consumer segments demonstrate opposing perceptions of the
green variant. We refer to customers who associate dis-utility with a green variant
with more recycled/reused content as “conventionals”, whereas those who have a
higher willingness-to-pay for the same product are referred to as “naturalites” (ii)
1In 2008, Starbucks announced that it does not have any plans to offer its beverages in
fully recyclable cups until at least 2015. As of October 2016, Starbucks’ cups are still not fully
recyclable.
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Including a green variant yields diseconomies-in-scope for the firm’s production
costs, which increases non-linearly as product variants become more vertically (and
environmentally) differentiated. (iii) Using more recycled content for the green
variant permits input material cost savings.
The aforementioned cost/demand dynamics give rise to a series of
managerially relevant research questions. Firstly, given the varied (and opposing)
consumer perceptions of the green product variants, what is the optimal product
line for a monopolist, which also prices its product optimally? In other words,
should the firm target each segment with a unique product, i.e., offer a green
variant (with some recycled content) for naturalites, and a base product (with
no recycled content) for the conventionals; or should the firm uniformly offer one
product, and price it appropriately to attract some demand from the segment with
the opposing perception? Secondly, if the firm chooses to offer a green variant, just
by itself, or, in addition to the base product, what should be the optimal degree
of vertical differentiation (as measured by the percentage of recycled content)
between the product variants? Thirdly, how do the optimal quality and price
decisions drive the firm’s demand and profit, and consequently, how does the
firm’s optimal product line decision transition from one to another as key problem
parameters, such as the relative proportion of the sizes of the naturalite and
conventional segments, the marginal (dis)utility of each customer segment from
additional recycled content, unit virgin and recycled material costs, and the degree
of diseconomies-in-scope in production, change? Regarding the last point, we are
particularly interested in characterizing the economic conditions under which a
monopolist can profitably cover the entire market by maintaining a uniformly
green product line, i.e., by selling only the green product variant. This is because,
when such equilibrium outcomes result, the firm’s traditional profit maximization
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objective coincides with an environmentally-conscious outcome. Finally, we assess
the demand segmentation and firm profit consequences of underestimating the
naturalites’ (conventionals’) marginal utility (dis-utility) for a green variant with
more recycled/reused content, and show that such missteps may yield adverse
implications for both firm profits and the environment.
Using an endogenous demand model that reflects consumers’ self-selection
regarding which (if any) of the product variants they choose to purchase, we
characterize five distinct demand segmentation scenarios. The monopolist can
induce one of these five demand scenarios by appropriately choosing prices for each
product variant and/or how vertically differentiated these variants will be from
one another (as measured by the green variant’s recycled content). In two such
scenarios, namely “Uniform Base” and “Uniform Green,” all purchasing consumers
(conventionals and/or naturalites) buy the same product variant, i.e., the base
product or the green variant, respectively. Consequently, the monopolist sells only
one product variant. In the other demand scenarios, which we refer to as “Targeted
Marketing” (or “Targeting” in short) scenarios, as the firm includes both variants
in its product line to target each segment with a unique product variant. In the
“Perfect Targeting” scenario, the firm completely segments the market, i.e., all
conventionals (naturalites) self-select to buy the base product (green variant). In
the “Conventional (Naturalite) Targeting” scenario, all conventionals (naturalites)
buy the base product (green variant), whereas only some naturalites (conventionals)
self-select to buy the variant intended for their consumption, i.e., the green variant
(base product).
We find that a uniformly green product line is optimal for a firm that cannot
influence the green variant’s product features (i.e., recycled content) when the
consumer base comprises mostly of conventionals with mild dislike for the green
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variant, the naturalites’ marginal willingness-to-pay for the green variant is low,
the green variant has limited recycled content, and the cost differential for input
material cost in virgin versus recycled forms is high. A uniformly green product
line with a maximally green variant (i.e., one that contains the highest permissible
amount of recycled content as per technological limits) sustains optimally only if
the firm can influence the green variant’s quality. In other words, a product line
that optimizes the monopolist firm’s traditional profit measure can induce all
customers (of both types) to consume the green product variant with maximum
recycled content yielding an environmentally-conscious outcome.
We also assess the potential profit loss for a firm that underestimates
the naturalites’ marginal utility or the conventionals’ marginal dis-utility from
a green variant with more recycled content. We find that underestimating
naturalities’ extra willingness-to-pay hurt firm profits the most when the virgin
and recycled input material costs are comparable. In this case, even though a more
environmentally-friendly outcome with a uniformly green product line results,
firm profit suffers as the firm fails to segment the consumer base by underpricing
the green variant and cannibalizing all demand for the base product. In contrast,
when the conventionals’ dislike for more recycled content in the green variant is
underestimated, firm profits decline the most when input material cost in virgin
form is high. In this case, the firm forgoes an opportunity to maintain a uniformly
green product line by overpricing the green variant. As a result, each demand
segment purchases only its intended product, i.e., the perfect targeting demand
scenario, which implies an outcome wherein not only does the firm accrue profit
loss, but also a less environmentally-friendly demand segmentation results yielding
more virgin material consumption.
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Literature Review
Our work lies at the intersection of sustainable operations management and
marketing, with particular focus on price and quality optimization for product
lines with green product variants. As such, following the classification of Guide
and Van Wassenhove (2009), our paper contributes to the “Prices and Markets”
phase of the research stream at this interface. In marketing, Mussa and Rosen
(1978) and Moorthy (1984) are the two seminal works in product line design,
which highlight that a monopolist may not be able to perfectly discriminate self-
selecting consumers to product variants at distinct quality levels. In our context,
this gives rise to the question whether a monopolist firm should offer both the
base product and the green variant, or attract demand from both conventionals
and naturalites for only one of the two products, and what firm cost and market
demand conditions support each strategy.
The existing works in vertical differentiation and pricing research that follow
the aforementioned seminal papers mostly assume that, when there are multiple
consumer types, consumers’ willingness-to-pay for a particular quality attribute
is consistently increasing in quality for each type (i.e., single crossing property).
However, in our context, conventionals’ and naturalites’ utility for the green variant
change in opposing directions as the variant’s recycled content increases. Our
assumption that there are different (and possibly opposing) consumer perceptions
for green product attributes finds empirical support in a number of studies such
as Antil (1984), Roberts (1996), and Ubilava et al. (2010), which indicate that
neither income level nor willingness-to-pay are closely tied to consumers’ sensitivity
to consumption with less waste.
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Recent studies in operations management have considered demand models
similar to ours. For example, Aydinliyim and Pangburn (2012) permit consumer
utility from green consumptions to take negative values, Yenipazarli and Vakharia
(2015) let two consumer segments (namely, green and brown) self-select one of two
product variants, and Kim et al. (2013) consider two customer segments, each of
which gives more importance to either a traditional quality attribute or a green
product attribute. However, all three of these aforementioned studies consider fixed
quality levels, and focus only on price optimization. In contrast, we study both
price and quality optimization for a monopolist, and in the same spirit as Salant
(1989) and Anderson and Dana (2009), we derive conditions relating production
costs and the relative demand segments under which forgoing a full product line
can be profitable. Chen (2001) also considers both price and quality optimization
with two distinct consumer segments—ordinary and green consumers. However, in
Chen’s model, traditional and environmental quality levels add up to a fixed value
(of one), and only green consumers value the environmental quality dimension.
As such each consumer type’s utility from distinct quality levels are consistently
ranked, satisfying Moorthy’s single crossing property.
In both marketing and sustainable operations literature, there are also studies
that permit demand models that one can derive from utility functions for two
attributes and violate Moorthy’s single crossing property in a duopoly setting; see,
for example, Vandenbosch and Weinberg (1995) and Chen and Liu (2014). These
papers consider settings similar to those in Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Moorthy
(1988), and extend their work by considering two product attributes instead of a
single attribute. In contrast with our study, these studies permit each firm to sell
only one product, and thus potential cannibalization effects within a firm’s product
lines are excluded from their analysis.
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Past research in sustainable management literature has repeatedly argued
that profit- and environment-related benefits are not necessarily antithetical;
see, for example, Porter and van der Linde (1995), and Guide et al. (2003).
Therefore, one of our objectives in this paper is to characterize situations wherein
a monopolist firm can profitably sustain a uniformly green product line. Our
focus on this particular matter relates to recent literature on closed loop supply
chains (CLSC), which has mostly focused on pricing and inventory decisions for
remanufactured products. Two almost uniformly applied assumptions in this
research stream are that all consumers associate lower consumer valuations with
remanufactured product variants, and that remanufactured products are cheaper to
produce than new products; see, for example, Debo et al. (2005), Ferguson and
Toktay (2006), Atasu, Guide and Van Wassenhove (2008), Atasu, Sarvary and
Van Wassenhove (2008), and Abbey et al. (2015). Our models differ significantly
from these aforementioned studies as the green product variant in our model may
yield higher production costs due to diseconomies-in-scope, while inducing higher
willingness-to-pay by naturalite consumers, which permits the possibility of a
higher price than a base product’s price at equilibrium.
Model
We consider a monopolist selling (at most) two product variants to a
segmented consumer base with heterogeneous valuations. The base product does
not contain any recycled content, whereas the green variant is produced by using a
combination of virgin and recycled materials where the latter comprises fraction β
of the input material. We refer to the consumer base who strictly prefers the green
variant to the base product as naturalites and, those with opposing preferences
for recycled content as conventionals ; see Russo (2010) for more details on this
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terminology. We assume that all consumers’ willingness-to-pay v for the base
product is uniformly distributed over the unit interval. We further assume that
the conventionals’ valuation of the green variant is (1 − αcβ)v, where marginal
dis-utility αc reflects these consumers’ utility loss percentage from using a green
variant with only recycled content. Similarly, we denote the naturalites’ marginal
utility gain percentage from consuming a green variant with only recycled materials
by αn. Consequently, naturalities’ valuation of a green variant with fraction β of
recycled content is (1 + αnβ)v. We denote by v¯c ≡ 1 − αcβ and v¯n ≡ 1 + αnβ the
largest of the conventional and the naturalite consumers’ valuations, respectively,
for the green variant. Without loss of generality, we normalize market size to 1, and
assume that the conventionals comrpise fraction ω of the market.
On the cost side, including a green variant in its product line has material
and production cost implications. Whereas the base product requires 100% virgin
content at unit cost cv, the unit material cost for the green variant with 100β%
recycled content is βcr + (1− β)cv, thus yielding material cost savings as long as the
monopolist can acquire recycled material at a discount (i.e., cv > cr). On the other
hand, consistent with the extant literature (e.g., Atasu, Guide and Van Wassenhove
(2008)), we assume that maintaining a more vertically differentiated product line is
more expensive. In other words, as the green variant’s recycled content β increases,
the monopolist experiences diseconomies-in-scope, which we model by the quadratic
unit production cost k(1 + β)2. (Note that when the monopolist offers only the base
product, i.e., β = 0, its unit production cost reduces to constant k.) Consequently,
it costs cb ≡ cv + k(1 + β)2 and cg ≡ βcr + (1− β)cv + k(1 + β)2 to deliver one unit
of base and green product variants, respectively.
We will permit the monopolist to make both quality and price decisions. The
quality decision comprises the recycled content fraction β to incorporate in the
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green product design, as choice of β yields a vertical differentiation gap between
the naturalites’ and the conventionals’ valuation of the green variant. Considering
two consumers with the same valuation v for the base product, the naturalite’s
valuation for the green variant will be (αn + αc)β more than the conventional’s
valuation for the same. To reflect practice, we will assume that the quality decision
comes first, and then price optimization, where the monopolist chooses pb and pg
for the base and the green product variants, respectively, follows closer to when
demand realizes.
Deriving the endogenous demand
We will employ an endogenous demand model to calculate the demand for
each product variant given β, pb, and pg, where each consumer self-selects the
option that gives him the highest net surplus whilst considering a purchase of one
of the two variants or leaving without a purchase. We denote the resulting demand
segments by Dbc (conventionals buying the base product), Dgc (conventionals
buying the green variant), Dbn (naturalites buying the base product), and Dgn
(naturalites buying the green variant), the relative magnitudes of which yield five
different demand segmentation scenarios.
Next, we will describe these demand scenarios by highlighting their product
line implications. As we will describe in more detail, the absolute price differential
∆ap ≡ pg − pb dictates the monopolist’s product line choice. When the base
product is so competitively priced that all purchasing consumers uniformly self-
select to buy that variant, i.e., Dgc = Dgn = 0, the monopolist’s product line
comprises only of the base product. We refer to this scenario as the uniform base
marketing case (UB), which realizes when ∆ap ≥ αnβ holds. In contrast, when
∆ap ≤ −αcβ, the green variant is uniformly favored by all purchasing customers
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yielding Dbc = Dbn = 0. Consequently, the monopolist includes only the green
variant in its product line, a scenario we refer to as the uniform green marketing
scenario (UG).2
The remaining range of price and quality decisions (−αcβ < ∆ap < αnβ) yield
demand segmentation scenarios wherein the monopolist maintains a product line
with both the base and the green variants. We refer to these scenarios as targeted
marketing scenarios,3 or targeting in short, as the monopolist targets each consumer
segment with a unique product offering. For these targeted marketing scenarios,
whether the monopolist can successfully direct each consumer type to its intended
variant depends on the variants’ relative price differential, which we denote by
∆rp ≡ pg−pbpg . When |∆rp| is small—more specifically, when |∆rp|< min {
αnβ
1+αnβ
, αcβ
1−αcβ},
prices are not different enough to overcome consumers’ opposing preferences of the
product variants, and thus consumers’ self-selection dynamics yield perfect targeting
(PT), a marketing scenario wherein each consumer buys his preferred variant
regardless of the (possible) discount offered for the other variant. On the other
hand, when the prices are close enough in absolute sense but are different enough
relatively, it is possible that one customer segment may purchase the product that
is meant to target the other customer segment with opposing perceptions of the
green variant. Specifically, when ∆ap < αnβ and ∆
r
p >
αnβ
1+αnβ
, some naturalites as
well as all conventionals buy the base product—a marketing scenario we refer to
as conventional targeting (CT), as that customer segment is successfully targeted
by the base product. Similarly, when ∆ap > −αcβ and ∆rp < −αcβ1−αcβ , some
conventionals as well as all naturalites buy the green variant, which we refer to
2The UG demand scenario may realize in two different ways depending on the magnitude of
demand segment Dgc, which we will discuss in more detail later in this section.
3See Ginsberg and Bloom (2004) for more details regarding this terminology.
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as the naturalite targeting (NT) scenario. In the following lemma, we consolidate
all of the aforementioned five demand segmentation scenarios that result from the
monopolist’s quality and price decisions. We relegate all proofs to the Appendix.
Lemma 1
The monopolist’s quality and price decisions yield the following demand
segments, and the corresponding product line and marketing scenarios
as summarized in Table 1:
TABLE 1. Demand segments given prices and recycled content fraction.
s Price range Dsbc D
s
gc D
s
bn D
s
gn
UB pb ≤ pg − αnβ w(1− pb) 0 (1− w)(1− pb) 0
CT pg − αnβ < pb < pg1+αnβ w(1− pb) 0 (1− w)(
pg−pb
αnβ
− pb) (1− w)(1− pg−pbαnβ )
PT
pg
1+αnβ
≤ pb ≤ pg1−αcβ w(1− pb) 0 0 (1− w)(1−
pg
1+αnβ
)
NT
pg
1−αcβ < pb < pg + αcβ w(1−
pb−pg
αcβ
) w(
pb−pg
αcβ
− pg1−αcβ ) 0 (1− w)(1−
pg
1+αnβ
)
UG pg + αcβ ≤ pb 0 w(1− pg1−αcβ )+ 0 (1− w)(1−
pg
1+αnβ
)
Note: Scenario UG realizes as UGinc or UGexc depending on whether w(1− pg1−αcβ )+ is positive or 0, respectively.
Note in Table 1 that scenario UG realizes in two different ways depending on what
DUGgc = w(1 − pg1−αcβ )+ returns. Specifically, we refer to the case with DUGgc = 0 as
the exclusive UG scenario, wherein the firm excludes the conventionals by setting
pg ≥ 1 − αcβ, and denote it by UGexc. In contrast, when DUGgc > 0, the firm
serves both the conventionals and naturalites with the same green product variant;
a scenario we refer to as inclusive UG and denote by UGinc.
When the Monopolist Cannot Influence Quality
In this section, we assume that the recycled content β in the green variant is
fixed, and cannot be influenced by the monopolist firm. Note that as the demand
expressions depend on prices inducing a particular demand scenario, the profit
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function we aim to optimize over the entire domain of prices changes. Therefore,
we will use pis(pb , pg| β) (or, pis(β) in short) where subscript s takes values from set
{UB,CT, PT,NT, UG} to denote the firm’s profit for each demand scenario s, and
employ binary indicator variables Is(pb , pg) (or, Is in short), which take a value of
1 if prices fall within the range prescribed for s in Table 1. As such, we can express
the firm’s profit pi(pb , pg| β) (or, pi(β) in short) as
pi(β) =
∑
s
Ispis =
∑
s
Is
(
(pb − cb)(Dsbc +Dsbn) + (pg − cg)(Dsgc +Dsgn)
)
. (2.1)
The firm’s optimization requires finding optimal prices p∗b and p
∗
g for the base
product and the green variant, respectively, which we can formally state with the
following mixed binary-integer non-linear program:
max
pb , pg
pi(β)
subject to pb ≤ 1 pg ≤ v¯n∑
s Is = 1 Is = {0, 1} , ∀s
Dsbc , D
s
gc , D
s
bn , D
s
gn ∀s are as defined in Table 1
(2.2)
We will first investigate the structural properties of pis(β) (for all s) and pi(β) to
see whether standard non-linear optimization approaches can be utilized to identify
globally optimal prices, which the next lemma clarifies:
Lemma 2
For each demand scenario s highlighted in Table 1, function pis(pb , pg| β)
is jointly concave in pb and pg. However, function pi(pb , pg| β) is not
jointly concave over its entire support (pb , pg) ∈ [0, 1]× [0 , v¯n].
18
Lemma 2 highlights that the globally optimal prices in each demand scenario s
must satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for each pis(β) and the
constraints that ensure scenario s realizes, yet further analysis is necessary to
determine the firm’s optimal product line strategy and the corresponding optimal
prices p∗b and p
∗
g. Consequently, the globally optimal prices may exist within one
of the five price range intervals that imply each demand scenario, or they may
coincide with one of the four bounds of two subsequent price ranges. Next, we will
identify the parameter spaces for all s (in terms of critical problem parameters
β, ω, cv, cr, αc, αn, k), and their subsets when necessary, over which the firm
optimally implements each demand scenario and the corresponding product line
and prices. The next proposition formally characterizes our result:
Proposition 1
Define the following constant parameter combinations:
z ≡ 1/( ω
v¯c
+ 1−ω
v¯n
)
y ≡ αcβ(1− z ωv¯c )
x ≡ v¯c
(
(1− cb)2 + z(1− w)( v¯nv¯c + v¯cv¯n − 2)
)
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Also, define the following parameter sets:
Γ∗UB ≡ {cb ≤ min{cg − αnβ, 1}}
Γ∗CT ≡ {cg − αnβ < cb < min{ cgv¯n , 1}}
Γ1PT ≡ { cgv¯n < cb < min{
cg
v¯c
+ ( v¯n
v¯c
− 1), 1}}
Γ2PT ≡ Γ∗NT
⋃
Γ∗
UG1inc
Γ∗NT ≡ { cgv¯c +
√
y( v¯n
v¯c
− 1) ≤ cb ≤ cg + αcβ}
Γ∗
UG1inc
≡ {cb < 1}
⋂ {cg ≤ min{v¯c −√x, cb − αcβ}}
Γ∗
UG2inc
≡ {cb ≥ 1}
⋂ {cg ≤ v¯c −√v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2))}
Γ∗UGexc ≡ {{cb > 1}
⋂{v¯c −√v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2)) < cg < v¯n}}
Then, the monopolist’s optimal price decisions p∗b and p
∗
g for each
demand scenario s, and the corresponding optimal profit pi∗s(β) and
optimality region Γ∗s(β) are summarized as in Table 2:
TABLE 2. Optimal prices, profit and regions
Scenario s p∗b p
∗
g pi
∗
s(β) Γ
∗
s(β)
UB 1+cb
2
v¯n+cb+αnβ
2
(1−cb)2
4
Γ∗UB
CT 1+cb
2
v¯n+cg
2
(1−cb)2
4
+ (1− w) (cb−cg+αnβ)2
4αnβ
Γ∗CT
PT 1+cb
2
v¯n+cg
2
w (1−cb)
2
4
+ (1− w) (v¯n−cg)2
4v¯n
Γ1PT \Γ2PT
NT αcβ+cb+z
2
cg+z
2
w (cg−cb+αcβ)
2
4αcβ
+ (z−cg)
2
4z
Γ∗NT
UGinc
2αcβ+cg+z
2
cg+z
2
(z−cg)2
4z
Γ∗
UG1inc
⋃
Γ∗
UG2inc
UGexc
2αcβ+cg+v¯n
2
cg+v¯n
2
(1−ω)(v¯n−cg)2
4v¯n
Γ∗UGexc
Proposition 1 offers a full characterization of the cost (cv, cr, k), product (β),
and market demand (αc, αn, ω) conditions under which a specific product line
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and pricing strategy optimally sustains for a monopolist firm. Yet, the resulting
optimality region closed-form expressions Γ∗s for each demand scenario are difficult
to interpret except for UB and CT.
Using relations we established earlier between virgin and recycled material
costs (cv and cr) and unit costs for each product variant (cb and cg), we can
conclude that unit cost differential cb − cg equals β(cv − cr). As such, the optimality
region Γ∗UB can simply be expressed as {cv − cr < −αn}, which yields the following
corollary:4
Corollary 1
Unless virgin materials can be procured at a discount relative to
recycled materials, i.e., cv < cr, the monopolist firm always maintains a
product line including the green variant.
In most practical settings, firms can acquire and utilize recycled input material
at a lower cost than they can procure input material in virgin form, and thus a
monopolist selling to a heterogeneous market should never maintain a product
line with only the base product. Similar algebra permits Γ∗CT to be expressed as
{−αn < cv − cr < −αncg}, and thus we have the following corollary:
Corollary 2
Unless virgin materials can be procured at a discount relative to
recycled materials, i.e., cv < cr, the naturalites always purchase the
green variant.
Corollary 2 highlights that, the input material being cheaper in virgin form than
it is in recycled form is a necessary condition for a monopolist to profitably induce
4Note that min{cg − αnβ, 1} = cg − αnβ as the principle of optimality dictates cg < p∗g < v¯n =
1 + αnβ.
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base product purchases by some naturalites. To appreciate this Corollary, note
that when the input material cost differential cv − cr is positive, v¯nvcg exceeds vcb ,
and thus a monopolist can always extract more surplus from a naturalite buying a
green variant than the surplus when the same consumer purchases a base product.
Consequently, cv > cr is a sufficient condition for one of PT, NT, or UG to sustain
as the monopolist’s optimal strategy.
As we highlighted via Proposition 1, it is analytically tractable to attain a
full characterization of what exact conditions induce each optimal strategy, yet,
the interpretation of the optimality conditions yielding Γ∗s for {PT,NT, UG} is
not straightforward as the boundaries of these surfaces are highly non-linear in
problem parameters. In what follows, we derive a combination of necessary and
sufficient conditions, which imply thresholds on critical parameters β, ω, and αn for
a “greener” product line (i.e., NT and UG) to sustain optimally.
Proposition 2
Define the following constant parameter combinations:
ωNT ≡ 1− (1+αnβ)(
cv−cr−αc(cv+k(1+β)2)
αn+αc
)
2
β(αc+(αn−αc)( cv−cr−αc(cv+k(1+β)2)αn+αc )
2
)
αNTn ≡
√
αcβ(1−αc)(1−αc−2k(1+β)2)
β
− αc
βNT ≡
(√
αc(1−w)(αn+αc)2+12αck((1−αc)cv−αck−cr)−(αn+αc)
√
αc(1−w)
)2
36α2ck
2
If αc(cv + k) < cv − cr < αc and k < cv(1−αc)−cr−αc
√
αcβ(1−ω)
αc(1+β)2
, then the
following statements hold true:
(i) Strategy NT is optimal if and only if ω > ωNT .
(ii) Strategy NT is optimal if αn < α
NT
n .
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(iii) Strategy NT is optimal if β < βNT . Furthermore, βNT increases
with a decrease in αn and/or in αc.
Proposition 2 highlights that product line strategy NT is only profitable for the
monopolist firm when the unit input material cost savings cv − cr for using recycled
material are high, the diseconomies-of-scope effects are not strong, i.e., low k,
and the conventionals’ dis-utility for using the green should not be significant,
i.e., low αc. If these conditions are not satisfied, the monopolist is better-off by
appropriately pricing both the base product and the green variant to perfectly
segment the market, i.e., scenario PT wherein each consumer type purchases the
variant that is intended to be sold to that consumer type.
What is surprising that Proposition 2 highlights is that a greener product line
(NT when compared to PT) does not sustain when there are many naturalites in
the customer base, i.e., low ω, who are willing to pay a significant premium for the
green variant, i.e., high αn. This is because, in such scenarios, it is better for the
monopolist to increase the price of the green variant and emphasize higher margins
it may attain from these high-paying customers, especially when there are plenty
of such customers. In that case, instead of trying to convince some conventionals
to purchase the green variant (which yields net unit cost savings due to high
cv − cr and low k), it makes more sense for the buyer to extract more surplus
from conventionals by making all of them purchase the appropriately priced base
product. Also unexpected, and highlighted by Proposition 2, is that it becomes less
likely for a monopolist to optimally sustain strategy NT when the green variant
contains high recycled content. As β increases, the product variants become
more vertically differentiated due to consumers’ opposing perceptions of recycled
content, thus giving the monopolist an opportunity to segment the market using
two distinct product variants, while, at the same time, exploiting the increased
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unit cost savings of the green variant. Finally, Proposition 2 highlights that βNT
increases as αc and/or αn decreases. In other words, optimally sustaining strategy
NT is more likely when the consumer’ preference gap between the two variants,
i.e., β(αn + αc), is smaller, so that the green variant is not only preferred by the
naturalites, but is acceptable to the conventionals if its price is right.
Proposition 3
Define the following constant parameter combinations:
S ≡ (1− cv − k(1 + β)2 + β(cv − cr − αc))2 − (1− αcβ)(1− cv − k(1 + β)2)2
ωα1 ≡ 1− Sαcβ(S+(1−αcβ)αcβ)
ωUG1 ≡ 1− S(1+αnβ)
β2(αn+αc)2(1−αcβ)+Sβ(αn+αc)
ωUG2 ≡ − (1−αcβ)(β(cr−cv−αn)+cv+k(1+β)
2−1)(β(2αc+cr−cv+αn)+cv+k(1+β)2−1)
β(αc+αn)(−2(1−αcβ)(βcr+cv(1−β)+k(1+β)2)+(βcr+(1−β)cv+k(1+β)2)2+(1−αcβ)(1+αnβ))
αUG1n ≡
√
S
√
Sw2+4(1−w)(1−αcβ)2+Sw
2β(1−w)(1−αcβ) − αc
αUG2n ≡ 1−β(2αc+cr)−(1−β)cv−k(1+β)
2
β
βUG2 ≡ cv−cr−2k−2αc−αn+
√
(αn+cr−cv+2(αc+k))2−4k(cv+k−1)
2k
If cv−cr > αc and k < min{1−cv, 14(1−cv+
√
(1− αc)− (1−ω)(αn+αc)21−αc+ω(αn+αc))},
then the following statements hold true:
(a) If cv < 1− k(1 + β)2, then:
(i) Strategy UGinc is optimal if and only if ω > ω
UG1 .
(ii) If ω > ωα1 , then strategy UGinc is optimal if αn < α
UG1
n
(iii) There exists βUG1 ∈ [0, 1] such that strategy UGinc is optimal
if β < βUG1 .
(b) If cv > 1− k(1 + β)2, then:
(i) Strategy UGinc is optimal if and only if ω > ω
UG2 .
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(ii) Strategy UGinc is optimal if αn < α
UG2
n
(iii) Strategy UGinc is optimal if β < β
UG2 .
(iv) Strategy UGexc is optimal if and only if ω < ω
UG2 .
Proposition 3 highlights that conditions similar to those we stated for strategy
NT to be optimal are required for the monopolist to optimally maintain a “green-
only” product line, i.e., strategy UG: The unit material cost differential cv − cr
must be high, the diseconomies-in-scope parameter k must be low, the number
of naturilites in the market must be limited, (i.e., high ω), and the consumers’
preference gap for the two variants β(αn + αc) must remain low to make the green
variant acceptable to the entire consumer base. The only distinction is that, for
the monopolist to optimally exclude the base product from its product line, an
even stricter set of threshold conditions must hold. For example, the unit material
cost differential cv − cr should exceed αc for strategy UG to sustain optimally. In
contrast, αc(cv + k) < cv − cr < αc suffices for strategy NT to be optimal. We
illustrate these dynamics more clearly in Figure 1. In this figure, we observe he
transitions for the monopolist firm’s optimal product line strategy as either ω, αn,
or β changes. In each panel, cv and cr vary between 0 and 1 within the vertical
and horizontal axis, respectively; k = 0.15 and αc = 0.3. (a) From left-to-right,
the conventional consumer segment percentage ω increases. (20%, 60%, 80%, 95%).
(b) From left-to-right, the naturalites’ marginal utility from recycled content αn
increases. (5%, 25%, 50%, 95%). (c) From left-to-right, the green variant’s recycled
content fraction β increases. (5%, 25%, 45%, 75%)
Also of note in each panel of Figure 1 is what we characterize in
Proposition 3(b), where the monopolist firm can sustain a profitable business only
by focusing on a solely green product line. In such case, the virgin material cost
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FIGURE 1. Optimal policy maps and sensitivity analysis
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is prohibitively high that, the only profit opportunity rests with the sales of the
green variant as it offers material cost savings while offsetting the adverse effects of
diseconomies-in-scope. In such cases, the firm sells only the green variant to both
consumer segments, i.e., the UGinc scenario, or only to the naturalites, i.e., UGexc.
(We highlight the latter scenario in regions marked “exc” in Figure 1.)
Of managerial importance, note that our findings in Proposition 3 also
highlight the fallacy of criticism some firms with diverse product lines receive, when
consumers and non-profit organizations criticize them for having green product
variants, which are not fully recyclable. Similarly, firms’ reluctance to focus on
green products due to not having enough naturalites in their consumer base is
unfounded. We show that a environmental and traditional bottom line objectives
align for a monopolist, i.e., “green only” product line is profitable, when the green
variant contains limited recycled content, and thus is acceptable to “all” consumer
segments, not just the naturalites. If this were not the case, then a profit-driven
monopolist is better-off by segmenting the market with two distinct product
variants.
When the Monopolist Can Optimize Quality
In this section, we consider the scenario where the monopolist can influence
the quality of the green variant by choosing the optimal recycled content fraction
β. As each consumer segment’s valuation of the green variant is influenced by β,
the monopolist’s choice affects how vertically differentiated the product variants
would be. As is typical in the operations and marketing literature, we assume that
the quality decision is strategic, whereas the pricing decisions are tactical. Thus, we
assume the monopolist’s quality optimization precedes price optimization, yielding
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the following non-linear objective function:
Π(β) =
∑
s Is(β)pi
∗
s(β)
=
∑
s Is(β)
(
(p∗b(β)− cb)(Dsbc(p∗b , p∗g) +Dsbn(p∗b , p∗g))
+ (p∗g(β)− cg)(Dsgc(p∗b , p∗g) +Dsgn(p∗b , p∗g))
)
.
(2.3)
We can then express the monopolist’s quality optimization problem by the
following mixed binary-integer non-linear program:
max
β
Π(β)
subject to 0 ≤ β ≤ βmax∑
s Is(β) = 1 Is(β) = {0, 1} , ∀s
(2.4)
In program (2.4), Is(β) returns 1 if optimal prices p
∗
b(β) and p
∗
g(β) for a given β
yields demand scenario s ∈ {UG,NT, PT,CT, UB} as defined in Table 1; and
0 otherwise. Evidently, there may be technological limits on how high β can be,
which we highlight via the constraint on β. Without loss of generality, we will
assume that βmax = 1, as program (2.4) returns β
∗ = βmax only when Π(β) is
increasing at β = βmax.
Our analysis of the structural properties of objective function (2.3) reveals
that Π(β) (≡ ∑s Is(β)pi∗s(β) is not well-behaved for all β ∈ [0, 1]. More specifically,
even though pi∗s(β) is concave for β values that yield demand scenario s for all s,
the dynamics of pi∗s(β) for two different demand scenarios do not always yield a
predictable relationship for a wide range of problem parameters, which we illustrate
via a numerical example in Figure 2. In this figure, we present the objective
function Π(β), the resulting demand scenarios, and optimal recycled content
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percentage β∗ when cr ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25}, αc = αn = 0.2, cv = 0.275,
ω = 0.5, and k = 0.05.
𝑐" = 0
𝑐" = 0.15
𝑐" = 0.10
𝑐" = 0.05
𝑐" = 0.20𝑐" = 0.25
NTPTUG
FIGURE 2. Objective function and the optimal recycled content percentage
Note in Figure 2 that Π(β) is sensitive to unit material cost differential
cv − cr, which we denote by ∆c. When the recycled material is free, i.e., cr = 0,
the monopolist only considers demand scenario UG, for which Π(β) is monotone-
increasing in β, yielding β∗ = 1. In contrast, when cr = 0.25, unit cost differential
cv − cr is very small, and thus Π(β) is monotone-decreasing in β as the monopolist
utilizes strategy PT for all β > 0. Consequently, it is optimal for the monopolist
to sell only the base product, i.e., β∗ = 0 implying demand scenario UB. In
contrast, for cr ∈ {0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20} the optimal recycled fraction for the green
variant is neither 0 or 1, yielding various demand scenarios UG, NT, or PT. For
some parameter combinations, it is possible to exploit some structure on how Π(β)
transitions from one demand scenario to another. For example, note the curve with
cr = 0.15 in Figure 2 where pi
∗
NT (β) is monotone-increasing in β. This implies that
the local optimum for pi∗PT (β) is the global optimum for Π(β), i.e., β
∗ = 0.35. In
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contrast, consider the curve with cr = 0.10 where the only way to find the global
optimum β∗ = 0.50 is to compare the local optima for pi∗NT (β) and pi
∗
PT (β).
Obviously, for parameter combinations that permit more than two demand
scenarios as β changes from 0 to 1, it is even harder to detect any structure. As
a result, we will refrain from fully characterizing the solution of the monopolist’s
quality and price optimization. Instead, we will only characterize the scenarios
wherein the monopolist optimal quality choice is extreme: The cases with β∗ =
1(= βmax), which may permit either a uniformly green product line or a targeted
product line yielding demand scenario PT; and the case with β∗ = 0, which imply
strategy UB with the monopolist marketing only the base product. We formalize
our statements for these scenarios in the next proposition:
Proposition 4
Define the following constant parameter combinations:
∆UBc ≡ −αn
ωPTβ ≡

1− 8k
2∆c+αn(1+
cv+k
1+αn
)
if ∆c < 2k
1− 8k
2∆c+αn(1+
4k(cv+∆c)−∆2c
4k(1+αn)
)
if 2k ≤ ∆c ≤ 4k
1− 8k
2∆c+αn(1+
cr+4k
1+αn
)
if ∆c > 4k
ωUGβ ≡ αc∆c−4k
Then, we have the following statements:
(i) When the unit input material cost differential ∆c satisfies ∆c <
∆UBc , the monopolist’s optimal product line strategy is UB with
β∗ = 0.
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(ii) Function pi∗PT (β) is increasing in β for ω < ω
PT
β when product line
strategy PT is optimal.
(iii) Function pi∗UG(β) is increasing in β for ω > ω
UG
β when product line
strategy UG is optimal.
Next, we provide representative examples from an extended numerical study
to draw more general managerial insights. In Figure 3, we illustrate how the
monopolist firm’s optimal product line strategy transitions as the unit virgin-to-
recycled material cost differential ∆c changes. In other words, this figure shows the
transitions for the monopolist firm’s optimal product line strategy and the optimal
recycled content β∗ of the green variant as ω changes. In each panel, cv (cr) varies
between 0 and 1 within the vertical (horizontal) axis; k = 0.05 and αc = αn = 0.2.
(a) ω = 0.1, (b) ω = 0.5, (c) ω = 0.9. The numbers for each (cv, cr) pair highlight
the optimal recycled content β∗ of the green variant. In cases marked by “exc,” the
optimal strategy is UGexc with β
∗ = 1.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
UBCTNTUGinc PTexc
FIGURE 3. Optimal recycled content percentage
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We can make several observations regarding Figure 3. As is the case in the
prior section where the quality (i.e., β) was fixed, an optimal green-only product
line (i.e., strategy UG) sustains when unit material cost differential ∆c is high.
Furthermore, our prior finding that strategy UG is more likely to be optimal
when selling to a consumer base with fewer naturalites remains true. (This latter
observation follows from region UG expanding as ω increases from panel (a) to
panel (c) in Figure 3.)
The most striking difference from the results when the quality is fixed is that,
a quality-optimizing monopolist should maintain a uniformly green product line
with significantly high recycled content. More specifically, consider a scenario with
problem parameters (e.g., high ∆c, low k, low αc, low αn) that induce optimal
strategy UG when the quality is fixed. As per Proposition 1(a)(iii), this must be
a scenario wherein the recycled content percentage for the green variant is not
high, i.e., low β. In this case, an increase in β, ceteris paribus, transitions the
monopolist’s optimal strategy to PT unless ∆c is very high. The monopolist,
in this case, should introduce the base product to obtain a more vertically-
differentiated product line to capture the consumers’ distinct valuations, which
becomes increasingly diverse as β increases.
In comparison, when quality-optimization is possible, the monopolist prefers
to increase β to its upper limit, which yields strategy UG if ∆c is high enough,
and strategy PT otherwise. In the former scenario, the firm maintains a uniformly
green product line while charging a premium price to capture the naturalites’ high
willingness-to-pay while enjoying material cost savings. In the latter case, as the
material cost savings are not high enough to justify a uniformly green product line,
the monopolist can offer its consumer base two high-margin products, each of which
uniquely targets one consumer type. In both scenarios, the green variant’s recycled
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content is higher than it would be when the quality is fixed. Thus, we can conclude
that quality optimization enables the monopolist to optimally maintain a more
environmentally-conscious product line.
The implications of underestimating consumer segments’ sensitivity for more
recycled content
As evidenced by our findings in prior sections, the monopolist firm’s ability to
segment its consumer base in the most profitable way heavily depends on various
cost and demand parameters. On the market side, consumers types’ opposing
(dis)like for how much recycled content the green variant has is of significant
importance. As such, in this subsection, we assess the potential profit loss for a
firm that underestimates the naturalites’ marginal utility or the conventionals’
marginal dis-utility from a green variant with more recycled content. We highlight
a number of managerial insights by presenting findings from a numerical study,
which we summarize in Figure 4. This figure has five parts, which we present
within three panels. Panel (b) is the same as Figure 3(b), and will be used as a
benchmark. In this problem instance we set k = 0.05, ω = 0.5, αn = αc = 0.2, and
vary unit material costs in virgin and recycled forms, i.e., cv and cr, from 0 to 1.
On the left-side of panel (a), we present the ensuing demand scenario
realizations when the firm optimizes price and quality having incorrectly assumed
αn = 0. On the right-side of the same panel, we highlight the firm’s percentage
profit loss for not choosing prices and β which would yielded the optimal demand
scenario realization in panel (b). As evident in the left-side of panel (a), failing to
recognize naturalites’ higher willingness-to-pay for a green product variant, the firm
forgoes opportunities to effectively segment its customer base by targeting each
consumer type with an appropriate product, yielding only the UB demand scenario
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(a)
(b)
(c)
-­‐
UBCTNTUGinc PTexc
1.000 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 3.00 3.90 24.75 37.45 19.75 25.00 32.65 44.44 64.00 100.00
0.975 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 3.00 3.90 24.75 37.45 19.75 25.00 32.65 44.44 64.00 97.52
0.950 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 3.00 3.90 24.75 37.45 19.75 25.00 32.65 44.44 64.00 92.75
0.925 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 3.00 3.90 24.75 37.45 19.75 25.00 32.65 44.44 68.67 96.25
0.900 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 3.00 3.90 24.75 37.45 19.75 25.00 32.65 44.44 90.40 85.00
0.875 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 3.00 3.90 24.75 37.45 19.75 25.00 32.65 85.00 78.40 66.25
0.850 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 3.00 3.90 24.75 37.45 19.75 25.00 32.65 73.33 61.60 40.00
0.825 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 3.00 3.90 24.75 37.45 19.75 25.00 69.38 58.33 40.00 6.25
0.800 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 3.52 13.51 24.75 16.00 19.75 64.09 55.91 40.00 13.60 0.00
0.775 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 3.69 13.69 24.94 15.95 51.37 54.27 40.36 19.00 0.15 0.00
0.750 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 4.20 14.22 26.16 40.65 49.02 41.10 23.50 2.40 0.00 0.00
0.725 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 5.04 15.10 28.56 39.98 41.93 27.13 6.73 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.700 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 6.18 17.01 29.65 38.56 30.06 12.79 1.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.675 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 7.62 20.24 29.64 32.46 17.96 3.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.650 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 9.31 22.09 28.73 22.02 7.06 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.625 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 2.38 13.00 22.80 25.27 11.59 2.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.600 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 4.02 15.28 22.55 16.11 4.54 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.575 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 8.11 16.35 19.78 7.81 1.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.550 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 1.94 10.80 17.75 11.72 3.09 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.525 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 3.63 12.27 15.53 5.60 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.500 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 1.61 6.50 12.69 8.68 2.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.475 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 2.32 8.14 12.20 4.14 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.450 0.87 1.00 1.16 1.35 3.76 9.77 6.64 1.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.425 0.87 1.00 1.16 2.09 5.61 9.58 3.12 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.400 0.87 1.00 1.16 2.61 6.40 5.20 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.375 0.87 1.00 1.48 2.84 6.51 2.38 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.350 0.87 1.00 2.51 4.53 4.11 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.325 0.87 1.33 2.68 5.15 1.82 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.300 0.87 1.93 2.96 3.28 0.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.275 0.87 2.02 3.50 1.39 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.250 1.49 2.84 2.72 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.225 1.97 3.32 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.200 2.12 2.55 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.175 2.47 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.150 2.40 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.125 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.100 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.075 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.050 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.025 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
1.000 96.92 95.79 94.44 92.78 90.72 88.10 84.70 80.13 73.73 71.67 65.89 58.58 49.09 36.28 18.18 0.00 0.00
0.975 93.98 92.65 91.08 89.17 86.82 83.87 80.06 75.00 68.01 66.53 60.87 53.87 44.99 33.39 17.57 0.00 0.00
0.950 91.03 89.52 87.72 85.57 82.93 79.63 75.42 69.87 62.28 61.39 55.85 49.15 40.90 30.50 16.96 0.00 0.00
0.925 88.08 86.38 84.37 81.96 79.03 75.40 70.78 64.75 56.56 56.25 50.83 44.44 36.81 27.60 16.36 0.00 0.00
0.900 85.14 83.24 81.01 78.35 75.13 71.16 66.14 59.62 50.84 51.11 45.81 39.73 32.72 24.71 15.75 0.00 0.00
0.875 82.19 80.10 77.66 74.75 71.24 66.92 61.50 54.49 45.11 45.98 40.79 35.01 28.63 21.81 15.15 0.00 0.00
0.850 79.24 76.97 74.30 71.14 67.34 62.69 56.86 49.36 39.39 40.84 35.78 30.30 24.54 18.92 14.54 0.00 0.00
0.825 76.30 73.83 70.94 67.54 63.45 58.45 52.22 44.24 33.66 35.70 30.76 25.58 20.45 16.02 10.55 0.00 0.00
0.800 73.35 70.69 67.59 63.93 59.55 54.22 47.58 39.44 35.15 30.56 25.74 20.87 16.36 13.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.775 70.41 67.55 64.23 60.32 55.65 49.98 42.94 34.45 30.14 25.60 20.96 16.47 12.68 10.78 0.00 0.69 0.00
0.750 67.46 64.41 60.88 56.72 51.76 45.74 38.30 29.74 25.46 21.06 16.70 12.74 9.87 10.26 1.81 0.00 0.00
0.725 64.51 61.28 57.52 53.11 47.86 41.51 33.66 25.33 21.17 16.99 13.03 9.74 8.29 3.02 0.32 0.00 0.00
0.700 61.57 58.14 54.16 49.50 43.97 37.27 29.02 21.27 17.30 13.44 9.99 7.50 4.97 1.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.675 58.62 55.00 50.81 45.90 40.07 33.03 24.38 17.59 13.87 10.42 7.58 5.84 1.76 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.650 55.67 51.86 47.45 42.29 36.17 28.80 19.74 14.31 10.92 7.94 5.80 2.98 1.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.625 52.73 48.72 44.10 38.69 32.28 24.56 15.10 11.44 8.43 6.00 4.18 1.79 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.600 49.78 45.59 40.74 35.08 28.38 20.33 11.96 8.98 6.41 4.59 2.41 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.575 46.83 42.45 37.39 31.47 24.48 16.09 9.54 6.92 4.84 3.24 1.99 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.550 43.89 39.31 34.03 27.87 20.59 11.85 7.48 5.26 3.69 2.62 0.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.525 40.94 36.17 30.67 24.26 16.69 8.04 5.76 3.97 3.37 1.60 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.500 38.00 33.03 27.32 20.66 12.80 6.30 4.37 3.34 2.89 1.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.475 35.05 29.90 23.96 17.05 8.90 4.85 3.30 3.64 1.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.450 32.10 26.76 20.61 13.44 5.37 3.69 3.39 2.49 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.425 29.16 23.62 17.25 9.84 4.13 2.84 3.25 1.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.400 26.21 20.48 13.89 6.24 3.14 3.58 2.70 0.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.375 23.26 17.35 10.54 3.56 2.69 3.50 1.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.350 20.32 14.21 7.18 2.71 3.79 2.29 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.325 17.37 11.07 4.54 2.70 3.72 1.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.300 14.42 7.93 3.12 4.00 2.47 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.275 11.48 5.36 3.08 3.28 1.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.250 8.53 3.94 4.30 2.63 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.225 6.04 3.80 3.48 1.52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.200 4.61 4.83 2.25 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.175 4.38 3.81 1.65 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.150 5.27 2.45 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.125 3.49 1.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.100 2.13 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.075 1.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.050 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.025 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80
FIGURE 4. Potential profit loss due to underestimating αn or αc
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realization when the input cost differential is positive-but-low or negative. In all
other cases, the UG demand scenario realizes. As highlighted in the right-side of
panel (a), we find that the aforementioned underestimation hurts firm profits the
most when the virgin and recycled input material costs are comparable. In this
case, even though a more environmentally-friendly outcome with a uniformly green
product line results, firm profit suffers as the firm fails to segment the consumer
base by underpricing the green variant too much, which in effect cannibalizes all
demand for the base product.
In panel (c), we present the ensuing demand scenario realizations when the
firm optimizes price and quality having incorrectly assumed αc = 0 and the
resulting profit loss for the firm relative to the benchmark case highlighted in panel
(b). We find that when the firm underestimates conventionals’ dislike for more
recycled content in the green variant, the decline in the firm’s profit increases with
unit virgin input material cost. In instances with such high virgin material costs
case, the firm forgoes an opportunity to maintain a uniformly green product line
by overpricing the green variant. The firm does so in hopes of extracting more
surplus from the naturalites while satisfying conventionals’ demand with the
base product. As a result, each demand segment self-selects to purchase only the
product variant targeting that consumer type, yielding the PT demand scenario.
When this demand realization ensues not only does the firm accrue significant
profit loss, but also a less environmentally-friendly demand segmentation results
yielding more virgin material consumption.
Conclusion and Discussion
When firms are confronted by advocates of the environment regarding why
their product offerings include no, or only a few, environmentally-friendly product
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variants, the typical responses cite high costs and/or lack of consumer demand
due to higher prices to offset costs or some consumers’ negative perception of such
“green” products. As such, many firms either do not market any green variants
at all, or, even when they do, they include limited number of green variants in
their product lines only as complements to a wider array of less environmentally-
friendly product offerings. Nevertheless, recent consumer surveys highlight an
ever increasing fraction of consumers who favor green consumption to the extent
that some of these consumers are willing to pay a premium for green product
variants. In addition, reduced collection costs and improvements in recycling/reuse
technologies provide firms with the opportunity to acquire recycled materials at a
lower cost, thus encouraging less virgin material use. As a result, even firms with
green product offerings are accused of “green-washing,” because environmentally-
conscious consumers believe that green products should include more—preferably
100%—recycled/reused content. This gives rise to the managerial questions
regarding whether it is feasible for firms to profitably maintain a product line
with only green product variants with high recycled/reused content, and, if so,
what economic factors related to product cost and consumer demand induce such
environmentally-friendly outcomes.
Seeking explanations regarding the aforementioned managerial issues, we
studied product line design (i.e., both price and quality optimization) problem
of a monopolist selling one or both of two product variants, i.e., a base product
and a green variant with recycled/reused content, to a consumer base with two
distinct customer types, i.e., conventionals and naturalites. Using an endogenous
demand model that captures these two customer types’ dislike and extra utility,
respectively, from consuming the green product variant, and accounting for cost
implications for a firm of expanding its product line to include green variants,
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we characterize optimal strategies for scenarios wherein the firm can or cannot
influence product quality. In the former case, the firm can be a manufacturer,
which also sells directly to consumers, whereas in the latter case, the firm can be
a retailer reselling products with set quality levels.
Our findings indicate that some passionately-advocated product and demand
characteristics such as green product variants with high recycled content, consumer
bases with more environmentally-conscious customers, and a higher willingness-
to-pay by such customers for green product variants are barriers preventing
firms from maintaining uniformly green product lines. This is because when
the aforementioned conditions hold, the firm is better-off targeting each unique
customer type with a product that is positioned more closely to that customer
type. We also find that firms with the ability to influence quality (as measured
in our model by the amount of recycled/reused content of the green variant) can
profitably maintain a product line with only a maximally green variant, e.g., one
with fully recycled/reused content, when the consumer base has limited amount
of naturalites who can derive low extra-utility from green variants. This finding
has the managerial implication that manufacturers of green product variants with
design capabilities are more likely to profitably maintain a maximally green product
line than firms that only manufacture or resell. The latter set of firms should
offer its customers a more diverse product line unless the green variant is not too
vertically-differentiated from the base product.
Our analysis also highlights that a firm’s profitability significantly hinges on
its understanding of the (dis)utility its customers associate with green product
variants. We show, via numerical examples, that underestimating the naturalites’
(conventionals’) marginal utility (dis-utility) for a green variant with more
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recycled/reused content yield unintended demand segmentation consequences with
adverse implications for both firm profits and the environment.
Bridge to Next Chapter
In this chapter, we looked at the role of consumer’s contrasting perception
on quality and how that affects a firm’s decision on what product(s) to offer and
at what quality and price points to ultimately increase profits. Thus the optimal
prices and marketing strategy are a direct function of consumer’s viewpoint of
(green) quality. In next chapter, we keep the quality fixed and instead study the
pricing problem of a firm from a different angle: timing. Specifically, we analyze
two pricing tactics that differ from each other only in timing of offering the rewards
and we investigate how rational customers react to the time of receiving a discount
and how that influences the ultimate profitability.
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CHAPTER III
DELAYED VS. IMMEDIATE PRICE DISCOUNTS
This work was submitted to the journal of Management Science with co-
authorship of Dr. Michael Pangburn.
Introduction
Retail promotion tactics come in many forms, including examples such as
coupons, quantity discounts, and bundling. Promotions typically relate not only
to what is purchased, but also when. Regarding the timing of discounts, the most
common practice is to offer limited-duration sales, or incremental markdown prices
over time (e.g., for clearance items). Another promotion scheme that we see in
practice is to give consumers a discount that is not limited to specific products and
times, but rather is a long-term promotion based on consumers’ spending across all
products. Such so-called “rewards programs” have become prominent in the retail
sector. The primary differentiating characteristics of such programs is that they are
generally ongoing and relate to spending across all products rather than specific
on-sale products. In practice, most rewards programs are implemented such that
the calculated discounts are not redeemable immediately, but rather only against
a future purchase. For example, REI offers a 10% rewards rate, but the earned
credit cannot be redeemed until the following year. In contrast with such delayed
discounts, some rewards programs offer instantaneous discounts, such as the Target
REDCard rewards card, which gives shoppers a 5% immediate discount off their
current spending, irrespective of specifics regarding item prices and sales. The fact
that, in practice, most spending-level based discounts are of the delayed type begs
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the question: why? Addressing this question is our focus. One possible explanation
is that consumers may be irrational and thus feel locked in once having earning
credit, or ascribe value to credit they may forget to redeem. In contrast, in this
paper, we seek to investigate ongoing spending-level based discounts while assuming
rational consumers, and determine under what conditions delaying such discounts
may be preferable.
Delayed credit is often referred to as “points” which have some dollar-value
equivalence. For example, Jamba Juice customers earn one “point” per dollar of
spending, where 35 points yields a $3 discount, thus reflecting an approximate
10% delayed discount. Although there are nuanced varieties of points programs
(e.g., points becoming active at certain thresholds, expiring at a particular time, or
applying only in trade towards selected products and services), we consider settings
where customers earn credit at some rate based on their spending, with that credit
being available either now (instantaneous discounts) or later (delayed discounts).
We will explore whether there may exist a possible motivation, rooted in rational
consumer behavior, for offering delayed discounts.
From an individual consumer’s perspective, receiving a certain discount in
the future is naturally less desirable than receiving it now, due to the time value
of money. However, for the same reason, the firm may be willing to increase
the discount when it is delayed. If consumers rationally assess the (lower) value
of delayed credit, which in turn may induce the firm to set a higher discount
percentage, it is unclear whether there is a net advantage to be gained by delaying
the discounts. Yet, the tactic remains popular in practice. An intriguing potential
source of value from delayed discounts stems from the (endogenous) flexibility of
consumers’ inter-purchase intervals. For example, with delayed credit, customers
who opt to wait for sales will not only earn less credit, but the value of that credit
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will be further reduced (via time discounting) due to the time delays associated
with waiting for sales. Thus, with delayed credit specifically, different customers
may face distinct net prices at the same point in time, depending on their purchase
history—yielding a form of behavior-based price discrimination.
As the above discussion highlights, delayed discounts can yield two interesting
effects: (i) higher initial net prices (both for the firm and consumers), and (ii)
consumer behavior-dependent price levels. The latter of these two effects is relevant
in particular when consumers’ spending varies over time. To isolate the impact
of the first effect and establish a baseline case, we will first analyze a scenario in
which consumers have a consistent level of spending with the retailer over time. We
subsequently consider the impact of fluctuating spending over time, which could
arise for example if the firm offers sporadic sales.
If spending is consistent over time, we will establish that neither the delayed
discount (DD) nor instantaneous discount (ID) policy has an advantage in
extracting profit from rational consumers. More specifically, we show that for any
particular choice of instantaneous discount, there exists a corresponding upwardly-
scaled delayed discount that yields equivalent performance. We show this is true
whether the firm targets each customer with the best possible (i.e., customized)
discount percentage, or, as would typically be the case in practice, the firm sets a
single discount percentage which applies to a heterogeneous market.
We subsequently consider scenarios in which consumer spending fluctuates
between high and low levels, which we refer to as the regular and reduced levels.
Given such spending fluctuations, the DD policy expands the number of pertinent
net price states from two to six, and three optimal customer segments endogenously
emerge: (i) sales shoppers, (ii) regular shoppers, and (iii) transition shoppers (i.e.,
customers who transition from sales- to regular-shopping). With instantaneous
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discounts, only the first two of these optimal behaviors apply. We then prove that
if a firm can target each consumer with their optimal discount percentage, then the
DD and ID policies’ profits are equivalent (as was true with consistent spending)
except for the transition segment, from which the DD policy can extract greater
profit. Given that the size of the transition segment may be small or zero, we
can conclude that if the discount percentage can be optimally personalized (i.e.,
targeted) to individual consumers, there is limited or no incremental value to be
gain by delaying discounts. However, such personalized pricing (a la first degree
price discrimination) may not be feasible in practice.
The most applicable case in practice is therefore a setting in which consumers
are heterogeneous, with varied spending, and the firm cannot personalize the
discount level to each. And, interestingly, we will show that it is in precisely
such settings that delayed discounts provide greatest value. We prove not only
is the firm’s optimal discount level higher when delayed, but also that the higher
(delayed) discount level enables the firm to extract higher aggregate profit from
the heterogeneous market. We also use a series of numeric experiments to illustrate
the extent to which the optimal discount percentage and resulting profits increase
under the DD regime. Interestingly, we find that in most cases the DD policy
simultaneously increases both profit and aggregate consumer surplus.
We also assess whether the DD policy’s profits are robust to changes in
the firm’s choice of the discount percentage. We show that even if the discount
percentage is set suboptimally, delayed discounts continue to yield a profit
advantage in most instances. Finally, we consider whether our key results hold
if we change from stochastic to deterministic spending variations. Analyzing a
particular deterministic pattern of prices, we arrive at the same findings: delayed
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discounts optimally yield both a higher discount level and profit, if the delayed
discount applies to a heterogeneous market with varied spending.
Literature Review
As defined by Caillaud and De Nijs (2014), “Behavior-based price
discrimination (BBPD) is a very simple form of price discrimination that consists
of offering different prices to different customers according to their past purchase
history.” An overview of the BBPD literature is presented by Fudenberg and Villas-
Boas (2006). In this literature, some papers study equilibrium pricing strategies in
a duopoly context, while others analyze pricing for a single firm—as we do in this
paper. Delayed price discounts imply a form of BBPD because the net price paid in
a given period by a customer depends on the amount of their credit, which in turns
depends on purchase history.
The primary focus of the BBPD literature is on stratifying consumers based
on their initial purchase choices, and then adjusting prices accordingly. The BBPD
literature has focused on two-periods models spanning both monopoly (Acquisti
and Varian (2005), Conitzer et al. (2012), Gandomi and Zolfaghari (2013), and
Ching-Jen (2014)) and duopoly (Zhang et al. (2000), Kim et al. (2001), Pazgal
and Soberman (2008), Chen and Zhang (2009), Esteves (2010), Zhang (2011),
and Mehra et al. (2012)) settings. In the two-period duopoly context, Singh
et al. (2008) observe numerically that a firm offering a second period discount for
returning customers can coexist in equilibrium with a firm that does not. Villas-
Boas (2004) and Caillaud and De Nijs (2014) consider an infinite horizon and
assume that each customer purchases at most twice. In contrast, to assess the value
of delayed versus instantaneous discounts, we must allow for the possibility of more
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than a single follow-up purchase, because the value of delayed discounts accrue over
an extended purchase history with the firm.
A common assumption in the BBPD literature is that a firm can charge
different customers different prices for the same product (Aydin and Ziya (2009)),
even in the same period. Personalized pricing (i.e., first degree price discrimination)
is problematic in practice because a firm risks alienating those consumers who are
targeted with higher prices. If a firm attempts to give discounts specifically to new
customers, for example, then past consumers may effectively mask their identity
and thus appear to be new visitors (Acquisti and Varian (2005) and Conitzer et al.
(2012)). The delayed discount tactic we analyze in this paper does not suffer from
this consumer anonymization concern, because consumers benefit from establishing
their purchase history. And, although the resulting net prices are purchase-history
dependent, the same publicly posted prices apply uniformly to all customers, which
addresses fairness concerns that relate to first degree price discrimination.
Although the existing literature contrasting instantaneous with delayed
discounts is quite limited, Chen et al. (2005) have shown, assuming a consumers’
utility changes post-purchase, that post-sale rebates can yield higher profits than
coupons. To the extent that a rebate may be viewed as a form of delayed discount,
with coupons being an instantaneous discount, our analytic results provide further
evidence of the value from delay. We establish the comparison, however, without
limiting consumers to a single purchase, and our findings do not require the post-
purchase change in consumer utility. Zhang et al. (2000) categorize coupons and
rebates as “front-loaded” versus “rear-loaded” discounts, and use empirical evidence
to support that up-front discounts tend to increase sales, yet, “from a profitability
perspective, rear-loaded promotions may be better than front-loaded promotions.”
Interestingly, the theoretical results stemming from our analytic model also lend
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support to these two empirically-motivated points, i.e., that delaying discounts has
the potential to: (i) lower sales, while (ii) increasing profit. Moreover, our results
support these findings for any exogenous (high and low) values for consumers’
varied spending levels (or, equivalently, for a single-product firm, any given
high/low price levels that define the firm regular/sale prices).
Delayed and Instantaneous Rewards with Static Pricing
Consider a market of consumers who may revisit a firm across successive
time periods to make a series of purchases of its service (e.g., lunch or dinner at
a restaurant) or product (e.g. a perishable good that a customer might repurchase).
In any time period t that a purchase occurs, the customer gains some utility value
v. We assume each consumer will make at most one purchase (i.e., one unit) in any
given period. Let R denote the full retail (pre-discount) price for the firm’s service
or product. We consider R to be exogenous (e.g., MSRP), but ultimately the prices
paid by customers will be endogenous, as the retailer sets its applicable discount.
Let xt ∈ {0, 1} denote a consumer’s binary purchase decision in period t. The
(endogenous) net purchase price is R minus any applicable discount. We express
the firm’s variable cost parameter c as a fraction (WLOG) of the firm’s regular
price, yielding a unit cost of cR. Similarly, we express the firm’s discount level,
which we denote as α, as a fraction (again, WLOG) of the price R. Therefore, a
customer receives a discount equal to αR when making a purchase in the amount
of R. We will often refer to the discount as a “spending reward” rather than price
discount, because we contrast the alternatives of simply applying αR immediately
with the alternative of giving αR in credit to apply against a future purchase. We
refer to these alternatives, which are the focus of our study, as the delayed and
instantaneous discounting policies, defined in Table 1. In practice, some retailers
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base delayed rewards on post-discount spending (i.e., α(R − αR) = (α − α2)R,
whereas others (e.g., Orbitz) use pre-discount spending (i.e., simply αR). Given
that α is small, these two are nearly equivalent, and so we apply the latter. Under
TABLE 3. Delayed versus instantaneous discount policies
Discounting
policy Notation Discount form
Instantaneous ID Immediate discount αIR applied to customer’s
current purchase.
Delayed DD “Reward” (credit) αDR applied to customer’s
next purchase.
the immediate discounts (ID) policy a customer enjoys an α-percent discount on
each purchase, whereas under the delayed discounts (DD) policy a customer gains
α-percent of their current purchase amount in credit towards their next purchase
as is not uncommon in practice, the firm automatically logs and applies the credit).
For example, with a fixed discount percentage α = 10%, an R = $150 purchase
yields $15 in credit, where under ID that credit applies immediately, but under DD
it applies to the consumer’s next purchase—i.e., a subsequent purchase is required
to redeem credit. For this baseline model with consistent spending, we will prove
that equivalent profits and consumer surplus are achievable, irrespective of whether
the consumer market is homogeneous or heterogeneous, provided the firm offers a
suitably larger delayed discount percentage.
Optimal consumer shopping behaviors
Tackling the DD policy first, consider a representative consumer with
valuation v corresponding to per-period spending level R. Such a customer realizes
a net surplus of v − R initially, earning credit in the amount of αDR, where we let
αD denote the firm’s choice of (delayed) discount percentage. That discount will
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apply to any subsequent purchase, which will thus yield an associated net surplus
of v − R + αDR. Given the two feasible credit states (αDR and 0) and two actions
(buy or not) at each, there are four potential shopping behaviors. Two of these
behaviors are that a customer may be a “regular shopper” (i.e., xt = 1 ∀t) or
not shop at all (xt = 0 ∀t). The other two potential behaviors are, respectively,
suboptimal and infeasible: buying only when having zero credit, or only when
having credit (this is infeasible because credit is earned via buying).
For the DD policy, the following two simultaneous equations define the net
present value V (α) of surplus for a regular shopper who experiences a discount
level of α. We denote the time discount factor as β ∈ (0, 1), and V (0) expresses a
customer’s surplus NPV from the time of initial purchase, at which point there is
no earned credit.
V (0) = v −R + βV (αD)
V (αD) = v −R + αDR + βV (αD)
⇒ VD(αD) ≡ V (0) = v −R(1− αDβ)1− β (3.1)
As shown at right within (3.1), we denote the consumer surplus NPV as VD(αD).
Similarly, under the ID policy, with its (potentially) distinct discount level αI , we
let VI(αI) denote the corresponding consumer surplus NPV. For the ID policy the
αI discount applies to each purchase, yielding the following result.
VI(αI) = v −R + αIR + βVI(αI)⇒ VI(αI) = v −R(1− αI)
1− β (3.2)
The assumption that “regular shopping” corresponds to purchase in every period,
as opposed to sporadically, is WLOG. More specifically, the following lemma proves
that to accommodate sporadic periods of shopping inactivity (or disinterest, e.g.,
v = 0), we need only downwardly adjust the time discount factor accordingly.
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Lemma 3
If a consumer has probability λ < 1 of visiting the firm in a period, then
to account for the possibility of inactivity periods the discount factor β
must be adjusted as βˆ ≡ βλ/(1− (1− λ)β).
For all proofs of propositions and lemmas, see Appendix B. Although we will
continue to use the terminology regular shopping, we can simply set β = βˆ
(decreasing in 1 − λ) to allow for sporadic periods in which regular shoppers are
unavailable to shop.
Profit comparison for the DD and ID policies
We now wish to assess whether instituting a delayed discount on
consumer spending should enable a firm to extract greater value than the
more straightforward alternative of offering an instantaneous discount. For
a representative customer and discount level α, v − R + αR expresses the
surplus resulting from a purchase, whereas the firm’s corresponding profit gain
is R − cR − αR. Analyzing profits for the DD and ID policies results in two
simultaneous recursive equations for the DD policy, as in (3.1), and one for the
ID case, as in (3.2) above. Letting piD(αD) and piI(αI) denote the respective profit
NPVs for the DD and ID policies, we thus derive the DD and ID policies’ profit
NPVs piD(αD) = R(1 − αDβ − c)/(1 − β) and piI(αI) = R(1 − αI − c)/(1 − β). We
next establish an equivalence between these profits.
Proposition 5
When consumer spending is consistent over time, delayed and
instantaneous discounts yield equivalent value to both the firm and
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consumers: VD(αD) = VI(αI) and piD(αD) = piI(αI), if (and only if)
the firm sets αD = αI/β.
Proposition 5 proves that both a (rational) consumer and firm are indifferent
between an immediate discount percentage αI and a correspondingly larger delayed
discount αD = αI/β. We assume equal time discounting for the firm and consumer,
because if consumers were relatively insensitive to time delays (i.e., had higher β
than the firm), then naturally delayed discounts would be advantageous. Given
that αI is typically much less than one, and β is near one, we generally have αD <
1 in practice, although it is not a requirement. (For example, αD > 1 is akin to a
bank giving back principal plus interest on loaned money, which is viable only given
a sufficiently low time discount factor and firm costs.)
Although Proposition 5 was derived for a representative consumer with
valuation v, its equivalence result extends naturally to a setting in which consumers
are heterogeneous in v, such as, without loss of generality, v ∈ [0, 1]. Given
heterogeneity, consumers will self-select (optimally) to become regular shoppers
if and only if VD(αD) ≥ 0 and VI(αI) ≥ 0, which implies valuations satisfying
v ≥ R(1 − αDβ) = vD(αD) and v ≥ R(1 − αI) = vI(αI), respectively. Leveraging
αD = αI/β from Proposition 5, we see that the resulting consumer purchasing
thresholds vD(αD) and vI(αI) coincide. As the following proposition shows, the
aggregate profits (piD(αD)[1− vD(αD)] and piI(αI)[1− vI(αI)]) also match.
Proposition 6
Given static pricing, the correspondence αD = αI/β also implies
equivalent profits for a market of heterogeneous consumers.
Taken together, the above two propositions show that irrespective of whether
the consumer market is homogeneous or heterogeneous, if consumers are forward
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looking and have consistent spending over time, then delayed and instantaneous
discounts achieve equal performance. Note that the mapping between αI and αD
holds for arbitrary values (i.e., αD = αI/β) and therefore also applies at optimal
values of both. Similarly, we need not optimize over the (MSRP) price level R,
as this comparison of instantaneous and delayed discounts holds generally for any
R, not only at some specific (e.g., optimized) value. Intuitively, their equivalence
holds because delaying discounts yields higher initial profits by (optimally) luring
consumers with the promise of subsequent higher discounts—which in turn reduce
later net revenues. However, in the next section, we will show that the two policies
are not equivalent when individual consumers’ spending fluctuates in time.
Delayed and Instantaneous Rewards Given Sporadic Sales
In this section we consider a generalized setting that exemplifies practical
settings in which the firm’s prices and thus consumers’ spending varies over time.
In practice, spending per customer may fluctuate due to having consumers with
varying service needs (e.g., visiting a restaurant for both lunch and dinner over
time), or the same service or product with varying high/low (sale) prices over time.
We consider the latter setting, denoting the firm’s sale frequency as 1 − γ, and the
regular and sale prices as R and r, respectively. Thus, in period t, the price Pt is as
follows.
Pt =
 R with prob. γr with prob. 1− γ. (3.3)
While we take the policy of fluctuating between regular and sale prices as given,
motivated by practice, such a policy also finds support in the literature (Cachon
and Feldman 2015). Moreover, we later show in section 6 that the insights we
next derive for a stochastic spending sequence are consistent with those stemming
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from a deterministic sequence. As in the prior section, our goal is to establish a
comparison of delayed versus instantaneous discounts not only for particular (e.g.,
optimized) values of R or r, but rather more generally for any R and sale price
r(< R).
We denote the realization of Pt at time t as pt, so pt is the posted price (i.e.,
pre-discount) that is in effect in period t. Naturally, if the firm had the flexibility
to optimize its prices {pt}∞t=1, then there would be no purpose for further discounts.
Therefore, we take the “posted prices” R and r as given, and then apply either the
delayed or instantaneous discount tactic. The firm optimizes the corresponding
discount level (α∗D or α
∗
I), thus making the final prices that consumers pay over
time endogenous.
In each period, consumers face the choice of deciding whether to purchase at
R or r (depending on whether a sale is in effect), or to not purchase. If sales are
sufficiently frequent (i.e., with low enough γ), a customer may strategically wait for
sales whenever the regular price R is in effect. Consistent with the prior section,
and as may apply when purchasing a service or perishable product which cannot
be stockpiled, we assume a consumer’s purchase decision is binary in each period,
xt ∈ {0, 1}. The three potential per-period spending levels are thus R, r, or zero.
Consistent with the assumption that the reduced spending level r reflects a price
reduction rather than the firm lowering its service- or product-quality, we assume
that each consumer’s type v ∈ [0, 1] is stable over time and the firm’s variable cost
is cR. (Assuming instead that the firm’s variable cost varies between cR and cr
would add complexity without additional insight.)
Under the DD policy, if kt denotes the spending-reward discount applied to
a purchase at time t, then k1 = 0 and each subsequent kt stems from period t −
1. For the ID policy, the discount kt at time t is simply αpt. For a representative
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consumer with purchase decisions {xt}∞t=1, the evolution of discounts for the DD
and ID policies proceed, for t = 1, 2, 3..., as follows.
kt+1 =
 kt xt = 0αpt xt = 1 for DD (3.4) kt =
 0 xt = 0αpt xt = 1 for ID (3.5)
Conveniently, using the appropriate definition for kt (delayed versus instantaneous)
from (3.4) or (3.5), the following formulation defines the firm’s decision problem,
which is to determine the optimal corresponding discount level α—i.e., α∗D and α
∗
I ,
respectively.
max
0≤α≤1
EPt pi(α, kt)
where
pi(α, kt) = xt(pt − kt − cR) + βEPtpi(α, kt+1) (3.6)
s.t. {xt}∞t=1 = argmax
xt∈{0,1}
V (kt) = xt(v − pt + kt) + βEPtV (kt+1) (3.7)
This formulation extends our analyses from the prior section to accommodate
sporadic sales. The firm thus maximizes the expected profit (3.6) it can extract
from a representative consumer with type v—we later extend to heterogeneous
consumer types—who makes purchase decisions in each period to maximize future
expected surplus (3.7). Although we denote the consumer’s initial arrival period
as time t = 1 for convenience, the consumer could arrive in any arbitrary period
without impacting our subsequent analysis. If multiple consumers arrive across
distinct time periods, then this formulation reflects the optimal per-customer NPV
the firm can extract from each, discounted back to their respective arrival times.
To determine whether delayed discounts can benefit the firm, we first must
solve the consumer subproblem (3.7), which requires analyzing the potentially
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distinct optimal shopping behaviors that result from the DD and ID credit
evolutions (3.4) and (3.5). In the next three subsections, we: (i) analyze consumers’
optimal shopping behaviors, (ii) understand how consumers self-select between
those behaviors based on their specific type v, and (iii) identify the firm’s
corresponding optimal choice of α. Later, in Section 3.5, we will leverage these
analyses to consider the firm’s optimal α decision for a market of heterogeneous
consumers with variable spending, where the compelling benefits of delayed
discounting ultimately emerge.
Net price states and shopping behaviors
An important implication of delaying discounts is that a greater number of
net-price states result. This implication holds the potential to enhance market
segmentation—as we will show. Given two price levels (R and r) in the current
period, coupled with three possible credit levels (corresponding to high, low, or zero
prior spending), six distinct net price states appear under DD, as detailed in Table
4. In contrast, the only two net price states in Table 4 that occur under ID are R
and r.
TABLE 4. The list of net spending states
Notation Effective price (spending) Condition
R R Zero discount, regular price
r r Zero discount, reduced price
r r − αR High discount, reduced price
r r − αr Low discount, reduced price
R R− αR High discount, regular price
R R− αr Low discount, regular price
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Given the ID and DD policies’ respective two and six feasible net-spending
levels, a variety of feasible shopping behaviors can arise. Some are clearly
suboptimal, such as the behavior of shopping at regular but not at sale prices. Two
intuitive behaviors that we will establish as optimal at low and high ranges for the
consumer-type parameter v are sales shopping and regular shopping, respectively.
The former corresponds to shoppers who optimally only purchase at price r(< R);
the latter corresponds to a consumer who is also willing to shop at price R. These
two fundamental behaviors correspond to the Markov chains in Figures 5 and 6
for the ID and DD policies, respectively. In both figures, we use dashed rather
than solid transition arrows from non-purchasing states. In Figure 5(b), dashed
transition arrows stem from R, highlighting that sales shoppers choose (optimally)
to not purchase until a sale period occurs; similarly, dashed arrows exit states R
and R in Figure 6(b). Figures 6(a) and 6(b) also highlight the transient nature
of states R and r—after a consumer makes a purchase those zero-credit states no
longer arise. We also see in Figure 6(b) that the high-credit states R and r never
occur for sales shoppers.
FIGURE 5. Purchase state evolution under ID
As these Markov chains imply, there are a number of potential shopping
behaviors beyond the aforementioned sales- and regular-shopping behaviors. In
general, given that a fully specified shopping behavior must prescribe an xt ∈ {0, 1}
purchase decision in each net price state, there are 2n possible shopping behaviors,
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FIGURE 6. Purchase state evolution under DD
where n is the number of such states. Thus, 22 = 4 behaviors are possible for
ID, versus 26 = 64 for DD. The sales- and regular-shopping behaviors represent
two of these many options. If we were to model two distinct sales levels (e.g.,
normal versus clearance sales), then twelve net price states would result under DD,
implying 212 possible behaviors—albeit, the overwhelming majority of which would
be suboptimal.
Under ID, the 22 feasible behaviors are: (i) buy at neither r nor R, (ii) buy
at both r and R (regular shopping), (iii) buy at r but not R (sales shopping),
and (iv) buy at R but not r. It is clear that the last of these (buying only in
the higher price state) is suboptimal. Thus, aside from the non-buying option
(i) which we do not refer to as a buying behavior, we see that the only two non-
dominated behaviors are those that correspond to sales- and regular-shopping. For
ID, we denote sales-shopping consumers as the segment SI , and regular-shopping
consumers as the segment RI .
Under DD, we next establish that beyond the aforementioned sales- and
regular-shopping behaviors, a third optimal buying behavior emerges. This third
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behavior corresponds to consumers who initially wait for a sale but subsequently
will also purchase at price R, using their earned credit. We refer to this as
transition-shopping behavior, because the customer transitions after their first
purchase from sales-shopping to regular-shopping. For DD, we denote sales-,
regular-, and transition-shopping consumers as the segments SD, RD, and TD. The
following proposition formalizes this result.
Proposition 7
With delayed discounts, in addition to the regular- and sales-shopping
behaviors (yielding segments SD and RD), a third optimal behavior
emerges: (segment TD) consumers who transition after their initial
purchase from sales- to regular-shopping.
Thus, we find that whereas two shopping segments pertain to the ID policy, three
segments can (optimally) emerge under delayed discounts. We next consider how a
given consumer of type v optimally self-selects between these segmentation options.
Consumer segmentation and self-selection
As highlighted by the above discussion and the Markov chains in Figure 6,
characterizing a shopping behavior under delayed discounts requires specifying
a consumer’s purchase choice (xt) for the full set of six states in Table 4. So, we
introduce the notation xkp to denote a consumer’s decision corresponding to the
credit-price pair (k, p), where k ∈ {0, αr, αR} and p ∈ {r, R}. Employing the xkp
notation, we express the consumer expected surplus NPV (3.7) as:
V (kt) = xkp(v − pt + kt) + βEPtV (kt+1). (3.8)
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A full specification of a shopping behavior under DD thus corresponds to an
allocation of binary values to the elements of the matrix:
xkp ≡
 x0,r xαr,r xαR,r
x0,R xαr,R xαR,R

For behaviors B ∈ {RD, SD,TD}, the matrices xRkp, xTkp, and xSkp are as follows.
xRkp=
 1 1 1
1 1 1
 xTkp=
 1 1 1
0 1 1
 xSkp=
 1 1 1
0 0 0
 (3.9)
By applying each of these matrices to (3.8), we solve for the corresponding surplus
NPV V (0), which we denote respectively as VB(0), or simply VB for brevity. (See
Appendix B for details.) Under DD we thus obtain:
VRD ≡ VRD(0) = [v − (1− αβ)(βr + βγ(R− r) + (1− β)R]/(1− β), (3.10)
VTD ≡ VTD(0) = β[v − (1− αβ)(r + βγ(R− r)]/(1− β), and (3.11)
VSD ≡ VSD(0) = β[v − r(1− αβ)]/(1− β), (3.12)
where β = β(1 − γ)/(1 − βγ). We then employ (3.10), (3.11) and (3.12) to
determine the valuation thresholds vRD(α), vRD(α) and vTD(α) which determine
consumers’ self-selection of a shopping behavior B ∈ {RD, SD,TD}. We thus find,
as we summarize next, how consumers self-select their shopping behavior based on
their type (v).
– B = RD,∀v : VRD ≥ max{VTD , VSD}, yielding v ≥ R(1 − αβ) = vRD(α).
We can intuitively explain this threshold by noting that a regular shopper’s
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initial outlay is R and the resulting credit gain αR is discounted by β because
it applies in the next period.
– B = TD,∀v : VTD ≥ max{VRD , VSD}, yielding R − αr − αβ(R − r) =
vTD(α) ≤ v ≤ vRD(α). We can explain this threshold by recognizing that
when transitioning to regular shopping, a customer’s outlay is R − αr and the
resulting credit gain α(R − r) has an associated discount factor β as it applies
in the next period.
– B = SD, ∀v : VSD ≥ max{VTD , 0}, yielding r − αβr = vSD(α) ≤ v ≤ vTD(α).
This result also has an intuitive interpretation. A sales shopper’s initial
outlay is r and the resulting credit gain αr is applicable in some uncertain
future sale period. The exact discount factor between two subsequent sale
periods is
∑∞
t=1 β
t(1− γ)γt−1 = β(1− γ)/(1− βγ) ≡ β.
Consumers of type v < vSD(α) do not participate (shop) because for such customers
even sales shopping does not generate positive expected surplus.
We now follow the same approach (details in Appendix B) for the ID policy
to obtain the consumer surplus NPV functions VRI and VSI for regular- and sales-
shopping with instantaneous discounts.
VRI = [v − (1− α)(R− β(1− γ)(R− r))]/(1− β), and (3.13)
VSI = β(1− γ)(v − (1− α)r)/(1− β). (3.14)
In turn, depending on a consumer’s type v, their optimal buying behavior will be:
– B = RI ,∀v : VRI ≥ VSI , yielding v ≥ R(1− α) = vRI (α), or
– B = SI ,∀v : VSI ≥ max{VRI , 0}, yielding r(1− α) = vSI (α) ≤ v ≤ vRI (α).
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Notice that under ID regular shopping requires v ≥ R(1 − α) = vRI (α), whereas
transition shopping (with DD) requires v ≥ R−αr−αβ(R− r) = vTD(α). It is thus
easy to show that vRI (α) < vTD(α) holds. For a given (fixed) α, Figure 7 illustrates
the consumer segmentation structure for both the DD and ID alternatives. Given
our understanding of how a consumer type v maps optimally to a particular
shopping behavior, we next address the firm’s problem of optimizing the reward
level (α) for any specific consumer type.
FIGURE 7. Valuation thresholds and market segmentation under DD and ID
Optimal targeted (consumer specific) spending rewards
For any shopping behavior, profit is highest for the lowest α percentage that
behavior will abide, i.e., α∗B = argminα{vB(α) : vB(α) ≤ v}. Setting v = vB(α) in
each case yields the following optimal discount percentages for ID and DD.
α∗I ∈
 αRI = (R− v)/RαSI = (r − v)/r
(3.15)
α∗D ∈

αRD = (R− v)/(βR)
αTD = (R− v)/(r + β(R− r))
αSD = (r − v)/(βr)
(3.16)
Together, (3.15) and (3.16) imply αRD > αTD > αRI and αSD > αSI . Therefore,
intuitively and congruent with Proposition 5, we see that when delaying discounts
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the firm optimally compensates consumers by setting a higher percentage. We
can also see from (3.15) and (3.16) that the optimal delayed discount is a scaling
of the corresponding instantaneous percentage, such that αRD = αRI/β and
αSD = αSI/β. The scaling is larger for sales shoppers because they wait longer
than regular shoppers, on average, before redeeming their credit. In essence, the
firm additionally compensates consumers who are less certain of redeeming their
credit soon. In contrast with Proposition 5, we will show that the resulting profits
are not necessarily equivalent, specifically for consumers who adopt the transition
shopping behavior.
By alternately applying xRkp, x
T
kp or x
S
kp to (3.6), we obtain (details in
Appendix B) the expected profit NPV for the corresponding shopping behavior
B ∈ {RD, SD,TD}. For each such behavior B, we denote the corresponding profit
as EpiB(α) ≡ EpiB(α, 0), yielding the following results.
EpiRD(α) ≡ EpiRD(α, 0) = [(γR + (1− γ)r)(1− αβ)− cR]/(1− β). (3.17)
EpiTD(α) ≡ EpiTD(α, 0) =
(1− γ)[(βγR + (1− βγ)r)(1− αβ)− cR]
(1− βγ)(1− β) . (3.18)
EpiSD(α) ≡ EpiSD(α, 0) =
(1− γ)[r(1− αβ)− cR]
(1− βγ)(1− β) . (3.19)
Following the same approach (details in Appendix B) , we can derive the expected
profits pertaining to regular- and sales-shopping segments under the ID policy,
yielding:
EpiRI (α) =
((1− γ)r + γR)(1− α)− cR
1− β , and EpiSI (α) =
(1− γ)(r − αr − cR)
1− β .
(3.20)
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Applying results (3.15) and (3.16), we next establish that if a consumer is optimally
targeted as either a regular or sales shopper, then equivalent profits result.
Proposition 8
If the DD and ID policies optimally target a consumer of type v, then
the regular- and sales-shopping behaviors yield identical profits, i.e.,
EpiRD(αRD) = EpiRI (αRI ) = ((v/R)((1− γ)r + γR)− cR)/(1− β), and
EpiSD(αSD) = EpiSI (αSD) = (1− γ)(v − cR)/(1− β).
In contrast, we next show that if the consumer type v is such that transition
shopping is optimal, then the delayed and instantaneous discounts do not generally
yield equivalent profits.
Proposition 9
Given γ > γ¯ = βR+r(1−2β)
β(2βR+r(1−2β)) , transition shopping increases the firm’s
profits for consumers of type v ∈ (vTS, vTR).
In the prior section we found that with consistent consumer spending delaying
discounts does not increase profits. Here, we see that with fluctuating spending,
the increase in segmentation options under DD can increase profits. Moreover, the
sufficient condition on γ in this proposition is relatively mild, and thus holds for
typical parameter settings. Note that for a typical β > 1/2, this ratio is of the form
x−a
β(2x−a) , with x > a > 0; thus, given typical β close to 1, this ratio is below one half,
often significantly so. The range of transition shoppers (v ∈ (vTS, vTR)) is generally
quite small or zero. For example, with R = 0.9, r = 0.6, β = 0.8, c = 0.5 and
γ = 0.7, the range v ∈ (vTS, vTR) is only (0.49,0.54) and even for modest parameter
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perturbations will cease to exist (e.g., if γ < 0.60, r < 0.55, or c > 0.55). This
result is significant primarily because it establishes that with fluctuating spending,
delaying credit is not necessarily “a wash” relative to instant discounts. With this
understanding, we may expect to find further support for the value of delayed
discounts in practice when we extend our analysis to a heterogeneous market.
Consumer surplus analysis
If a regular or sales shopper is targeted by the firm with their respectively
optimal discount percentages, we established that DD and ID profits are equivalent.
The following lemma establishes a parallel result for surplus.
Lemma 4
For both the regular- and sales-shopping behaviors, the same NPV of
consumer surplus results from the DD and ID policies, if each targets
the consumer optimally (i.e., with the optimal discount level).
We also know from Proposition 9 that the firm can extract greater profit from
transition shoppers. We might thus expect consumer surplus in that case to drop,
but the following lemma establishes that the corresponding change in consumer
surplus can also be positive.
Lemma 5
Consumer surplus from transition-shopping behavior can be higher or
lower under the DD policy. Specifically, surplus increases under DD
(relative to ID) for v ∈ (vTS, vRISI ), but decreases for v ∈ (vRISI , vTR).
In conjunction with Proposition 9, Lemma 5 shows that the DD policy can increase
both profit and surplus simultaneously. As we show in the next section, this finding
extends to a heterogeneous market as well.
63
Heterogeneous Market with Varied Spending
In subsection 3.4, we assume the firm could target each consumer type v with
the correspondingly optimal (i.e., consumer-type specific) discount percentage,
but in this section we consider the common practice of setting a percentage
to apply consistently across all customers (such as the 5% and 10% levels in
the aforementioned Target and REI examples). Therefore, we now assume a
market of consumers who are heterogeneous in their type v, such that values of
v are dispersed over the interval [0, 1] (this interval choice is WLOG). For the
heterogeneous market, we denote the optimal discount percentages for the DD and
ID policies as α∗D and α
∗
I , respectively.
To determine the firm’s profit we must weight the NPV of profit derived from
each potential shopping-behavior by the corresponding number of shoppers who
self-select into that segment. For the DD policy and a corresponding choice of
α, we can thus express the total expected discounted profits under DD from the
regular, transition, and sales segments as follows.
EpiD(α) = (1−vRD(α))EpiRD(α)+(vRD(α)−vTD(α))EpiTD(α)+(vTD(α)−vSD(α))EpiSD(α).
(3.21)
Likewise, for the ID policy and its two induced segments, we have:
EpiI(α) = (1− vRI (α))EpiRI (α) + (vRI (α)− vSI (α))EpiSI (α). (3.22)
Substituting the valuation thresholds from subsection 3.4 and the expected profit
NPV terms from (3.17) through (3.20) in the above two functions, we can show
that d2EpiD(α)/dα
2 < 0 and d2EpiI(α)/dα
2 < 0, and hence the aggregate expected
profit functions are (strictly) concave in α. Because the profit functions (3.21) and
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(3.22) are well behaved, we can apply first-order conditions (dEpiI(α)/dα = 0 and
dEpiD(α)/dα = 0) to determine their respective optimal discount percentages.
Denoting those optimal values as α∗D and α
∗
I , we find:
α∗I =
γR(2R− 1) + (1− γ)r(2r − 1)− cR(γR + (1− γ)r)
2 (γR2 + (1− γ)r2) , and (3.23)
α∗D =
γR(2R− 1) + (1− γ)r(2R(1− h1) + 2h1r − 1)− cR(γR + (1− γ)r)
2 (βγR2 + βRh3r + (1− γ)h2r2) , (3.24)
where h1 =
1−γ
1−βγ , h2 = h1
(1−β)2γ
1−γ + βh
2
1, and h3 = 2(1 − β)γh1. We see from the
above expressions that α∗I is independent from the time discount factor β, which
is intuitive given that under ID consumers are not waiting for the discount. In
contrast, α∗D depends on β. We next establish by comparing the optimal α
∗
I and
α∗D percentages that the optimal delayed discount percentage is indeed higher.
Proposition 10
When fixing a single discount percentage with which to serve the
heterogeneous market, the firm optimally sets α∗D ≥ α∗I . In the absence
of time discounting (β = 1), the inequality binds.
We intuitively anticipate this ordering for the discounts, but we next also prove
that the delayed spending rewards also increase total profit, under the sufficient
condition that c exceeds a lower threshold we denote as cM (as we later discuss,
this threshold is typically negative, so c > cM is a very mild condition.)
Proposition 11
For the heterogeneous market with fluctuating consumer spending,
EpiD(α
∗
D) ≥ EpiI(α∗I), for c > cM . At β = 1, the expected profits
match.
65
To better understand this result, it is helpful to first consider the case of no
time discounting, as it is easy to verify that α∗I = α
∗
D when β = 1. And, logically, in
that case, all active customers should view delayed and instant credit identically—
i.e., when there is no time discounting, delay can yield no segmentation power and
segment TD is empty. As β drops below 1, delay begins to provide segmentation
flexibility via its greater number (six versus two) of implied price states, and TD
emerges as an optimal purchasing policy via consumer self-selection. DD profits
then begin to dominate those of ID, and the DD policy increases α∗D to compensate
for the now-present time value of money. As α increases, under DD the relative
appeal of waiting for sales (i.e., being a sales shopper) decreases, due to the larger
credit amounts consumers can apply to their purchases. The relatively large α for
the DD policy thus reduces dilution risk, which in turn helps support higher profit.
Assessing the magnitude of DD profit gains
We next use a set of numeric experiments to assess the magnitude of the
profit gain implied by Proposition 11, as well as associated consumer surplus
repercussions. In these experiments, we adjust each of the problem parameters both
upwards and downwards, starting from the following baseline parameter values. We
set the baseline regular spending level (the full price before any discounts) R = 0.9,
with a reduced (sale) price r = 0.6. We set the baseline γ = 0.5, i.e., the firm
will offer a sale in every other period, on average. We assume a baseline cost factor
c = 0.5, so the regular price R reflects 100% mark-up above the firm’s cost cR.
We use β = 0.8 as the baseline time discount factor. For these five parameters,
we alternately adjust their values by ±0.2. In Table 5 we report the corresponding
optimal results, including: (i) the α∗D and α
∗
I values from (3.23) and (3.24), (ii)
segment-specific demands, denoted by DB where B ∈ {R,T, S}, (iii) the profit
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increase from DD relative to ID, and (iv) the surplus increase from DD relative to
ID. The sufficient condition c > cM in Proposition 11 holds in all the implied eleven
cases, with cM even being negative in all but two.
We previously evaluated the consumer subproblem for any given value of α,
and we now leverage that analysis to compute the aggregate expected consumer
surplus (EVB) for each of the consumer segments. For the ID policy, the aggregate
market consumer surplus is as follows.
EV ∗I =
∫ 1
vRI (α
∗
I )
EVRI (α
∗
I)dv +
∫ vRI (α∗I )
vSI (α
∗
I )
EVSI (α
∗
I)dv
Assessing the aggregate market consumer surplus for the DD policy requires
summing over its three relevant segments, but is otherwise identical in nature.
EV ∗D =
∫ 1
vRD (α
∗
D)
EVRD(α
∗
D)dv +
∫ vRD (α∗D)
vTD (α
∗
D)
EVTD(α
∗
D)dv +
∫ vTD (α∗D)
vSD (α
∗
D)
EVSD(α
∗
D)dv
Leveraging these two surplus expressions, the percentage surplus increase from DD
relative to ID is as follows.
∆EV ∗ = 100%(EV ∗D − EV ∗I )/EV ∗I
For consistency, we likewise present the profit increase from DD relative to ID in
percentage terms as follows.
∆Epi∗ = 100%(EpiD(α∗D)− EpiI(α∗I))/EpiI(α∗I)
We report the optimal profit and consumer surplus changes within the last two
columns of Table 5, which also shows the comprehensive set of results.
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TABLE 5. DD versus ID segmentation: profit and surplus comparisons
R r c β γ Case α∗ DR DT DS ∆Epi∗ ∆EV ∗
0.9 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.5
DD 11% 0.18 0.013 0.25
3.85% 5.17%
ID 7% 0.163 - 0.278
- - - 1 -
DD 7 0.163 0 0.278
0% 0%
ID 7 0.163 - 0.278
- - - 0.6 -
DD 16 0.187 0.039 0.214
6.55% 6.81%
ID 7 0.163 - 0.278
- - 0.7 - -
DD 0 0.1 0 0.3
0% 0%
ID 0 0.1 - 0.3
- - 0.3 - -
DD 24 0.277 0.029 0.191
3.55% 1.2%
ID 18 0.267 - 0.244
- - - - 0.7
DD 18 0.229 0.021 0.207
6.07% 2.48%
ID 11 0.217 - 0.261
- - - - 0.3
DD 1 0.108 0.001 0.295
0.07% 2.93%
ID 0 0.1 - 0.3
- 0.8 - - -
DD 18 0.236 0.03 0.034
1.62% -0.48%
ID 15 0.235 - 0.085
- 0.4 - - -
DD 7 0.152 0.005 0.461
17.44% 4.74%
ID 2 0.125 - 0.485
The baseline parameter settings correspond to the first row in the table.
For that base case, DD outperforms ID both in terms of the resulting profit NPV
increase ∆Epi∗ = 3.85% and the consumer surplus increase ∆EV ∗ = 5.17%. It
does so even while setting a higher discount percentage, 11% versus 7%. The first
three sets of results illustrate the impact of changing β, with β = {1, 0.8, 0.6}.
Consistent with the discussion following Proposition 11, at β = 1 we expect
identical results between DD and ID, and DD should dominate as the significance
of the time discount factor increases. The numeric results support this, showing
both increasing profit and surplus gains from DD as β drops from 1 to 0.8 and
then to 0.6. Recall from Lemma 3 that a smaller β could result from customer
inactivity periods, which we see serves to increase the profit gap in favor of the
DD policy. The results for c = 0.7 show no discounts (and hence equal profits)
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from the DD and ID policies, due to the cost being sufficiently high as to make
additional discounts suboptimal. For the case of r = 0.8 (with R = 0.9), DD yields
only minor profit increases of 1.62%, because prices change little in this case and
we established in Proposition 5 that DD offers no advantage when prices are static.
It is also interesting to observe that delayed discounts also induce a larger regular-
shopping segment and fewer customers who adopt the sales-shopping behavior and
an equal or lower total sales (the sum of the three demand columns) in six out of
nine cases.
FIGURE 8. DD versus ID profit gain, versus sales frequency
Using the same baseline parameter set in Table 5, Figure 8 illustrates ∆Epi∗
for the full range of potential sales frequency (1 − γ) values between 0 and 1. From
Table 5, we see three specific values from this curve: ∆Epi∗ = 6.07%, 3.85%, and
0.07%, corresponding to 1 − γ = 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7. Figure 8 highlights our finding
from Section 3 that when the firm’s price is static (e.g., at R when γ = 1 or at r
when γ = 0), equivalent profits result from delayed and instantaneous discounts.
And, consistent with our analysis in this section and Section 4, we see that if there
are sporadic sales, then the fluctuations in consumers’ spending allow delayed
discounts to be advantageous for the firm—and for consumers too in many cases
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as we saw in Table 5. The asymmetry in the Figure 8 curve is due to the lessening
role that additional discounting (whether DD or ID) can play as sales become very
prevalent. For example, when the sales frequency 1 − γ = 0.3 (i.e., sales occurring
30% of the time), there is evident scope for further discounting, and we see from
Table 5 that the respectively DD and ID discount levels are 18% and 11%—with
the former increasing profits by about six percent. In contrast, when the sales price
holds most of the time, with frequency 1 − γ = 0.7, Table 5 shows the optimal
DD and ID discount levels are both close to zero, since further price reductions are
not optimal. For this reason, we see that the Figure 8 curve is asymmetric, with
the DD policy exhibiting its most significant profit gains for low-to-moderate sales
frequencies.
Collectively, the results in this section motivate, even with rational
consumers and costless rewards redemption (as opposed to coupons, which
entail inconvenience), why delayed spending rewards are generally preferable to
instantaneous rewards and thus popular in practice. As we have shown, their
benefits stem from the juxtaposition the heterogeneous consumers and spending
variability—resulting, for example, from sporadic sales as we have considered.
Notably, we have shown that these benefits hold for any arbitrary values for the
regular and sale prices R and r(< R), and are not tied to specific (and thus
potentially unlikely, in practice) optimal values.
Delayed-Discounts Policy Robustness
In this section, we consider the robustness of delayed discounts by considering
two changes in conditions. First, we consider applying a suboptimal discount, e.g.,
if the optimal α is 13% but a manager rounds off that value to 10%. Second, we
will consider the implication of the price sequence being varied but deterministic.
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Under both conditions, we show that DD continues to outperform ID and optimally
set a higher reward level.
Enforcing a suboptimal discount percentage
As highlighted by the results in Table 5, the relative advantage of DD is
sometimes significant. We have thusfar, however, set the discount level α optimally.
We now consider how well the DD and ID policies perform if the firm were to
potentially employ a suboptimal α. A firm might use a suboptimal discount
percentage because: (i) the optimum is unknown, (ii) a manager applies a “round
number” (e.g., 10% versus 13%), or (iii) underlying parameters (e.g., product
MSRP, or cost) change over time but the firm holds its α choice steady.
FIGURE 9. Delayed discount strategy is a more robust pricing tactic.
The solid curves in Figure 9 (we address the dashed curves in the next
subsection) represent the DD and ID profits EpiD(α) and EpiI(α) from (3.21) and
(3.22), over a range of α. All other parameters are at their baseline values, and
we see that the solid curves reach their maximum values for α∗ values of 11% and
7%, consistent with the baseline results from Table 5. Figure 9 shows the ID profit
curve exhibits more curvature than the DD profit curve. The DD policy is more
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robust to a suboptimal α selection, yielding higher profit over the range of arbitrary
(suboptimal) α values.
Enforcing a deterministic price sequence
We next consider whether our insights regarding the DD and ID policies
change if we enforce a deterministic price pattern. For example, let us consider
the price sequence R, r,R, r, R, ..., which is a deterministic analog to the stochastic
sequence with γ = 0.5. It is straightforward to establish that the same three/two
optimal shopping behaviors remain under DD/ID, but we must re-derive the
threshold valuations that dictate consumers’ self-selection choices and the resulting
profits. For a regular shopper, the surplus NPV becomes VRD(α) = (v − R) +∑∞
i=0 β
2i(v− r+αR) +∑∞i=0 β2i+2(v−R+αr). For a transition shopper, purchasing
begins in period 2 and the surplus NPV is VTD(α) = β(v − r) +
∑∞
i=0 β
2i+2(v − R +
αr) +
∑∞
i=0 β
2i+3(v − r + αR). For a sales shopper, purchasing occurs in periods
2,4,6,..., and the surplus NPV is VSD(α) = β(v − r) +
∑∞
i=0 β
2i+3(v − r + αr).
Via the maximization of surplus NPV, we can show that a consumer will optimally
self-select to be a: (i) regular shopper if v > R(1 − αβ), (ii) transition shopper if
R(1−αβ) > v > R−αr−αβ(R−r) or (iii) sales shopper if R−αr−αβ(R−r) > v >
r−αβ2r. The first two of these thresholds are unchanged from the prior section; the
third, corresponding to sales shoppers, has changed slightly because consumers will
redeem their credit in exactly two periods. Constructing the firm’s profit NPV for
each of these shopping behaviors parallels the construction of the surplus for each.
For example, piTD(α) = β(r−cR)+
∑∞
i=0 β
2i+2(R−αr−cR)+∑∞i=0 β2i+3(r−αR−cR).
Following the same steps that led us to expression (3.21), we can formulate the
profit under DD and apply first-order conditions to find α∗D. Similarly, we then
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repeat the process to formulate the ID profit for the sequence R, r,R, r, ... and so
determine α∗I .
Lemma 6
Given deterministic and alternating spending, α∗D > α
∗
I .
We thus see that when considering a deterministic sequence, we retain our
established result that discounts are optimally larger when delayed. Within Figure
9, we use dashed lines to illustrate DD and ID profits for the price sequence
R, r,R, r, ..... We see the same two profit characteristics as held for the stochastic
problem: (i) optimal profits are higher with delayed discounts, and (ii) profits
under DD are relatively robust if the discount percentage is specified suboptimally.
Naturally, the earlier more general stochastic formulation permitted this particular
deterministic sequence as well as all other feasible sequences.
Conclusion
For a firm serving repeat customers, we have explored the potential advantage
of implementing delayed spending-level based discounts. In contrast with typical
instantaneous discounts, delayed discounts are computed based on today’s spending
but applied to a subsequent purchase. The time of that next purchase may be
uncertain due to a customer wishing to wait for sale, or simply having no need to
shop with the firm. The uncertainty regarding when earned credit will be redeemed
serves to diminish its expected value. The higher the level of earned credit, the
more likely it is that a consumer will make a subsequent purchase sooner. Because
the net price a consumer faces in the current period depends on previously earned
credit, delayed discounts induce behavior-based price discrimination (BBPD).
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From the firm’s perspective, paying out a discount later rather than sooner
is naturally appealing, all other things being equal. But, all other things are not
equal, precisely because consumers adjust their shopping behavior. We find that if
the firm opts to delay discounts, then rational consumers will react such that the
firm must (optimally) offer a higher discount level to compensate. The firm gains
initially, but over time gradually gives back that advantage over successive periods
via the higher discounts. Indeed, we begin by establishing that in settings where
consumer spending is consistent over time, delayed discounts offer no advantage.
However, by extending our analysis to consider spending variability, we find that
delayed discounts offer potential value to both the firm and consumers.
The sources of value from delayed rewards stem from the interplay of three
factors: (i) consumer heterogeneity, (ii) spending fluctuations, and, naturally, (iii)
time discounting. All three factors must be present for the delay to add value. As
we have seen, there are two distinct sources of advantage that delayed discounts
create, relative to their simpler instantaneous counterpart. First, given variable
spending, delayed rewards multiply the number of subsequent net-price states
(e.g., high/low and low/high combinations of price and credit, beyond the simple
high/high and low/low combinations resulting from instantaneous discounts).
Second, delayed rewards have distinct and higher-price states associated with
initial purchase, which leads to the emergence of “transition shopping” behavior for
consumers with moderate valuations. Using two price levels (regular retail versus
sale prices), we showed that delayed rewards yields six net spending-level states and
three consequent optimal segmentation options for consumers, versus two for each
with instantaneous discounts. As we have shown, this increase in net-price states
and corresponding segmentation options enables more effective price discrimination
and thus greater profits. Interestingly, we also showed that the broader array of
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net-price states and shopping behaviors often leads to higher consumer surplus as
well, yielding a win-win outcome for the firm and consumers.
Notably, these findings regarding the relative merit of delayed rewards do not
hinge upon an assumption that the firm’s underlying service or product prices are
set optimally. Rather, our initial results showing the equivalence of delayed rewards
(versus instant discounts) when consumers have consistent spending over time holds
for both homogeneous and heterogeneous markets, irrespective of the firm’s regular
(pre-discount) price level. Moreover, when we extended the analysis to include a
sporadic (lower) sales price, we proved the benefits from delayed rewards hold,
again, for arbitrary values of those sale and regular prices (subject to a mild cost
condition that we showed holds quite generally). To further demonstrate robustness
of these findings, in the prior section we considered enforcing suboptimal discount
levels and deterministic pricing sequences (in lieu of the earlier stochastic setting),
and again find that the greater pricing flexibility due to delayed discounts continues
to add value—stemming from, as highlighted above, the juxtaposition of time
discounting, consumer heterogeneity, and spending fluctuations. In summary,
delayed discounts offer an intriguing mechanism for leveraging behavioral based
pricing to increase profits. Our findings help motivate why firms exploit time-
lagged rewards in practice, even in the absence competitive pressures or irrational
(“locked in”) customers.
Bridge to Next Chapter
In the current chapter, the utility the customer derives from consumption of
the product/service was assumed to be known to the customer and the question
of interest was the effect of the timing of price discounts on the consumer’s and
the firm’s welfare. In the next chapter, we will focus on experience goods where
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the customer doesn’t know the true utility from the product unless the product is
consumed. In such cases, we address the pricing problem of a firm on how to set
the trial and selling prices for such a good and whether the firm should adjust the
post-trial price to encourage the customers to upgrade to a purchase after renting
the product.
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CHAPTER IV
TRY BEFORE YOU BUY PRICING
This work is in preparation for submission and is co-authored with Dr.
Michael Pangburn. The excerpt to be included is written entirely by me, while my
coauthor provided invaluable editorial assistance.
Introduction
When a durable experience product has uncertain value, the customer may
prefer to try it first–hopefully by paying a low fee–to resolve valuation uncertainty.
Offering a product in a rental mode provides this opportunity for the firm to
help the customer resolve uncertainty while extracting a positive surplus. Many
firms rent their products, as well as sell them outright. In such cases a customer
may choose to rent a product before making a potential purchase decision. After
renting, a consumer may be certain that they like the product (or not). On the
other hand, the consumption during the rental period may imply a reduction in the
subsequent consumption utility a customer can experience from the same product.
For example watching a thriller movie or a wearing a prom/wedding dress for the
second time might not be as enjoyable as the first time. To alleviate such a drop
in customers’ willingness to pay, sellers may practice behavioral-based pricing in
which they apply some or even the entire rental fee paid by the customer toward
a subsequent purchase of the product. Examples include ski gear, bike rentals,
and wine-tasting fees. However, it is also common in practice to see examples in
which firms apply no portion of the rental price towards a subsequent purchase. For
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example if you rent and then purchase a movie via the iTunes Store, the purchase
price is unaffected.
In this paper, we analyze the optimal pricing for a firm that can
simultaneously sell and rent its product, given that consumers have uncertain
product valuations. begin by analyzing a market context with homogeneous
consumers (ex ante), and then later extend the analysis to consider market
heterogeneity. We study all the possible product mode offerings (selling, renting or
both simultaneously) and then we derive the conditions under which a firm should
optimally refund some or all of its rental price to customers who subsequently
convert from renters to purchasers. The firm commits to its pre and post-trial
prices. However, customers with a rental history may face a different price
when choosing to upgrade to purchase. We prove several interesting results. We
particularly find that both price discounts and price premiums can be optimal after
the first rental. One of our interesting findings indicates a necessary condition for
conversion discounts to be optimal and that is the firm’s rent-vs.-sell cost ratio
must be less than a consumer’s rent-vs.-buy value ratio (i.e., the fraction of the
total product utility that a customer realizes from a single rental of the product).
Literature Review
Our paper relates to the literature on valuation uncertainty and consumer
learning, renting vs. selling a durable good, behavioral based-pricing, and return
policies.
Valuation uncertainty and consumer learning
We investigate a seller’s optimal pricing strategy in the presence of valuation
uncertainty. There is a strong stream of research surrounding valuation uncertainty,
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which arises due to different factors. One source of uncertainty can be explained
by the gap between time of purchase and point of consumption. For example, in
Courty and Li (2000), a customer commits to a contract when only having partial
information about their valuation (such as buying an airline ticket). Learning
occurs just prior to point of consumption and the customer can exercise the
refund term of the signed contract should he decide to withdraw from potential
consumption. Nocke et al. (2011) studies the profitability of advance-selling
discounts when consumers face uncertainty about their valuation because the time
of consumption is far ahead in the future. The monopolistic firm utilize advance-
purchase discounts to achieve price discrimination among customers based on their
expected valuations. In their model, consumers with a low expected valuation will
wait and purchase the good at the regular (non discounted) price only in the event
where their realized valuation is high. Consumers realize the true valuation when
the time of consumption arrives and they do not need to try the product to resolve
their valuation uncertainty. Bhargava and Chen (2012) also look at scenarios where
customers have uncertain valuation at the time of purchase. They show that spot
selling to informed buyers outperforms advance selling to uninformed buyers when
the market is ex ante heterogeneous. The firm can choose to help the buyers to
learn about their valuations by providing information to consumers, or giving them
time to become better informed by coming closer to the consumption date. One
of their key assumptions is that the firm (or the buyer) incurs no extra cost in
providing (or obtaining) information.
A rather large body of literature evolves around the uncertain valuation of
experience goods (Nelson (1970)). For example Jing (2011a) studies a two-period
monopoly model for a durable experience good and whether it is profitable to
invest in seller induced learning (SIL), i.e., actions a firm can take — such as
79
offering a product trial — to facilitate consumer learning. This paper analyzes
the trade off between selling early to an uninformed market and selling later to
a better-informed market. In his model, a customer only potentially (by some
probability) learns the true valuation after the first period through information
dissemination via exogenous and/or seller-induced investments.In another paper,
Jing (2011c) investigates a two-period monopoly in which late buyers potentially
discover their true valuation from the product information generated by the
early buyers, a phenomenon called social learning. Similarly, in Bonatti (2011)’s
model on selling experience goods, learning occurs on the basis of aggregate
information in the market which is increasing in the total quantity sold. Wei and
Nault (2013) analyze a version-to-upgrade strategy for information goods in which
the monopoly offers a lower quality version as a bridge for consumers to discover
their valuation through use. In their model, the customers pay a tax for learning
if they want to upgrade to the higher quality version. Xiong and Chen (2014)
investigate the role of SIL in the service/product line design (quality decision)
with consumer uncertainty and identify regimes under which SIL is charged at a
strictly positive price. They find that inducing consumer learning is profitable as
long as it completely resolves the consumers’ uncertainty. They have two consumer
types; either both or one type can face uncertainty. In our model, the uncertainty
is resolved only via consumption and the availability of a rental option can be
interpreted as sampling of a durable product which acts like a low-price SIL tool.
Selling and/or renting a durable product
There has been a long-lived debate in literature about whether, why and
how a firm might benefit from offering a durable product via selling or renting
(or both). Bulow (1982) proves leasing a durable product helps the firm to escape
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the well known time-inconsistency trap. Bhaskaran and Gilbert (2005) study
the strategy of selling and/or leasing a durable product when a complementary
good is available. Cachon and Feldman (2011) question the efficacy of per-use
renting versus subscription selling for a consumer population who are sensitive
to congestion. With and without the capacity decision, they show that despite
increasing the usage rate, subscriptions may outperform rentals. In our model,
we look at the simultaneous offering of a product in sales and rental modes. In
one of the more recent works on co-optimality of renting and selling, Gilbert
et al. (2014) highlight the trade offs between selling an information good and
renting it on a per-use basis by a monopoly firm. In their model, consumers are
heterogeneous according to their frequency of use and they receive a random
utility at each instance of need. As a result, they establish that selling and renting
serves the firm’s goal of price discrimination among consumers in two ways. In
particular, “renting allows the firm to price discriminate among the valuations that
are realized at a particular instance of time”, while “selling allows a firm to price
discriminate among consumers who vary in terms of their long-run expected utility-
per-unit-of time.” We look at offering rentals, for a durable experience good, not
only to price discriminate among consumers, but also to facilitate the resolution
of fit uncertainty through a low-cost option. In their model, the firm incurs no
production cost and an equal (transaction) cost to either rent or sell the product.
We, on the other hand, allow for distinct per-unit rental and selling costs. Also, in
their model a consumer observes his realized valuation for the product prior to each
decision to rent (similar to Cachon and Feldman (2011)), whereas in our model a
customer realizes their utility by trying the product.
The law of diminishing marginal utility associates a higher utility to the
first unit of consumption relative to second or subsequent units. In the context
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of durable digital goods such as movies and books that exhibit diminishing returns
to consumption, Rao (2015) empirically analyzes the coexistence of purchase and
rental markets. She establishes that the consumer heterogeneity in diminishing
returns motivate the co-optimality of operating in both rental and purchase
markets. Calzada and Valletti (2012)’s model is also built on the assumption that
the utility a customer receives after the first consumption (i.e., watching a movie in
theatre) drops. They however assume that the movie quality is known and rather
study the optimal release strategy (simultaneous or sequential) as a function of
the distribution channel structure. In our model, we study rentals as a learning
platform toward purchases, as well as a price discrimination tool among customers.
Behavioral-based price discrimination (BBPD)
Behavioral-based pricing refers to when a firm observes each consumer’s
purchase history and charge different prices to returning and first-time customers
starting in the second period. In an early paper in the topic of BBPD with
experience goods, Cremer (1984) finds the price of a non-durable experience good
should be lowered for second-time buyers. Jing (2011b) looks at benefits of BBPD
relative to price commitment for a non-durable experience good in a monopoly
model.De Nijs and Rhodes (2013) show that when duopolists sell experience goods,
the skewness of consumer valuations fully determines whether firms reward repeat
customer or new customers. They assume perfect market coverage. Jing (2016)
analyzes a duopoly two-period model for an experience good and finds that in
equilibrium each firm rewards repeat purchase when the probability of a high
value is relatively low and when the high-low value difference is large. Villas-Boas
(2006) develops a duopoly model of non-durable experience goods to analyze the
informational advantage a product gains by being picked first by customers. In
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our model, we look at the intersection of price commitment and behavioral-based
pricing. In other words, the firm pre-announces the second period price (i.e., post-
trial selling price) at the start of first period and there is no surprises there for the
customers.
A commonly used alternative solution to deal with uncertain valuation
is to allow for returns. The customer can return the experience good in case
it doesn’t meet his true preference and receive a refund (full or partial). The
literature on efficacy of return policies is rich. One of the early papers, Che (1996)
proves that the return policy is optimal for experience goods if the consumers are
sufficiently risk averse or retail costs are high. In one of the most recent works,
Shang et al. (2017) shed light on the phenomenon called “wardrobing” in which
some opportunistic customers may abuse the existence of return policies to use the
product for just a short period of time before returning it. In this case, the non-
zero restocking fee charged for returns resembles the rental fee in our model. In our
paper, we analyze resolving consumer uncertainty via pre-sales trials rather than
via returns, as the latter can be problematic with opportunistic customers, with
information goods (due to moral hazard) or with other products for which returns
are costly to handle (e.g., due to shipping costs or damage). In a subsequent
“Extensions” section in this chapter, Extensions section, we briefly compare a
simple return policy with try before you buy pricing and find that the latter in
fact is more efficient in extracting more consumer surplus. Therefore, our paper
considers short-term rentals as a tool to address valuation uncertainty, and we
analyze how the firm’s corresponding optimal pricing strategy can leverage BBPD.
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Model
Consider a single firm offering an experience good, for rental and/or purchase.
Customers face uncertainty regarding the value of the firm’s product. Let θV
denote the value a consumer derives from the product, where θ represents a
consumer’s known type and V refers to the uncertain product value. The true value
of V , referred to as v, is realized post-consumption. We assume a two-point discrete
distribution for V . We assume that V is realized as vh with probability of γ and vl
with probability of 1−γ (where vh > vl, WLOG) 1. We express consumer’s expected
valuation as µ, where µ = θE[V ] = θ(γvh + (1 − γ)vl). We later use the notation
v¯ ≡ γvh + (1 − γ)vl. As is typical in practice, we consider the rental period to
be sufficiently short that the discount factor can be treated as 1 and thus dropped
from the analysis.
An important consideration when renting and selling a product is that
consumers’ post-rental willingness to pay may change not only due to resolving
uncertainty, but also simply because the consumer has already used the product.
In the case of certain types of products, such as movies, this latter issue cannot
be neglected, as a customer may have significantly reduced interest in watching a
movie again, even if they found in their first viewing that they really enjoyed the
movie. Therefore, to properly model the consumer behavior, beyond incorporating
utility uncertainty, we must also consider the fraction of the product value, which
we denote as α ∈ [0, 1], consumed via the rental. High α products (e.g., a
documentary movie, or a prom dress) correspond to those for which consumers
derive the bulk of their utility from a single rental, whereas for products with low
α (a bicycle, a watch, or a funny TV series), the fraction of (total) utility gleaned
1In an Extensions section later in this chapter, we consider continuous distribution over V
values
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from the initial use would be comparatively small. Thus, the consumer receives a
priori utility of αµ by renting the product and, should the consumer converts to
purchase, the residual utility would be equal to (1− α)θvh or (1− α)θvl, depending
on what is the outcome of learning.
We assume that the seller and the consumers are risk neutral; i.e., they
maximize their expected payoffs. For a firm that considers both renting and selling
its product, the pricing decision entails three interrelated parts: (i) the selling
price p, (ii) the rental price r, and (iii) a (possibly) distinct conversion price for
consumers who transition from a rental to a purchase, pc. The firm’s variable costs
associated with selling will typically be significantly higher than for renting, and
therefore we consider distinct variable costs cs and cr, respectively, where cs > cr
and, as we later find, the magnitude of the cost ratio is indeed critical in selection
of the optimal pricing strategy.
Our research question boils down to this: When should a firm set pc < p, i.e.,
reimburse consumers a portion of their rental price if they convert from renting to
buying. Defining δ ∈ [0, 1] as the fraction of the rental price the firm reimburses
(i.e., , pc = p − δr), we can explore conditions under which δ∗ > 0, along with
associated segmentation implications. It is also possible, as we see later, that δ∗ <
0, meaning there is a premium charged for conversion .
Given the random utility model (variable V ), there is heterogeneity in
consumer valuations after customers try the product (i.e., both realization of vh
and vl can coexist). A priori, however, we model the problem under two scenarios.
We first consider a scenario where consumers are homogeneous ex-ante, meaning
that all consumers share the same parameters (i.e., equal θ, vh, vl and γ). This
scenario therefore exhibits only an ex-post heterogeneity. Then we go on to
extend the analysis to a scenario where customers are heterogeneous ex-ante, with
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respect to their type parameter, θ. This scenario exhibits both ex-ante and ex-post
heterogeneity in the market. Under both scenarios, we normalize the market size to
1, without loss of generality.
Consumers with ex-ante homogeneity
For an ex-ante homogeneous market, we can equivalently analyze the decision
process of a representative consumer, depicted in Figure 10.
FIGURE 10. Representative consumer decision tree
The representative consumer, having observed the firm’s prices r, p and pc,
first faces the decision between buying the product, trying the product, or leaving
the market. Buying the product outright yields a total expected surplus of µ −
p, while renting (i.e., trying) yields an expected surplus αµ − r. After the rental
and realizing the true valuation, the customer shall decide whether to purchase
the product or leave2. If the conversion price is very low (lower than the minimum
possible residual utility, i.e., pc ≤ (1 − α)θvl), then upgrading to a purchase yields
a definite additional (positive) surplus, regardless of the true valuation learned after
2One may argue that the customer may consider renting the product again. We briefly study
that scenario in the later Extensions section.
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trial. The total expected surplus under this branch would be equal to αµ− r + (1−
α)(γθvh + (1− γ)θvl)− pc = µ− r− pc.3 On the lowest branch where the conversion
price is higher than the maximum possible residual utility (i.e., pc ≥ (1 − α)θvh),
the consumer simply prefers to leave rather than collect a negative surplus. On the
middle branch, for which pc ∈ ((1 − α)θvl, (1 − α)θvh), two possibilities arise. If
the consumer learns the high valuation vh, with probability γ, then conversion to
purchase yields an additional positive surplus of (1 − α)θvh − pc; in the case of the
low valuation outcome, the consumer prefers to leave rather than to convert, due to
negative resulting surplus (because (1− α)θvl − pc < 0 for this middle range on pc).
If a consumer is indifferent between two actions, we assume the customer
chooses the action that the firm prefers. Below, we explicitly analyze the firm’s
pricing problem regarding the middle branch in which the consumer rents and
then possibly (with probability γ) converts. We later examine the corner solutions
associated with the remaining branches.
max
r,pc≥0
piC(r, pc) = r − cr + γ(pc − cs) (4.1)
s.t. αµ−r+γ((1−α)θvh−pc) ≥ 0 participation constraint
(1− α)θvl < pc < (1− α)θvh
We refer to the resulting pricing policy solving this problem, which addresses
rentals with purchase conversions, as pricing policy C. Since the profit function
piC linearly increases in both r and pc, the linearly decreasing participation
constraint is binding at optimality with a resulting conversion price (as a function
of rental price) of p∗c(r) =
µ−(1−γ)(1−α)θvl−r
γ
. The second constraint in the above
3For the consumer to prefer this action over outright buying, the firm has to refund back more
than 100% of the rental fee toward conversion. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the firm
would never set a conversion price strictly lower than p − r (or δ > 1), or otherwise under no
condition would a consumer ever prefer to buy the product before trying it.
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maximization problem ensures the feasibility of pricing policy C. Thus we check
for this constraint at the point of p∗c(r), which simplifies to r
∗
min ≡ αµ < r <
µ − (1 − α)θvl ≡ r∗max. Therefore for any r ∈ (r∗min, r∗max), there is a single
corresponding p∗c(r) ∈ ((1 − α)θvl, (1 − α)θvh), determined by the linear function of
p∗c(r). The optimal profit under pricing policy C thus simplifies as
pi∗C = µ− (1− γ)(1− α)θvl − γcs − cr (4.2)
We now analyze the corner solutions associated with other branches of the
consumer tree.
– If the firm sets a high conversion price, i.e., p∗c = (1 − α)θvh (which optimally
corresponds to a low rental price, i.e., r∗ = r∗min), then the consumer rents
the product and leaves afterwards. We call this case pricing policy R in which
the optimal rental fee would be equal to r∗min = αµ with resulting profit of
pi∗R = αµ− cr.
– If the firm sets a low conversion price, i.e., p∗c = (1 − α)θvl (which optimally
corresponds to a high rental fee, i.e., r∗ = r∗max), then the consumer rents and
definitely converts to a purchase. We call this case pricing policy RC, under
which the optimal profit would be equal to pi∗RC = r
∗
max − cr + p∗c − cs =
µ− cs − cr.
Pricing policy RC is dominated by the only remaining policy, pricing policy
B, where the firm sets the selling price, p∗, equal to µ and extracts the profit of
pi∗B = µ − cs. Not surprisingly, the two policies B and RC converge if cr → 0.
The three candidate dominant pricing policies, B, C and R, each can be optimal
depending on the market and cost parameters. When pricing policy C outperforms
88
the other two, the ex-ante homogeneous customers first rent the product and a
fraction γ of them upgrade to purchase and the rest leave the market. To discover
when offering conversion discounts (denoted by δ) is optimal, we need to therefore
answer two questions: 1) when does pricing policy C outperform the other two
policies (i.e., pi∗C > max{pi∗B, pi∗R}), and 2) when is the optimal conversion price less
than the optimal selling price. (i.e., δ∗ = p
∗−p∗c
r∗ > 0). The following two propositions
address these questions.
Proposition 12
The pricing policy C outperforms policies B and R iff cs
vh(1−α) < θ <
(1−γ)cs−cr
(1−α)(1−γ)vl .
A simple pairwise comparison between optimal profits of the three pricing policies
determines the optimality condition of each policy. According to Proposition 12,
mid θ and mid-to-low γ corresponds to optimality of pricing policy C, where the
consumers are optimally encouraged to try the product before possibly converting
to buy. As either θ or γ increases, the firm prefers pricing policy B, while a lower
consumer type θ leads to pricing policy R. Higher vl, which means higher expected
valuation, understandably makes the pricing policy C less attractive for the firm.
A simple rearrangement of boundaries on θ (in Proposition 12) reveals that cr
cs
<
(1−γ)(vh−vl)
vh
≡ k is a necessary condition for the optimality of pricing policy C (a
violation of this condition leads to an empty range for θ). An insight from this
condition is that when a product is relatively expensive for the firm to sell (i.e.,
high cs), letting consumers try it first is more profitable for the firm, relative to
selling it outright. to support the optimality of pricing policy C, a larger dispersion
of customer’s perception on the valuation (vh − vl), and/or lower chance of realizing
a high value (low vh or low γ), are required. We later see that the same necessary
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condition applies for the existence of a potential “converter” customer segment
under an ex-ante heterogeneous market 4. We next examine the second question —
when are conversion discounts optimal? — in the following proposition.
Proposition 13
Depending on the choice of (r, p∗c(r)), an optimal conversion discount
(δ∗) can fall anywhere in the range of (1−
(1−α)vh
v¯
α
, 1).
– When choosing the pair r = r∗min and pc = p
∗
c(r
∗
min), it is optimal to
give a discount to converters only if α > k. On the contrary, when
α < k, the firm should optimality raise the conversion price, i.e.,
δ∗ < 0 or equivalently p∗c > p
∗.
– As the rental price increases toward r∗max, a larger conversion
discount becomes optimal. At r∗max, it is optimal to refund back
100% of the rental fee to converters.
As there are alternative optima for (r, pc), depicted in Figure 11, we should
expect to also find an optimal range for δ, which is defined by end points of
δ∗min =
p∗−p∗c(r∗min)
r∗min
and δ∗max =
p∗−p∗c(r∗max)
r∗max
. It turns out that δ∗max is calculated
to be 100%, always. This result is consistent with our discussion of the consumer
decision tree, specifically the upper branch of the second layer. It essentially means
that if the firm choose to charge a high rental fee, then consumers need to be
promised a full refund toward conversion. At the other end of the spectrum, we
have δ∗min =
1− (1−α)vh
v¯
α
> 0 iff α > (1−γ)(vh−vl)
vh
≡ k. For products with large α (i.e.,
α > k), the conversion discount is always optimal and the higher the rental price
advertised, the higher the optimal conversion discount should be.
4For products with cs = cr, pricing policy C will never be optimal (θ range would be empty).
This can have implication for digital products with zero marginal cost.
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FIGURE 11. Optimal prices under pricing policy C
Although we do not account for any type of irrational consumer behavior
regarding the mentality toward gain and loss, the existence of alternative optima
gives a firm the flexibility to choose the right policy that can play out well in the
marketing and psychological aspects. The magnitude of δ∗ increases non-linearly
with α (i.e.
dδ∗min
dα
> 0). However, for a product with α < k, the optimal discount
size depends on the size of rental fee and conversion price. If the firm chooses the
alternative optima pair of (r, pc) closer to the endpoint of (µ−(1−α)θvl, (1−α)θvl),
then offering a relatively large conversion discount is optimal such that δ∗ → 1.
However, if the choice of (r, pc) pair falls closer to the endpoint of (αµ, (1 − α)θvh),
no conversion discount is optimal.
The results also show that it is possible that the firm should charge a
premium (over the selling price if it were to sell the product outright) after the
rental. Consider a product for which α < k and (r, pc) = (αµ, (1 − α)θvh). In this
case, the conversion price optimally exceeds the optimal selling price of p∗ = µ (i.e.,
δ∗ < 0).
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Consumers with ex-ante heterogeneity
In this section, we consider the case where consumers are heterogeneous in
terms of their type parameter θ. Let θ be uniformly dispersed between M and
M across the market. Recall that v ≡ γvh + (1 − γ)vl and thus the expected
product valuation for consumer type θ is µ ≡ θv. Depending on their type,
a consumer will self select from the action set {B,C,R, L} where B refers to
outright buying, C refers to potentially converting after renting, R refers to only
renting once, and L stands for leaving. Consumer surplus maximization dictates
that a high type consumer will prefer outright buying to renting, while a lower
θ prefers to rent first while being open to convert to purchase, especially when
some refund toward purchase is available. An even smaller θ forces the consumer
to select one-time renting, or not participating as a customer at all. Looking back
to Figure 10, we can define the three participating customer segments by forming
the selection/participation constraints in sets Λi(θ) for i ∈ {B,C,R}:
– Outright buyers: ΛB(θ) = {θ|θv¯ − p ≥ αθv¯ − r + γ((1− α)θvh − pc)}
– Potential converters: ΛC(θ) = {θ|θv¯−p ≤ αθv¯−r+γ((1−α)θvh−pc) ≥ αθv¯−r}
– One-time renters: ΛR(θ) = {θ|αθv¯ − r + γ((1− α)θvh − pc) ≤ αθv¯ − r ≥ 0}
Figure 12 showcases an instance of market segments for a range on pc. In this
example, the firm should offer some discount i.e., pc ≤ p, to encourage the existence
of potential converters segment. We can thus formulate the firm’s decision problem
as follows:
max
r,p,pc≥0
pi(p, r, pc) =
1
M −M [ΛB(θ)(p− cs) + ΛC(θ)(r− cr +γ(pc− cs)) + ΛR(θ)(r− cr)]
(4.3)
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FIGURE 12. An instance of market segmentation
Beyond a unique interior solution to this decision problem, there are five potential
corner solutions, each corresponding to a particular market segmentation policy.
For a detailed solution, please refer to the Appendix for this chapter. The following
proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 14
Depending on the market and cost parameters, one of the six pricing
policies, denoted by S ∈ {BCR,BC,BR,CR,B,R}, are optimal.
The analytic expressions of optimality conditions, denoted by ΓS sets, are presented
in the Appendix. Figure 13 illustrates the firm’s optimal policy map with respect to
the changes in two parameters of α and cr (for parameter set of vh = 20, vl = 5,
γ = 0.5, cs = 5, M = 0 and M = 2) Depending on the parameter values,
one of the six pricing policies dominates the rest. Each policy is named such that
it presents which customer segments will be active in the market. For example,
BR corresponds to a pricing scheme that stimulates outright buyers and one-time
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TABLE 6. Optimal pricing policies for a heterogeneous market
S r∗ p∗ p∗c
Optimality
Condition: ΓS
BCR αMv+cr
2
Mv+cs
2
(1−α)Mvh+cs
2
ΓBCR
BC αp
∗
cv
(1−α)vh
Mv+cs
2
(1−α)vh(γ(cs+M(vh−αvl))+cr+αMvl)
2(γvh+αvl(1−γ)) ΓBC
BR αMv+cr
2
Mv+cs
2
1
2
vh
(
cs−cr
v
+M(1− α)) ΓBR
CR αMv+cr
2
r∗ + p∗cγ+
Mvl(1− α)(1− γ) (1−α)Mvh+cs2 ΓCR
B αp∗ Mv+cs
2
p∗vh(1−α)
v¯
ΓB
R αMv+cr
2
r∗ +M(1− α)v Mvh(1− α) ΓR
renters. As expected, low values of cr induce the optimality of pricing policies
FIGURE 13. Optimal pricing policies in the plane of α− cr
BC, BCR, CR and R, under which one-time renting (segment R) and/or trying
(segment C) are voluntarily active. When the utility gain from the first usage (α)
is very low, it is difficult to optimally encourage one-time renting and hence pricing
scheme BC dominates the rest. In the opposite direction, α values close to 1 induce
policy R where all participating customers optimally are encouraged to be a one-
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time renter. Let’s look at optimal prices for cr = 1 over a range on α in Figure 14.
Low values of α drive the one-time renters out of the market. Moderate values of
FIGURE 14. Optimal prices with respect to α
α activate all three possible segments. A product with higher α calls for a higher
rental fee and a relative lower pc. We can see that post-rental conversion discounts
are optimal for α > k = 0.375. The following proposition derives this condition
formally.
Proposition 15
cr
cs
< k < α (where k ≡ (vh−vl)(1−γ)
vh
) is a necessary and sufficient
condition for the co-optimality of encouraging purchase upgrades with
conversion discounts, under pricing policy BCR. If α < k, it is optimal
to charge a premium conversion price (i.e., p∗c > p
∗) under policy BCR
or BC.
The first inequality, i.e., cr
cs
< k, derives the optimality of pricing policy BCR
over BR pricing in which the converter segment is priced out of the market. The
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inequality α > k ensures the optimality of conversion discounts (i.e., p∗ < p∗c). We
can further compute the optimal conversion discount as δ∗ = p
∗−p∗c
r∗ =
M(v¯−(1−α)vh)
αMv¯+cr
.
Figure 15 showcases the sensitivity of δ∗ wrt to α and γ (for parameter set of
vh = 20, vl = 5, cr = 1, cs = 5, M = 0 and M = 2). The optimal discount
increases in γ and in α. When there is a higher probability of conversion (higher
γ), the optimal conversion discount increases. For example, consider a product with
α = 0.4. For the parameter set of Figure 15 and γ = 0.5, we have r∗ = $5.5,
p∗ = $15 and p∗c = $14.5 i.e., it is optimal for the firm to refund back 10% of the
rental fee to converters. However, if γ decreases to 40%, then we have r∗ = $4.9,
p∗ = $13.5 and p∗c = $14.5, i.e., the firm should charge a premium of $1 to
converters i.e. δ∗ < 0.
FIGURE 15. Optimal conversion discount with respect to α and γ
Extensions
In this section, we: (i) discuss the implications of second rentals, (ii)
contrast trials versus returns, and (iii) consider stochastic valuations that follow
a continuous distribution.
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Possibility of a second rental
We now assume that the first rental utility proportion equals α1 and the
second rental utility proportion equals α2. We focus our attention to cases where
α2θvl < r < α2θvh (condition 1) and (1 − α1)θvl < pc < (1 − α1)θvh (condition
2) hold. Condition 1 assures that a second rental can be an optimal decision for the
customer. If the customer learns vh, then the second rental yields positive surplus.
If r < α2θvl (or r > α2θvh) second rental is optimal (not optimal) regardless of the
outcome of the learning. Similar reasoning holds for justifying the second condition.
Outside these ranges, the problem is trivial. We are still interested to find when
the firm wants to optimally encourage a customer to try once before committing to
purchase. We can find the optimal prices under policy C (i.e., encouraging the rep
customer to rent first and then possibly convert (with probably γ)) by solving the
following problem:
max
r,pc≥0
piC(r, pc) = r − cr + γ(pc − cs) (4.4)
s.t. α1µ−r+γ((1−α1)θvh−pc) ≥ 0 participation constraint
(1−α1)θvh−pc > α2θvh−r selection constraint
Figure 16(a) showcases the scenario with multiple optima lying on the
participation constraint, bounded by two end points, determined by [ra =
θ
1−γ ((α1 + α2)vh + α1(1 − γ)vl), pac = θ1−γ ((1 − α1 − α2 + γ)vh + α1(1 − γ)vl)]
and [rb = α2θvh, p
b
c =
θ
γ
((γ − α2)vh + α1(1 − γ)vl)]. Optimal profit under
this case equals to pi∗C = α1θvl − cr + γ(θ(vh − α1vl) − cs). The parameters
underlying this figure are vh = 20, vl = 10. γ = 0.5, cs = 3, cr = 1, θ = 1,
and α1 = 0.3. Note that when point (a) falls outside the rectangle specified by
conditions (1) and (2), we should refer to Figure 16(b). Thus Figure 16(a) is viable
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FIGURE 16. Feasible price region when the customer considers a second rental
as long as ra < α2θvh and p
a
c < (1 − α1)θvh. These simplify to α2 > α1v¯/vh.
Figure 16(b) shows the feasible region under α2 < α1v¯/vh, for which case we
hit a corner solution at [r∗ = α2θvh, p∗c = (1 − α1)θvh] with resulting profit of
pi∗C = α2θvh− cr + γ(θ(1− α1)vh− cs). Two other candidate pricing policies are 1)to
set a selling price p = µ with resulting profit of pi∗B = µ − cs or 2) to rent once at
r∗ = α1µ with resulting profit of pi∗R = α1µ − cr. Focusing on scenarios like Figure
16(a), we can see that pi∗C > max{pi∗R, pi∗B} holds iff csvh(1−α1) < θ <
cs(1−γ)−cr
(1−α1)(1−γ)vl .
We can further see that p∗ > pac iff α1(vh − vl(1 − γ)) + α2vh > (vh − vl)(1 − γ2).
This condition implies that for conversion discounts to be optimal, both α1 and α2
should be relatively large. This result is consistent with Proposition 13 and 15.
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Comparison of trials with a simple return policy
In this section we analyze whether there are conditions under which consumer
uncertainty is more efficiently (i.e., profitably) resolved via trials (rentals) than by
allowing for post-purchase product returns. One scenario of a return policy can be
to let the customer try the product by paying a fee (=r). If the customer likes the
product (realizing vh), he can upgrade to purchase by paying pu − r, which means a
full refund of the fee. If the product doesn’t meet the expectation (realizing vl = 0
for simplicity), the customer can return the product, despite having used it, and
receive 100% refund (equal to +r). Thus the expected surplus for consumer type θ
under this return policy would be equal to
ESu = αµ− r + γmax{(1− α)θvh − pu + r, r}+ (1− γ)r
After trying the product and liking it (realizing vh), the customer will choose to
upgrade if (1 − α)θvh + r − pu > r. To encourage upgrades, then the firm should
set p∗u = (1 − α)θvh − . At this upgrade price, total expected surplus the customer
receives at time zero will net to αµ− r+ γ((1−α)θvh− p∗u + r) + (1− γ)r = αµ > 0.
Considering an ex-ante homogeneous market, the firms profit = r − cr + γ(p∗u −
r − cs) + (1 − γ)(−r) = γ(1 − α)θvh − γcs − cr . This expression can be compared
to equation 4.2. One can see that such a policy always underperforms the Pricing
Policy C for an ex-ante homogeneous market, in terms of optimal profit. It is not
a surprising result because when allowing for returns and full refund, the customer
optimally leaves with positive surplus (which could be turned into profit for the
firm).
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Modelling valuation uncertainty with a continuous distribution
We now let the customer’s uncertain valuation V follow a uniform
distribution, i.e., V ∼ U [µ− , µ+ ], rather than a discrete distribution (as was the
assumption so far). Similar to before, a customer may choose to buy the product
outright (B), rent first to possibly convert (C) or be a certain one-time renter (R).
The expected surplus of buying outright would be
ESB(µ) = E[αV − p+ (1− α)V ] = µ− p. (4.5)
Renting the product first yields the expected surplus of
ESR(µ) = E[αV − r] = αµ− r. (4.6)
Calculating expected surplus associated with a product trial before possibly
buying, which we denote as ESC(µ), is now more involved. By trying the product,
the consumer learns the true v somewhere in the range of [µ − , µ + ] and
faces a subsequent decision between converting to purchase or leaving. Through
conversion, an extra surplus of (1 − α)v − pc can be earned, so conversion yields a
nonnegative surplus iff v > pc/(1 − α) ≡ vc. The probability of conversion then
can be calculated as
∫ µ+
vc
1/(2)dv = µ+−vc
2
denoted as Pr(µ, pc). The probability
of conversion (Pr(µ, pc)) is linearly increasing (decreasing) in µ (pc). However it
is nonlinearly increasing (decreasing) in  for µ < vc (µ > vc). Checking for
0 ≤ Pr(µ, pc) ≤ 1 results in µ ≡ vc −  ≤ µ ≤ vc +  ≡ µ. This implies that
for a relatively low consumer type (i.e., µ < µ), the conversion is not going to be
optimal, i.e., the chance of conversion is pre-known to that consumer to be zero.
However, for a high consumer type (i.e., µ ≥ µ), the conversion is unquestionably
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optimal. We now are ready to calculate the expected surplus for a consumer with
type µ who tries the product with the positive chance of conversion as:
ESC(µ) = αµ− r + Pr(µ, pc)((1− α)vc + µ+ 
2
− pc) (4.7)
Let us consider the setting in which customers are heterogeneous in term
of the parameter µ with µ ∼ U [M,M ], similar to our assumption on θ as the
consumer type distribution main part of the paper. From the equations (4.5), (4.6)
and (4.7), we can form consumer selection constraints to determine the µ range for
each consumer segment. The consumer type µ selects to be:
– an outright buyer if µ ∈ {µ|ESB(µ) > ESC(µ)} ≡ (µbc,M ] where µbc =
pc−2
√
(1−α)(pc+r−p)
1−α +  = µ− 2
√
(pc+r−p)
1−α
5
– a potential converter if µ ∈ {µ|ESB(µ) ≤ ESC(µ) ≥ ESR(µ)} ≡ [µ, µbc]
– a one-time renter if µ ∈ {µ|ESC(µ) < ESR(µ) ≥ 0} ≡ [ rα , µ)
The firm’s profit maximization problem can be formulated as
max
p,r,pc≥0
pi(p, r, pc) =
1
M −M ((M−µbc)(p−cs)+
∫ µbc
µ
(r−cr+Pr(µ, pc)(pc−cs))dµ+(µ− r
α
)(r−cr))
s.t. M ≥ µbc ≥ µ ≥ rα ≥M ≥ 0
Clearly µ < µbc is a necessary and sufficient condition for the potential
converter segment to be non-empty 6. This inequality simplifies to pc ≤ p − r +
(1 − α) ≡ p¯c. Therefore p∗c < min{p¯c, p∗} is the necessary and sufficient condition
5ESB(µ) == ESC(µ) have two roots. The second root is always larger than µ and thus ruled
out
6µ < µbc is simplified to
√
(pc − p+ r)(1− α) < (1− α).
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for optimality of conversion discounts. The following proposition addresses our
question of interest: under what condition are the conversion discounts optimal?
Proposition 16
Conversion discounts are optimal for large α:
p∗c < p
∗ ← α >
√

(
8crM
2
+ (cr +M)2
)
+ (M − cr)
2M(2M + )
Consistent with our previous results, we observe that there should exist a
lower bound on α for conversion discounts to be optimal. Thus we see that the
assumption of discrete distribution on V drives us the same qualitative results.
Conclusion
In this paper, we address the popular pricing technique for experience
goods under which customers are encouraged to try a product to resolve the
valuation uncertainty. Should they decide to upgrade from a rental to a purchase,
a partial or full refund of the rental fee may be applicable, depending upon the
firm’s pricing policy. We study the firm’s optimal pricing problem for consumers
who are, alternatively, either ex-ante identical (i.e., homogeneous) and ex-ante
heterogeneous. For the case of the ex-ante homogeneous market, we proved that
if the representative customer type belongs to a middle range and the ratio of
the rental cost to selling cost is small enough, then the firm implements the try
before you buy pricing policy. In that case, the firm can choose the rental fee
and the conversion price from a range of alternative optima. Depending on the
magnitude of rental fee charged, the conversion discount might or might not be
optimal. Depending on the desired marketing strategy, the firm could choose to
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raise the rental fee to thus optimally afford offering conversion discounts. This
may be valuable to the firm in presence of irrational consumer behavior where the
refunds may be perceived differently than being charged a lower price in the first
place. For the case of the heterogeneous market, we showed that for conversion
discounts to be optimal, rental-to-selling cost must be smaller than a threshold (k),
and the degree of diminishing marginal utility (α) must be larger than the same
threshold. In other words, for a product to be qualified for a conversion discount,
the portion of the utility that is derived from the first usage should be considerable
and it should be specifically large than the rent-to-sell cost ratio. As the dispersion
between the two possible learning outcomes (vh − vl) (or the probability of realizing
a low value = 1 − γ) increases, more customers choose to try the product first
(rather than to buy outright). However, that reduces the chance of optimal offering
of conversion discounts. Indeed, when the dispersion surpasses a threshold, then the
firm should increase the conversion price rather than reducing it. In that case, the
customers who end up liking the product and want to upgrade to a purchase are
subjected to a tax on their learning. If the customers have access to ways to hide
their rental history, they can escape this higher post-trial price by acting like new
customer, and pay the selling price that is lower in this case.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation consists of three essays addressing problems that lie at the
interface of marketing and operations management with a focus on pricing. The
first essay (chapter II) investigated the economics of optimally going green by solely
selling a product that has some degree of recycled content in it. When the profit
maximization problem results in a green-only product line, we showed that the
firm profitably omits the non-green version from the product line and serve the
customers - regardless of what group they belong to - with a single green product
and thus can honestly claim as a green firm. However, the conditions should be
right so that the firm can optimally adopt a green-only strategy. For instance,
recycled material should be cheaper than virgin raw material and production of
a green product shouldn’t be very costly, or otherwise green products cannot be
justified from a cost perspective. Also the customers shouldn’t strongly prefer one
of the products over the the other one. Because once they do, then the profits
can increase by maintaining both product types in the line and serve each group
of customers by their own targeted product and a uniformly green line cannot
sustain. A rather more surprising result relates to whether the firm can or cannot
choose the degree of recycled content or in other words, optimize the green quality.
At some cases, the seller does not have the flexibility to decide on the degree of
recycled content, such as retailers who just buy the product and not manufacture
it. We found that under this case, the green-only product can sustain when the
product is not very green. Only then the endogenous price of green product can be
attractive to both consumer types. However if the firm can influence the design and
104
thus quality of the product, we found that a maximally green product sustains as
the result of price and quality optimization.
In the second essay (chapter III), we explored the time-related dynamics of
price discounts. In particular, we analyzed whether it is optimal to shift discounts
in time rather to offer immediate lower prices? Delayed discounts — a percentage
of today’s spending applied to future purchases — are quite common in practice. It
is quite reasonable to quickly conclude that a firm should prefer delayed discounts
if (i) customers may forget to redeem their credits or (ii) if customers irrationally
weigh the credit more than real money or (iii) if the firm has a higher time value
of money relative to the customers. However, we have explored whether delayed
discounts are beneficial, if the firm’s consumers are fully rational. We established
that delayed discounts are equivalent in performance to immediate discounts when
the posted pre-discounted prices (i.e., consumer spending) are stable over time,
as long as the firm scales up the delayed reward rate to compensate the loss in
consumer surplus for the wait the customer incurs, before credit redemption. This
result is independent of whether the rewards are personalized for each customer
or a single reward percentage is applied to a range of heterogeneous customers.
If the posted prices, and consequently the customer spending, vary over time,
the results change. Specifically when prices fluctuate over time, the customer
faces a larger number of net prices (price minus credit) over time with delayed
discounts — relative to immediate discounts — and thus has more flexibility to
self select the shopping pattern that maximizes her surplus. With a personalized
reward percentage, we find that delayed discounts potentially increase profits
if a customer’s valuation falls into a particular range. Regardless, the optimal
discount percentage should be higher when discounts are delayed. When the firm
has to choose a single discount percentage and must apply that uniformly to a
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range of customers, we prove that delayed discounts segment the market more
efficiently and turn more of the customers into frequent shoppers. By inducing
more consumption, the delayed discount accumulate more profits over time. Hence
the delayed discounts are proven to be more successful in the more realistic setting
in which prices fluctuate and rewards are not customized per customer.
In the third essay (chapter IV), we studied “try-before-you-buy” pricing,
which applies in practice to goods with valuation uncertainty. We allow for both
selling and renting a durable good and consider renting as a learning tool for
customers who prefer to resolve their uncertainty — by paying a fee – before
committing to purchase a product. Inspired by practice, we examine when it is
optimal to stimulate post-rental conversions to purchase by offering a refund of
the rental fee —partial or full— as a discount applied to the selling price. This
incentive might be required for those products whose value drop significantly after
the first usage. Our findings show that a relatively small ratio of the unit rental vs.
selling cost is necessary to profitably encourage customers to try the product. To
optimally giving a rental rebate toward conversion, a relatively large portion of the
overall product utility must have been derived during the trial or rental period.
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APPENDIX A
CHAPTER 2: TECHNICAL PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 1: Given prices pb and pg, and the green variant’s recycled
content β, each consumer with base valuation v (i.e., valuation for the base
product) assesses her surplus from buying the base product, the green variant,
and the no-purchase option. If a type-i (i ∈ {n, c}) consumer’s participation
constraint for product variant j (j ∈ {b, g}) is satisfied, and the same customer’s
surplus from purchasing product variant j is more than her surplus from the other
product variant (i.e., her self-selection constraint for product j is satisfied), then
that consumer is included in demand Dji. We highlight these participation and self-
selection constraints for each demand segment in the second and third columns of
Table 7. As consumer valuations follow uniform distribution over the unit interval,
the aforementioned constraints yield the demand quantities highlighted in the
fourth column of Table 7. Imposing the price restrictions outlined in the “Price
Range” column of Table 1 on the aforementioned demand quantities yield the
remaining entries in Table 1.
TABLE 7. The participation and self-selection constraints
Demand
Segment Participation Self-Selection Demand
Dbc v − pb ≥ 0 v − pb ≥ (1− αcβ)v − pg ω(1−max{min{pb−pgαcβ , 1}, pb})
Dgc (1− αcβ)v − pg ≥ 0 (1− αcβ)v − pg ≥ v − pb ω(max{0,min{pb−pgαcβ , 1} −
pg
(1−αcβ)})
Dgn (1 + αnβ)v − pg ≥ 0 (1 + αnβ)v − pg ≥ v − pb (1− ω)(1−max{min{pg−pbαnβ , 1},
pg
1+αnβ
})
Dbn v − pb ≥ 0 v − pb ≥ (1 + αnβ)v − pg (1− ω)(max{0,min{pg−pbαnβ , 1} − pb})
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Proof of Lemma 2: We will prove the Lemma in five parts, each corresponding to
one demand scenario s when Is = 1, ∀s ∈ {UB,CT, PT,NT, UG}. In each part, for
brevity, we will denote pis(pb, pg|β) as pis.
When IUB = 1, the demand expressions of Table 1 yield piUB = (pb−cb)(1−pb).
Taking the first and the second order derivatives with respect to pb yields
d2piUB
dpb2
=
−2 < 0. Furthermore, piUB does not depend on pg. Therefore, function piUB is
jointly concave for prices that yield IUB = 1.
When ICT = 1, the demand expressions of Table 1 yield piCT = (pb − cb)(ω(1−
pb) + (1 − ω)(pg−pbαnβ − pb)) + (pg − cg)((1 − ω)(1 −
pg−pb
αnβ
)), which has the following
Hessian:
H(piCT ) =
−2(1+αnβ−ω)αnβ 2(1−ω)αnβ
0 −2(1−ω)
αnβ

As ∂
2piCT
∂pb2
= −2(1+αnβ−ω)
αnβ
< 0 and ∂
2piCT
∂pg2
= −2(1−ω)
αnβ
< 0, and the determinant of
H(piCT ) is positive, i.e.,
−2(1+αnβ−ω)
αnβ
· −2(1−ω)
αnβ
− 0 > 0 function piCT is jointly concave
for prices that yield ICT = 1.
When IPT = 1, the demand expressions of Table 1 yield piPT = (pb − cb)(ω(1−
pb)) + (pg − cg)((1− ω)(1− pg1+αnβ )), which has the following Hessian:
H(piPT ) =
−2ω 0
0 −2(1−ω)
αnβ

As ∂
2piPT
∂pb2
= −2ω < 0 and ∂2piPT
∂pg2
= −2(1−ω)
αnβ
< 0, and the determinant of H(piPT ) is
positive, i.e., −2ω · −2(1−ω)
αnβ
− 0 > 0, function piPT is concave for prices that yield
IPT = 1.
When INT = 1, the demand expressions of Table 1 yield piNT = (pb− cb)(ω(1−
pb−pg
αcβ
)) + (pg − cg)((1 − ω)(1 − pg1+αnβ ) + ω(
pb−pg
αcβ
− pg
1−αcβ )), which has the following
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Hessian:
H(piNT ) =
−2wαcβ 2wαcβ
0 −2(1−w)
1+αnβ
+ −2w
αcβ(1−αcβ)

As ∂
2piNT
∂pb2
= −2w
αcβ
< 0 and ∂
2piNT
∂pg2
= −2(1−w)
1+αnβ
+ −2w
αcβ(1−αcβ) < 0, and the determinant of
H(piCT ) is positive, i.e.,
−2w
αcβ
· (−2(1−w)
1+αnβ
+ −2w
αcβ(1−αcβ)) − 0 > 0, function piNT is jointly
concave for prices that yield INT = 1.
When IUG = 1, the demand expressions of Table 1 yield piUG = (pg− cg)(ω(1−
pg
1−αcβ ) + (1− ω)(1−
pg
1+αnβ
)). Taking the first and the second order derivatives with
respect to pg yields
d2piUG
dpg2
= −2(1−ω)
1+αnβ
+ −2ω
1−αcβ < 0. Furthermore, piUG does not depend
on pb. Therefore, piUG is jointly concave for prices that yield IUG = 1.
To prove that function pi =
∑
∀s Ispis is not jointly concave in pb and pg for all
prices satisfying pb ≤ 1 and pg ≤ v¯n, we provide a numerical example as depicted in
Figure 17. In this figure, we have function pi =
∑
∀s Ispis for pb ∈ {0.85, 0.90, 1.00}
and pg ∈ [0.6, v¯n], where ω = 0.7, cv = 0.7, cr = 0.2, k = 0.05, αc = 0.3, αn = 0.4,
and β = 0.5, implying v¯n = 1 + αnβ = 1.2.
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pb	  =	  1
pb	  =	  0.9
pb	  =	  0.85
FIGURE 17. Profit function is not jointly concave over the whole region
Proof of Proposition 1: We will prove the proposition in five parts. For each
part, we will specialize non-linear program (2.2) to one demand scenario s when
Is = 1 (∀s ∈ {UB,CT, PT,NT, UG}), which implies the constraint regarding the
prices in the “Price Range” column of Table 1 holds. For each demand scenario s,
we will denote by pb
FOC
s and pg
FOC
s the prices that solve the firm’s unconstrained
optimization problem, which satisfy ∂pis
∂pb
|pb=pbFOCs = 0 and ∂pis∂pg |pg=pgFOCs (s)= 0 due to
the joint concavity of pis. We will denote by pb
∗
s and pg
∗
s the prices that solve the
firm’s optimization problem subject to Is = 1. (For notational brevity, we will drop
the subscript “s” when necessary.)
Uniform Base (UB): Using the constraint in Table 1 that induces the UB
demand scenario, the firm solves
max
pb
piUB = (pb − cb)(1− pb)
subject to pb ≤ min{pg − αnβ, 1}.
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We have p∗b = p
FOC
b =
cb+1
2
and p∗g =
cb+1
2
+ αnβ if and only if
cb+1
2
≤ min{ cb+1
2
+
αnβ, 1}, i.e, cb ≤ min{cg − αnβ, 1}. Using the optimal prices in piUB yields pi∗UB =
(1−cb)2
4
.
If, on the other hand, cb ≥ 1 then we have p∗b = 1 and p∗g = v¯n yielding no
demand and pi∗UB = 0. Thus, we denote by ΓUB ≡ {cb ≤ min{cg − αnβ, 1}} the
parameter space over which the firm may feasibly choose prices that yield the UB
demand scenario.
Conventional Targeting (CT): Using the constraint in Table 1 that induces the
CT demand scenario, the firm solves
max
pb, pg
piCT = (pb − cb)(ω(1− pb) + (1− ω)(pg−pbαnβ − pb)) + (pg − cg)((1− ω)(1−
pg−pb
αnβ
))
subject to pg − αnβ < pb < min{ pg1+αnβ , 1}.
We have p∗b = p
FOC
b =
cb+1
2
and p∗g = p
FOC
g =
cg+v¯n
2
if and only if cg+v¯n
2
− αnβ <
cb+1
2
< min{ cg+v¯n
2v¯n
, 1}, i.e., cg − αnβ < cb < min{ cgv¯n , 1}. Using the optimal prices in
piCT yields pi
∗
CT =
(1−cb)2
4
+ (1− ω) (cb−cg+αnβ)2
4αnβ
.
If, instead, cg−αnβ ≥ cb, we have pg−αnβ ≥ pb, which yields the UB demand
scenario. Similarly, if cb ≥ cg1+αnβ , we have pb ≥
pg
1+αnβ
, which yields the PT demand
scenario. Thus, we denote by ΓCT ≡ {cg − αnβ < cb < min{ cgv¯n , 1}} the parameter
space over which the firm may feasibly choose prices that yield the CT demand
scenario.
Perfect Targeting (PT): Using the constraint in Table 1 that induces the PT
demand scenario, the firm solves
max
pb,pg
piPT = (pb − cb)(ω(1− pb)) + (pg − cg)((1− ω)(1− pg1+αnβ ))
subject to pg
1+αnβ
≤ pb ≤ min{ pg1−αcβ , 1}.
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We have p∗b = p
FOC
b =
cb+1
2
and p∗g = p
FOC
g =
cg+v¯n
2
if and only if cg+v¯n
2v¯n
< cb+1
2
<
min{ cg+v¯n
2v¯c
, 1}, i.e., cg
v¯n
< cb < min{ cgv¯c + ( v¯nv¯c − 1) , 1}. Using the optimal prices in piPT
yields pi∗PT =
ω(1−cb)2
4
+ (1− ω) (v¯n−cg)2
4v¯n
.
If, instead, cg
v¯n
≥ cb, then the firm solves maxpb piPT over the line satisfying
pb =
pg
v¯n
. As piPT is concave, we must have
d piPT
d pb
|pb=p∗b= 0, which yields p∗b =
0.5 (1−w)(cg+v¯n)+(cb+1)w
(1−w)v¯n+w and p
∗
g = v¯np
∗
b . Similarly, if cb ≥ cgv¯c + ( v¯nv¯c − 1), then the
firm solves maxpb piPT over the line satisfying pb =
pg
v¯c
. As piPT is concave, we must
have d piPT
d pb
|pb=p∗b= 0, which yields p∗b = 0.5
v¯c(1−w)(cg+v¯n)+v¯nw(cb+1)
(1−w)v¯2c+wv¯n and p
∗
g = v¯cp
∗
b .
Thus, we denote by Γ1PT ≡ { cgv¯n ≤ cb ≤ min{
cg
v¯c
+ ( v¯n
v¯c
− 1), 1}} the parameter space
over which the firm may feasibly choose prices that yield the PT demand scenario.
Naturalite Targeting (NT): Using the constraint in Table 1 that induces the NT
demand scenario, the firm solves
max
pb ,pg
piNT = (pb − cb)(ω(1− pb−pgαcβ )) + (pg − cg)((1− ω)(1−
pg
1+αnβ
) + ω(pb−pg
αcβ
− pg
1−αcβ ))
subject to pg
1−αcβ < pb < pg + αcβ
We have p∗b = p
FOC
b =
cb+αcβ+z
2
and p∗g = p
FOC
g =
cg+z
2
if and only if cg+z
2v¯c
<
cb+αcβ+z
2
< cg+z
2
+ αcβ, i.e.,
cg
v¯c
+ z αcβ
2(1−w)(αc+αn)
v¯nv¯c
< cb < cg + αcβ. Using the optimal
prices in piNT yields pi
∗
NT =
(z−cg)2
4z
+ ω (cg−cb+αcβ)
2
4αcβ
.
If, instead, cg
v¯c
+ z αcβ
2(1−w)(αc+αn)
v¯nv¯c
≥ cb, we have pg1−αcβ ≥ pg, which yields the
PT demand scenario. Similarly, if cb ≥ cg +αcβ, we have pb ≥ pg +αcβ, which yields
the UG demand scenario. Thus, we denote by ΓNT ≡ { cgv¯c + z
αcβ2(1−w)(αc+αn)
v¯nv¯c
< cb <
cg + αcβ} the parameter space over which firm may feasibly choose prices that yield
the NT demand scenario.
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Uniform Green (UG): Using the constraint in Table 1 that induces the UG
demand scenario, the firm solves
max
pg
piUG = (pg − cg)(ω(1− pg1−αcβ )+ + (1− ω)(1−
pg
1+αnβ
))
subject to pg ≤ min{pb − αcβ, 1 + αnβ}
We have p∗g = p
FOC
g =
cg+z
2
and p∗b =
cg+z+2αcβ
2
if and only cg+z
2
< min{ cg+z+2αcβ
2
−
αcβ, 1 + αnβ}, i.e., cg < 2v¯c − z. Note that the minimum operator in the constraint
must return pb − αcβ when p∗b < 1, and thus both consumer types purchase the
green variant, yielding the UGinc demand scenario. As such, we denote by ΓUGinc ≡
{cg ≤ min{cb − αcβ, 2v¯c − z}} the parameter space over which firm may feasibly
choose prices that yield the UGinc demand scenario. Using the optimal prices in
piUG yields pi
∗
UGinc
= (z−cg)
2
4z
.
If, on the other hand, p∗b ≥ 1 (which, the firm would resort to only if cb ≥ 1),
then the minimum operator in the constraint must still return pb−αcβ, as otherwise
piUG = 0 due to zero demand. In such a case, as p
∗
g > 1 − αcβ, no conventional
consumer purchases the green variant, yielding the UGexc demand scenario. In this
case, we have p∗g = p
FOC
g =
cg+v¯n
2
and p∗b = p
∗
g + αcβ =
cg+v¯n+2αcβ
2
is and only if
v¯c <
cg+v¯n
2
< v¯n, i.e., 2v¯c − v¯n < cg < v¯n. Thus we denote by ΓUGexc ≡ {{2v¯c − v¯n ≤
cg ≤ v¯n} ∩ {cb ≥ 1}} the parameter space over which firm may feasibly choose
prices that yield the UGinc demand scenario. Using the optimal prices in piUG yields
pi∗UGexc =
(1−ω)(v¯n−cg)2
4v¯n
.
We next characterize the parameter spaces over which the firm adopts a
particular demand scenario, i.e., Γ∗s , ∀s ∈ {UB,CT, PT,NT, UG}. We will prove
the corresponding results in a series of lemmas.
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Lemma 7
ΓUB = Γ
∗
UB and ΓCT = Γ
∗
CT .
Lemma 7 follows from ΓUB ∩ Γs = ∅, ,Γ∗s , ∀s ∈ {CT, PT,NT, UG} and ΓCT ∩ Γs =
∅, ,Γ∗s , ∀s ∈ {UB,PT,NT, UG}.
Lemma 8
Γ∗NT ⊂ ΓNT . Furthermore, Γ∗NT = { cg+
√
y(v¯n−v¯c)
v¯c
< cb < cg + αcβ}.
As cg
v¯n
< cg
v¯c
+ z αcβ
2(1−w)(αc+αn)
v¯nv¯c
and min{ cg
v¯c
+ ( v¯n
v¯c
− 1), 1} > cg + αcβ, we
have ΓNT ⊂ ΓPT . Therefore, to characterize Γ∗NT , we investigate the dynamics of
pi∗NT − pi∗PT , which is a convex quadratic function of cb as d
2{pi∗NT−pi∗PT }
dcb2
= ωv¯c
2(1−v¯c) > 0.
As pi∗NT − pi∗PT = 0 yields cb = cg∓(v¯n−v¯c)
√
y
v¯c
, we have pi∗NT − pi∗PT > 0 for parameter
spaces satisfying {cb < cg−(v¯n−v¯c)
√
y
v¯c
} and {cb > cg+(v¯n−v¯c)
√
y
v¯c
}. As the intersection of
the former set and ΓNT is the empty set, Γ
∗
NT ⊆ { cg+(v¯n−v¯c)
√
y
v¯c
< cb < cg +αcβ} must
hold. Furthermore, simple algebra dictates cg
v¯c
+ z αcβ
2(1−w)(αc+αn)
v¯nv¯c
<
cg+(v¯n−v¯c)√y
v¯c
,
which yields Γ∗NT ⊂ ΓNT , and further implies Γ∗NT = { cg+(v¯n−v¯c)
√
y
v¯c
< cb < cg + αcβ}.
Lemma 9
ΓUG1inc
⋂
Γ1PT 6= ∅. Furthermore, Γ∗UG = Γ∗UG1inc
⋃
Γ∗
UG2inc
⋃
Γ∗UGexc where
Γ∗
UG1inc
= {cb < 1}
⋂ {cg ≤ min{v¯c −√x, cb − αcβ}},
Γ∗
UG2inc
= {cb ≥ 1}
⋂ {cg ≤ v¯c −√v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2))},
Γ∗UGexc = {cb ≥ 1}
⋂ {v¯c −√v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2)) < cg < v¯n}.
As v¯n
v¯c
− 1 > αcβ always holds, we have cg+αcβv¯c <
cg+v¯n−v¯c
v¯c
, which implies
we have ΓUG1inc
⋂
Γ1PT 6= ∅. Therefore, to characterize Γ∗UG1inc , we investigate the
dynamics of pi∗UG − pi∗PT , which is a convex quadratic function of cg as d
2{pi∗UG−pi∗PT }
dcg2
=
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ω
2v¯c
> 0. As pi∗UG − pi∗PT = 0 yields cg = v¯c ∓
√
x, we have pi∗UG − pi∗PT > 0 for
parameter spaces satisfying {cg > v¯c +
√
x} and {cg < v¯c −
√
x}. As the intersection
of the former set and ΓUG1inc is the empty set, Γ
∗
UG1inc
⊆ {cg ≤ min{v¯c −
√
x , 2v¯c − z}
must hold, where the minimum operator always returns v¯c −
√
x as simple algebra
dictates v¯c −
√
x < 2v¯c − z ⇔ −(1−w)wv¯cv¯n(v¯c−v¯n)2(v¯c(1−w)+wv¯n)2 < v¯c(1 − cb)2. As such, we have
Γ∗
UG1inc
≡ {{cg + αcβ ≤ cb ≤ 1} ∩ {cg ≤ v¯c −
√
x}}.
Note that no demand scenario other than UG is feasible when cb ≥ 1,
and thus, scenario UGinc sustains optimally over parameter space ΓUG2inc\ΓUGexc ,
and UGexc sustains optimally over parameter space ΓUGexc\ΓUG2inc . To complete
characterizing Γ∗
UG2inc
and Γ∗UGexc , we compare pi
∗
UGinc
and pi∗UGexc over parameter
space ΓUG2inc
⋂
ΓUGexc = {2v¯c − v¯n ≥ cg ≥ 2v¯c − z}
⋂{cb ≥ 1}. As
pi∗UGinc > pi
∗
UGexc
when cg < v¯c −
√
v¯c(z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2)), we have
Γ∗
UG2inc
= {{cb > 1} ∩ {cg ≤ v¯c −
√
v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2))} and
Γ∗UGexc = {{cb > 1} ∩ {v¯c −
√
v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2)) < cg < v¯n}}.
Finally, scenario PT sustains optimally when neither scenario NT nor
scenario UG1inc is optimal over parameter space Γ
1
PT , which we state formally in
the next lemma:
Lemma 10
Γ∗PT = Γ
1
PT \ (Γ∗NT
⋃
Γ∗
UG1inc
).
We illustrate how all prior results are integrated in Figure 18, where we highlight
parameter spaces Γs (in panel (a)) and Γ
∗
s (in panel (b)) for each demand scenario
s, where s ∈ {UB,CT, PT,NT, UG}. Lemmas 7 through 10 yield the full
characterization of Proposition 1.
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FIGURE 18. Feasible and optimal regions for each demand scenario
Proof of Proposition 2: As per Table 2 in Proposition 1, strategy NT is optimal
when cg
v¯c
+
√
y( v¯n
v¯c
− 1) < cb < cg + αcβ holds, which we can rewrite as cr1−αc +
k(1+β)2αc+(αc+αn)
√
y
1−αc < cv < cr + αc. Evidently cv − cr < αc is necessary for Γ∗NT to be
non-empty.
(i) Defining M ≡ cv(1−αc)−cr−αck(1+β)2
αn+αc
, we can re-write ωNT = (αcβ−M
2)v¯c
(αcβ−M2)v¯c+M2v¯n .
Then, we have
ω > ωNT ⇔ ω > (αcβ−M2)v¯c
(αcβ−M2)v¯c+M2v¯n
⇔ M2 > αcβ(1− z ωv¯c )
⇔ M >
√
αcβ(1− z ωv¯c ) (using M > 0 as cb = cv + k(1 + β)2 ≤ cv−crαc ≤ 1 )
(and z ω
v¯c
≤ 1⇔ (1− w)v¯c > 0 via simple algebra.)
⇔ M > √y (using y = αcβ(1− zωv¯c ).)
⇔ cv > cr1−αc +
k(1+β)2αc+(αc+αn)
√
y
(1−αc)
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(ii) Note that, if k <
cv(1−αc)−cr−αc
√
αcβ(1−ω)
αc(1+β)2
holds, then αNT > 0. Furthermore
αn < αNT ⇔ αn <
√
αcβ(1−αc)(1−αc−2k(1+β)2)
β
− αc
⇔ k(1 + β)2αc + (αc + αn)
√
αcβ(1− ω) < cv(1− αc)− cr
⇒ k(1 + β)2αc + (αc + αn)√y < cv(1− αc)− cr
(using y < αcβ(1− w) when v¯c < z.)
⇔ cv > cr1−αc +
k(1+β)2αc+(αc+αn)
√
y
(1−αc)
(iii) We define F (β) = (αc + αn)
√
αcβ(1− ω) + αck(1 + 3β) − cv(1 − αc) − cr, and
let βNT be the largest β satisfying F (
√
βNT ) = 0. Then, we have
β < βNT ⇒ F (β) < 0 and F (0) < 0 (using αc(cv + k) < cv − cr.)
⇔ (αc + αn)
√
αc(1− ω)β0 + αck(1 + 3β20) < cv(1− αc)− cr
⇒ (αc + αn)
√
αc(1− ω)
√
β + αck(1 + 2β + β
2) < cv(1− αc)− cr
⇒ k(1 + β)2αc + (αc + αn)√y < cv(1− αc)− cr
(using y < αcβ(1− w) as v¯c < z.)
⇔ cv > cr1−αc +
k(1+β)2αc+(αc+αn)
√
y
(1−αc)
Proof of Proposition 3: For part (a), we consider the cases satisfying cb < 1,
i.e., cv < 1 − k(1 + β)2, in which case strategy UG sustains optimally if problem
parameters fall within Γ∗
UG1inc
, i.e., both cg + αcβ ≤ cb and cg ≤ v¯c −
√
x hold. Using
cv − cr ≥ αc, we establish cg + αcβ ≤ cb for all parts.
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(i) Using S = (v¯c − cg)2 − v¯c(1− cb)2 we have
ω > ωUG1 ⇔ ω > 1− S(1+αnβ)
β2(αn+αc)2(1−αcβ)+Sβ(αn+αc)
⇔ S > (1−ω)β2(αn+αc)2(1−αcβ)
ω(1+αnβ)+(1−ω)(1−αcβ)
⇔ (v¯c − cg)2 > v¯c( (1−ω)(v¯n−v¯c)2ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c + (1− cb)2) (using the definition of S.)
⇔ v¯c − cg >
√
v¯c(
(1−ω)(v¯n−v¯c)2
ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c + (1− cb)2) (taking square roots)
⇔ cg ≤ v¯c −
√
v¯c((1− cb)2 + z(1− ω)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2))
⇔ cg ≤ v¯c −
√
x (using the definition of x as in Proposition 1.)
(ii) We first define F (αn) = α
2
nv¯c(1−ω)β2+αn(2v¯c(1−ω)αcβ2−Sωβ)+v¯c(1−ω)β2α2c−
S(ω+ v¯c(1−ω)), and let αUG1n be the largest αn satisfying F (αn) = 0. Furthermore,
as ω > v¯c(β
2α2c−S)
v¯c(β2α2c−S)+S = ω
α1 , we have F (0) < 0. Using S = (v¯c− cg)2− v¯c(1− cb)2 and,
we have
αn < α
UG1
n ⇒ F (αn) < 0 (as d
2F (αn)
dαn2
> 0 , ∀αn and F (0) < 0 when ω > ωα1 .)
⇔ (v¯c − cg)2 > v¯c( (1−ω)(v¯n−v¯c)2ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c + (1− cb)2) (using the definition of S.)
⇔ cg ≤ v¯c −
√
x (using part (a)(i) of the proof.)
(iii) We define FL(β) ≡
√
v¯c((1− cb)2 + z(1− ω)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2)) and FR(β) ≡
v¯c− cg, and rewrite cg ≤ v¯c−
√
x as FL(β) < FR(β). We establish the result in three
steps:
1. FL(0) = FR(0) = 1− cv − k.
2. If k < 1/4(1− cv +
√
(1− αc)− (1−ω)(αn+αc)21−αc+ω(αn+αc) , then we have
FL(1) =
√
(1− αc)((cv + 4k − 1)2 + (1−ω)(αn+αc)2αnω−αc(1−ω)+1)
> 1− αc − cr − 4k
= FR(1).
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3. Condition k < 1 − cv implies 1 + cv + k < 2(cv−cr)αc , as cv − cr > αc. Then we
have
dFL(β)
dβ
|β=0 = (1−cv−k)(−αc(1−cv−k)−4k)
2
√
(1−cv−k)2
< cv − cr − αc − 2k
= dFR(β)
dβ
|β=0.
As such, there must exist βUG1 ∈ (0, 1) satisfying FL(βUG1) = FR(βUG1), and
FL(β) < FR(β) for β < β
UG1 .
For part (b), we consider the cases satisfying cb ≥ 1, i.e., cv ≥ 1 − k(1 + β)2,
in which case only strategy UG can sustain optimally if problem parameters lie in
Γ∗
UG2inc
or Γ∗UGexc ; otherwise, the monopolist does not participate.
(i) Using the definition of ωUG2 , we have
ω < ωUG2 ⇔ v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2)) < (v¯c − cg)2
⇔ v¯c −
√
v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2)) > cg (taking square roots.)
(ii) Using the definition of αUG2 , we have
αn < α
UG2
n ⇔ β(αn + αc)− 1 + αcβ + (1− β)cv + βcr + k(1 + β)2 < 0
⇔ β(αn + αc) < v¯c − cg
⇒
√
(1−ω)v¯c(β(αn+αc))2
(1−ω)v¯c+ωv¯n < β(αn + αc) < v¯c − cg (using
(1−ω)v¯c
(1−ω)v¯c+ωv¯n < 1.)
⇔
√
(1−ω)v¯c(β(αn+αc))2
(1−ω)v¯c+ωv¯n < v¯c − cg
⇔ cg ≤ v¯c −
√
v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2))
(iii) We define F (β) = β(αn + αc) − 1 + αcβ + (1 − β)cv + βcr + k(1 + β)2, and
let βUG2 be the largest β satisfying F (βUG2) = 0. Furthermore, note that F (0) < 0
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when cv < 1− k. Then, we have
β < βUG2 ⇒ F (β) < 0
⇔ β(αn + αc) < v¯c − cg (Rearrangement and using the definition of cg)
⇔ β(αn + αc) < v¯c − cg
⇒
√
(1−ω)v¯c(β(αn+αc))2
(1−ω)v¯c+ωv¯n < β(αn + αc) < v¯c − cg (using
(1−ω)v¯c
(1−ω)v¯c+ωv¯n < 1.)
⇔
√
(1−ω)v¯c(β(αn+αc))2
(1−ω)v¯c+ωv¯n < v¯c − cg
⇔ cg ≤ v¯c −
√
v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2))
(iv) Using the definition of ωUG2 , we have
ω > ωUG2 ⇔ v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2)) > (v¯c − cg)2
⇔ v¯c −
√
v¯c (z(1− w)(v¯n/v¯c + v¯c/v¯n − 2)) < cg (taking square roots.)
Proof of Proposition 4: For part (i), note that as Γ∗UB = {∆c < ∆UBc }, the
optimality of strategy UB is straightforward. Furthermore, as cb < 1 when UB is
optimal, and dcb
dβ
= 2k(1 + β) > 0, we must have dpiUB
dβ
= −1
2
(1 − cb)dcbdβ < 0,
which implies β∗ = 0. For part (ii), note the following regarding how cg evolves as β
changes:
– As dcg
dβ
> 0 for all β when ∆c < 2k holds, we have cg > cg|β=0= cv + k.
– When 2k ≤ ∆c ≤ 4k, cg > cg|β= cv−cr
2k
−1= 2cv − cr − (cv−cr)
2
4k
.
– As dcg
dβ
< 0 for all β when ∆c > 4k holds, we have cg > cg|β=1= cr + 4k.
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We denote by C a lower bound for cg in each scenario, we have
ω < ωPTβ ⇔ ω < 1− 8k2(cv−cr)+αn(1+ C1+αn ) (using the definition of C.)
⇔ 8k
1−ω − 2(cv − cr) < αn(1 + C1+αn )
⇔ 8k−2(cv−cr)(1−ω)
αn(1−ω) < 1 +
C
1+αn
⇔ 2
dcg
dβ
+2ω(cv−cr)
αn(1−ω) <
2
dcg
dβ
|β=1+2ω(cv−cr)
αn(1−ω) < 1 +
cg
1+αnβ
(bcz dcg
dβ
≤ dcg
dβ
|β=1 and C < cg.)
⇔ 2
dcg
dβ
+2ω(cv−cr)
αn(1−ω) < 1 +
cg
1+αnβ
(using dcg
dβ
≤ dcg
dβ
|β=1 and C < cg.)
⇔ 2ω(1 + αnβ)(1 + αnβ − cg)dcbdβ
< (1− ω)(1 + αnβ − cg)(αncg + (1 + αnβ)(αn − 2dcgβ ))
⇔ 2ω(1 + αnβ)2(1− cb)dcbdβ < 2ω(1 + αnβ)(1 + αnβ − cg)dcbdβ ( cg1+αnβ < cb for PT.)
⇔ −1
2
ω(1− cb)dcbdβ + 14(1− ω)1+αnβ−cg(1+αnβ)2 (αncg + (1 + αnβ)(αn − 2
dcg
β
)) > 0
⇔ dΠPT (β)
dβ
> 0 (using the definition of ΠPT (β).)
Therefore, we must have β∗ = 1 if ω < ωPTβ when the firm optimally implements
implies scenario PT.
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For part (iii), we have
ω > ωUGβ ⇔ αcω < cv − cr − 4k
⇒ αc
ω
< cv − cr − 2k(1 + β) (using β ≤ 1.)
⇔ ω
αc
> 1
cv−cr−2k(1+β) (taking the inverse of both sides.)
⇒ ω
αc
+ (1−ω)
2v¯2c
αcv¯2nω
+ 2v¯c(1−ω)
αcv¯n
> ω
αc
> 1
cv−cr−2k(1+β)
⇔ (ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c)2
αcv¯2nω
> 1
cv−cr−2k(1+β)
⇔ αcv¯2nω
(ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c)2 < cv − cr − 2k(1 + β) (taking the inverse of both sides.)
⇒ αcv¯2nω
(ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c)2 2z < 2z(cv − cr − 2k(1 + β))
< αcv¯
2
nω
(ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c)2 2z < 2z(cv − cr − 2k(1 + β)) ( cg < 2v¯c − z and v¯c < z.)
⇔ − αcv¯2nω
(ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c)2 (cg + z) > −2z(cv − cr − 2k(1 + β))
(multiplying both sides by -1.)
⇒ −αcv¯2nω
(ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c)2 (cg + z) +
αnv¯2c (1−ω)
(ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c)2 (cg + z)
> 2z(− cv + cr + 2k(1 + β)) (as the newly added term is positive.)
⇔ −αcv¯2nω+αnv¯2c (1−ω)
(ωv¯n+(1−ω)v¯c)2 (cg + z) > 2z(− cv + cr + 2k(1 + β))
⇔ dz
dβ
(cg + z)− 2z dcgdβ > 0
⇔ dpiUG(β)
dβ
= (z−cg)
4z2
( dz
dβ
(cg + z)− 2z dcgdβ ) > 0 ( cg < z and the definition of ΠUG(β).)
Therefore, we must have β∗ = 1 if ω > ωUGβ when the firm optimally implements
implies scenario UG.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 3: TECHNICAL PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 3: Let λ < 1 denote the probability that a consumer is available
to shop in a given period. Therefore, the probability that a consumer will next be
available after precisely n periods is equal to (1 − λ)n−1λ, and the corresponding
discount factor is βn. Therefore, considering all possible n = 1, 2, . . .∞, the
expected discount factor corresponding to the subsequent availability period is
given by the infinite sum:
βλ+ β2(1− λ)λ+ β3(1− λ)2λ+ β4(1− λ)3λ+ ... = βλ
1− (1− λ)β ≡ βˆ.
We see that dβˆ/dλ > 0, implying that infrequent visitation (low λ) translates to a
lower resulting β, as we should expect. Also, limλ→1 βˆ = β, as expected.
Proof of Proposition 7: To determine the set of dominant shopping behaviors
under DD, we begin by ordering the four recurrent price states in order of
increasing appeal to a consumer, i.e., R ≺ R ≺ r ≺ r (of these, r  R is non
obvious but must hold because v − r − αr > v − R − αR for these two alternatives,
and neither causes a change in credit—implying no future ramifications). In Table
8, we highlight the ordering of the four recurrent price states, along with the first-
purchase price states R and r (between which the latter is more desirable).
Individual rows of the table correspond to distinct feasible shopping
behaviors. For a given behavior in the row, a check mark denotes participation (a
purchase), a cross denotes non-participation, and a dash denotes that a state does
not occur. The check and cross marks correspond to the preference ordering R ≺ r
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TABLE 8. Set of dominant purchase policies under DD
First After first
purchase purchase︷ ︸︸ ︷
ssssss
︷ ︸︸ ︷
ssssssssssssss
R r R R r r Dominated?
No (regular shoppers segment, RD)
× Yes
× × Yes
× × × Yes
× No (transition shoppers segment, TD)
× - - No (sales shoppers segment, SD)
× × - No (sales shoppers segment, SD)
× × × - Yes
× × - - - - No (non-participating consumer)
and R ≺ R ≺ r ≺ r. We see that if buying (in the table, a check mark) occurs
in a less-favored state, then buying should occur in any feasible more-favored state;
visually, this translates to check marks propagating to the right. Of the 26 possible
rows, this consideration eliminates all but the nine rows that appear in the table.
Of these nine, we see from the table that four are dominated. The dominance result
for the first three of these four holds because we can show that any customer who
chooses to initially buy in state R (rather than wait for the lower price state, as in
the next block of four table rows) with zero credit would also optimally purchase
in state R—which yields higher immediate payoff and carries forward the same
(high) credit value. The dominance result for the last of the four holds because any
customer who buys in state r will also optimally purchase in state r—which yields
a higher immediate payoff and carries forward the same (low) credit value.
Proof of Proposition 9: Consider when EpiTD(αTD) ≥ max{EpiRI (αRI ), EpiSI (αSI )}
holds. EpiTD(αTD) ≥ EpiRI (αRI ) reduces to v ≤ vTR where vTR ≡
βγR(R−r)(cR+r(1−γ))+Rr(cγR+r(1−γ))
βγ(R−r)(R+r(1−γ))+r(γR+r(1−γ)) . The inequality EpiTD(αTD) ≥ EpiSI (αSI ) reduces
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to a lower threshold v ≥ vTS ≡ βγ(β(R−r)(cR+r)+r((c−1)R+r))−(1−β)r2βR(2βγ−1)−(1−2β)r(1−βγ) , provided that
γ > γ¯ ≡ βR+r(1−2β)
β(2βR+r(1−2β)) . Therefore, given sufficiently high γ and vTS < v < vTR,
the firm maximizes profits via α = αTD corresponding to the transition shopping
segment.
Proof of Lemma 4: Plugging the associated optimal α functions (3.15) and
(3.16), respectively, into expressions (B.1) and (B.4) for a regular shopper
and expressions (B.3) and (B.5) for a sales shopper, we find that VRI (αRI ) =
VRD(αRD) =
(1−γ)v(R−r)
(1−β)R and VSI (αSI ) = VSD(αSD) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 5: Under ID, the inequality EpiRI (αRI ) ≥ EpiSI (αSI ) holds
for all v ≥ vRISI ≡ cγR
2
(2γ−1)R+r(1−γ) , given γ >
R−r
2R−r ≡ γ¯ (this must be satisfied
under Proposition 9, because γ¯ < γ¯). Under DD, with γ > γ¯, the firm optimally
(Proposition 9) induces transition shopping if and only if vTS < v < vTR. Therefore,
there are two possible cases.
Case (i) v : vTS < v < vRISI . In this valuation range, the ID policy’s profit
is maximized by offering αSI to induce sales shopping, while DD profit is maximized
by offering αTD to induce transition shopping. Given that the representative
consumer earns zero expected surplus when targeted as a sales shopper, and here
under DD the consumer chooses transition-shopping over sales-shopping, the
expected surplus is positive. Hence, DD yields higher surplus for this valuation
range.
Case (ii) v : vRISI < v < vTR. In this (higher) valuation range, the ID
policy’s profit is maximized by offering αRI to induce regular shopping, while DD
profit is maximized by offering αTD to induce transition shopping. It is easy to
check that VRI (αRI ) ≥ VTD(αTD) holds for v < R (for v > R, a zero discount is
optimal); thus, ID yields higher expected surplus for this valuation range.
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Proof of Proposition 10: Since 0 ≤ h1 ≤ 1, the numerator of α∗D is larger than
the numerator of α∗I (i.e., 2R(1 − h1) + 2h1r − 1 ≤ 2r − 1 ⇔ r < R). Utilizing
0 ≤ h2 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ h3 ≤ 1, we can show that the denominator of α∗D is less than or
equal to denominator of α∗I . Thus, α
∗
D ≥ α∗I . The inequality binds at β = 1.
Proof of Proposition 11: To establish that DD earns higher profit (EpiD(α
∗
D) −
EpiI(α
∗
I) ≥ 0), we will show that even when setting α = α∗I the DD policy
dominates, i.e., EpiD(α
∗
I)− EpiI(α∗I) is positive (since, from Proposition 10, we know
α∗D > α
∗
I for β < 1). We can express this profit difference as
α
(1−βγ)2M(α)|α=α∗I ,
where M(α) is a linear function of c. M(α∗I) > 0 simplifies to c > cM =
K1(β)/K2(β), where K1(β) and K2(β) are lengthy third degree polynomials in β.
Moreover, we can formally establish that K2(β) > 0 holds, and, as we confirm with
our analyses reported in Table 5, the condition c > cM is nonrestrictive (with even
cM < 0 in most cases—due to K1(β) being negative—implying any non-negative
cost is sufficient).
Proof of Lemma 6: Via FOC we solve for α∗D =
(2−c)R2−R(βr(2β+c−2)+1)+βr(2βr−1)
2β(R2−2(β−1)βRr+(β(β2+β−2)+1)r2)
and α∗I =
(2−c)R2−βcRr−R+βr(2r−1)
2(R2+βr2)
. It is easy to establish that the denominator of α∗D
is smaller than the denominator of α∗I , and the numerator of α
∗
D is larger than the
numerator of α∗I . Combined, these two facts imply α
∗
D ≥ α∗I , where the inequality
binds at β = 1.
Deriving NPV of surplus under DD and ID: For each candidate shopping
behavior B, we denote the corresponding expected surplus NPV V (0) from (3.8)
as VB(0), or simply VB for brevity. These surplus NPV functions depend on the
consumer type v. Using them, we derive valuation thresholds defining which
behavior is optimal for a given v. To obtain the surplus NPV for each behavior, we
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must alternately consider the two possible first-period states pt = R or pt = r, given
that a consumer witnesses the outcome pt prior to making their initial purchase
decision. We begin by analyzing the case pt = R but we later find that the resulting
valuation thresholds also hold when pt = r. We can derive VRD for pt = R by
applying xRkp to (3.8) while twice invoking its recursion to yield the following three
simultaneous equations.

VRD(0) = v −R + 0 + βEVRD(αR)
EVRD(αR) = γ(v −R + αR + βEVRD(αR)) + (1− γ)(v − r + αR + βEVRD(αr))
EVRD(αr) = γ(v −R + αr + βEVRD(αR)) + (1− γ)(v − r + αr + βEVRD(αr))
We solve this system by initially solving the latter two equations for the two
unknowns EVRD(αR) and EVRD(αr), and we then obtain the full NPV result
VRD(0) from the first equation, yielding:
VRD ≡ VRD(0) = [v − (1− αβ)(βr + βγ(R− r) + (1− β)R]/(1− β). (B.1)
Similarly, we derive VTD by applying x
T
kp to (3.8), which in turn leads to invoking its
recursion three additional times to yield four simultaneous equations.

VTD(0) = 0 + βEVTD(0)
EVTD(0) = γβEVTD(0) + (1− γ)(v − r + βEVTD(αr)
EVTD(αr) = γ(v −R + αr + βEVTD(αR)) + (1− γ)(v − r + αr + βEVTD(αr))
EVTD(αR) = γ(v −R + αR + βEVTD(αR)) + (1− γ)(v − r + αR + βEVTD(αr))
The latter two equations in this system have the same structure as the latter two
equations within (B) above, so we know EVTD(αr) = EVRD(αr) and EVTD(αR) =
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EVRD(αR) (this is also intuitive since once a transition shopper has credit, either
αr or αR, their subsequent actions and surplus match those of regular shoppers).
We thus solve the system for EVTD(αr) and EVTD(αR), and then EVTD(0), and
finally VTD(0) with the following result:
VTD ≡ VTD(0) = β[v − (1− αβ)(r + βγ(R− r)]/(1− β), (B.2)
where β = β(1− γ)/(1− βγ). In (B.2), the expression in brackets represents the net
surplus once the consumer initiates purchasing under the transition behavior (i.e.,
at the first reduced-price opportunity), and β (< β) discounts that value because
the consumer may face one or more periods at R before purchasing begins. In
analogous fashion we derive VSD by applying x
S
kp to (3.8) and invoking the recursion
twice to yield three simultaneous equations with unknowns VSD(0), EVSD(0), and
EVSD(αr). 
VSD(0) = βEVSD(0)
EVSD(0) = γβEVSD(0) + (1− γ)(v − r + βEVSD(αr)
EVSD(αr) = γβEVSD(αr) + (1− γ)(v − r + βEVSD(αr)
Solving this system yields:
VSD ≡ VSD(0) = β[v − r(1− αβ)]/(1− β). (B.3)
In above analysis, we considered a first period price pt = R. For the alternative case
pt = r, no distinction exists between regular- versus transition-shopping because
both imply buying in the first period at pt = r and subsequently (by definition)
transition shoppers become regular shoppers. The threshold demarcating regular-
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shopping from transition-shopping therefore doesn’t exist for pt = r case, making it
simpler to address. The VB expressions with pt = r do change slightly (with VRD =
VTD now holding) such that the scalar β simply becomes equal to one in expressions
(B.2) and (B.3), and so their pairwise comparisons yield the same vTD(αD) and
vSD(αD) expressions we derived above. Thus, our results both for DD and ID hold
irrespective of whether the initial price level is low (r) or high (R).
Having derived the valuation thresholds which define optimal consumer
shopping behavior under the DD policy, we must do the same for ID. With no
carry-forward of credit, it is relatively easy to express (3.8) directly via its implied
infinite sum. Expanding the recursion in (3.8) with pt = R at time t = 1 for the
regular- and sales-shopping behaviors (recall that the transition segment does not
apply under ID) yields the resulting surplus NPVs VRI and VSI .
VRI = v−R(1−α)+
∞∑
t=2
βt−1[γ(v−R(1−α))+(1−γ)(v−r(1−α))] = v − (1− α)(R− β(1− γ)(R− r))
1− β
(B.4)
VSI = 0 +
∞∑
t=2
βt−1[(1− γ)(v − r + αr)] = β(1− γ)(v − (1− α)r)
1− β (B.5)
Deriving NPV of profit under DD and ID: The following system of
equations corresponds to a regular shopper under the DD policy. By solving these
simultaneous equations for EpiRD(α, 0), we obtain the expected NPV of profit per
regular shopper under DD.

EpiRD(α, 0) = γ(R− cR + βEpiRD(α, αR)) + (1− γ)(r − cR + βEpiRD(α, αr))
EpiRD(α, αr) = γ(R− αr − cR + βEpiRD(α, αR)) + (1− γ)(r − αr − cR + βEpiRD(α, αr))
EpiRD(α, αR) = γ(R− αR− cR + βEpiRD(α, αR)) + (1− γ)(r − αr − cR + βEpiRD(α, αr))
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Analogous systems of simultaneous equations yield the per-customer profit NPV for
the transition-shopping and sales-shopping behaviors.
Calculating the per-customer profit NPV under the ID policy is simpler,
as the result for each behavior follows from a single equation. The equation
corresponding to the regular- and sales-shopping behaviors are below.
EpiRI (α) = (1− γ)(r − αr − cR) + γ(R− αR− cR) + βEpiRI (α)
EpiSI (α) = (1− γ)(r − αr − cR) + βEpiSI (α).
We simply solve the first of these two equations for EpiRI (α), and the second
equation for EpiSI (α).
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APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 4: TECHNICAL PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 14: We aim to solve the problem stated in expression 4.3.
1) Pricing Policy BCR: Each constraint set simplifies into a range on θ. We
first translate the constraint sets into ranges on θ as below: ΛB(θ) ≡ θ ∈
[ p−r−γpc
(1−α)(1−γ)vl ,M ] ≡ [θbc,M ], ΛC(θ) ≡ θ ∈ [
pc
vh(1−α) ,
p−r−γpc
(1−α)(1−γ)vl ] ≡ [θcr, θbc] and
ΛR(θ) ≡ θ ∈ [ rαv , pcvh(1−α) ] ≡ [θr, θcr]. For existence of converter segment, the
inequality θcr < θbc should hold. This inequality simplifies to pc <
vh(p−r)
v
≡ p¯c.
Only if the conversion price be less than p¯c, the market consists of some potential
converters. (see Figure 12). Next, we take the profit function expressed in (4.3)
and replace the constraints sets with the equivalent θ ranges that we just obtained
above. Through solving dpiC
dr
= dpiC
dp
= dpiC
dpc
= 0, we can obtain the sole critical point
of the profit function pi at the below triple:
r∗ =
αMv + cr
2
p∗ =
Mv + cs
2
p∗c =
(1− α)Mvh + cs
2
The existence of converter segment at optimal prices can be examined via the
condition θ∗bc ≥ θ∗cr, which is simplified to cr ≤ (vh−vl)(1−γ)vh cs (i.e., p∗c < p¯c|r∗,p∗).
The optimal conversion discount can be calculated to be δ∗ = p
∗−p∗c
r∗ =
M(v¯−(1−α)vh)
αMv¯+cr
and δ∗ > 0 if and only if α > (vh−vl)(1−γ)
vh
≡ k.
The feasibility region of above interior solution, as we are going to call it
BCR solution - where all three segments are optimally existent - is defined via
checking for non-emptiness of the customer segments at respective optimal prices:
(1) θ∗r ≥M ↔ cr ≥ −(M − 2M)αv || 2M < M
(2) θ∗cr ≥ θ∗r ↔ crcs ≤ αv¯(1−α)vh ← renter segment
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(3) θ∗bc ≥ θ∗cr ↔ crcs ≤
(vh−vl)(1−γ)
vh
≡ k ← converter segment
(4) M ≥ θ∗bc ↔ cr ≥ (1− γ)(cs −Mvl(1− α)) ← buyer segment
Let’s denote ΓBCR as the intersection of above (non-trivial/non-binding?)
conditions on cost factors.
ΓBCR = {cr, cs|cr
cs
≤ min{k, αv¯
(1− α)vh}∩cr ≥ max{(1−γ)(cs−Mvl(1−α)),−(M−2M)αv}}
Obviously, the violation of any of the above conditions derives the solution to
a particular corner solution, where one segment’s size shrinks to zero. We next
characterize all the remaining solutions to the firm’s problem.
2) Pricing Policy BC: By violation of condition (2) above, the one-time renter
segment becomes non-existent (i.e., θ∗cr ≤ θ∗r ↔ crcs ≥ αv(1−α)vh ). We then need to
resolve the firm’s problem by setting r = αpcv
(1−α)vh (that derives θcr = θr) and run
the FOC for the profit pi(r, p, pc) via the two variables p and pc. The optimal prices
under BC are:
p∗ =
Mv + cs
2
p∗c =
(1− α)vh(γ(cs +M(vh − αvl)) + cr + αMvl)
2(γvh + αvl(1− γ))
The feasibility of solution BC at new optimal prices can be checked via below
conditions:
a) θ∗r ≥M ↔ cr ≥ −γcs − (M − 2M)(α(1− γ)vl + γvh)
b) θ∗bc ≥ θ∗cr ↔ crcs ≤
(1−γ)(γvh+vl(α−γ))
v
= csc
c) M ≥ θ∗bc ↔ cr ≥ (1− γ)(cs −Mvl(1− α))
ΓBC = {cr, cs| αv
(1− α)vh ≤
cr
cs
≤ csc ∩ (cr ≥ max{(1− γ)(cs −Mvl(1− α)),−γcs−
(M − 2M)(α(1− γ)vl + γvh))}}
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3) Pricing Policy BR: Violation of condition (3) in the main problem (i.e., cr >
kcs ↔ θ∗cr > θ∗bc) derives the converter segment out of the picture. We can resolve
the firm’s problem by setting pc = p¯c (that derives θcr = θbc) and re-optimize
the profit pi(r, p, pc) wrt the two variables r and p. Here are the optimal prices for
pricing policy BR:
r∗ =
αMv + cr
2
p∗ =
Mv + cs
2
p∗c = p¯c|r∗,p∗=
1
2
vh
(
cs − cr
v
+M(1− α)
)
The feasibility of solution BR at new optimal prices can be checked via below
conditions:
a) θ∗r ≥M → cr ≥ −(M − 2M)αv
b) θ∗cr ≥ θ∗r → cr ≤ αcs
c) M ≥ θ∗cr → cr ≥ cs −M(1− α)v
ΓBR = {cr, cs|k < cr
cs
≤ α ∩ cr ≥ max{−(M − 2M)αv, cs −M(1− α)v}}
4) Pricing Policy CR: Violation of condition (4) in the BCR problem (i.e., M <
θ∗bc ↔ cr < (1 − γ)(cs −Mvl(1 − α))) derives the buyer segment out of the picture.
We can resolve the firm’s problem by setting p = r + pcγ +Mvl(1− α)(1− γ) (that
derives M = θbc) and re-optimize the profit pi(r, p, pc) wrt the two variables r and
pc. Via FOC, we obtain r
∗ = αMv+cr
2
and p∗c =
(1−α)Mvh+cs
2
.
The feasibility of solution CR at new optimal prices can be checked via below
conditions:
a) θ∗r ≥M → cr ≥ −(M − 2M)αv
b) θ∗cr ≥ θ∗r → crcs ≤ αv¯(1−α)vh
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c) θ∗bc ≥ θ∗cr → cs ≤Mvh(1− α)
ΓCR = {cr, cs|−(M−2M)αv < cr < (1−γ)(cs−Mvl(1−α))∩cs ≤Mvh(1−α)∩cr
cs
≤ αv¯
(1− α)vh}
5) Pricing Policy B: Take the solutions BR and BC. If conditions (b) (at both
solutions) are violated, i.e., cr
cs
> α and cr
cs
> (1−γ)(γvh+(α−γ)vl)
v¯
, the participating
market boils down to one segment: outright buyers. We then need to resolve the
firm’s problem by setting r = αp and pc =
pvh(1−α)
v¯
(that derives θbc = θcr = θr) and
re-optimize the profit pi via the only remaining variable p and we have p∗ = Mv+cs
2
.
ΓB = {cr, cs|cr
cs
> max{α, (1− γ)(γvh + (α− γ)vl)
v¯
}}
6) Pricing Policy R: Take the solutions CR and BR. If conditions (c) (at both
solutions) are violated, i.e., cs > Mvh(1 − α) and cr < cs − M(1 − α)v, the
participating market boils down to one segment: one time renters. We then need to
resolve the firm’s problem by setting p = r +M(1− α)v¯ and pc = Mvh(1− α) (that
derives M = θbc = θcr) and re-optimize the profit pi via the only remaining variable
r and we have r∗ = αMv+cr
2
ΓR = {cr, cs|cs > max{Mvh(1− α), cr +M(1− α)v}}
Proof of Proposition 15: Let’s look back at ΓBCR
ΓBCR = {cr, cs|cr
cs
≤ min{k, αv¯
(1− α)vh}∩cr ≥ max{(1−γ)(cs−Mvl(1−α)),−(M−2M)αv}}
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The non-binding cost condition that causes the existence of converter segment is
cr
cs
≤ k. Taking the optimal selling (p∗) and post-rental price (p∗c) from solution
BCR, we can show that p∗ > p∗c iff α > k.
Proof of Proposition 16: The profit function pi(p, r, pc) is not jointly concave in
all three decision variables at all points. However, the following function determines
the best response conversion price, given a pair of (p, r):
dpi(p, r, pc)
dpc
= 0→ pc(p, r) = p− r + cr
2
+
1
8
((1− α) +
√
(1− α)(8cr + (1− α)))
The lowest possible conversion price is naturally achieved at 100% conversion
discount i.e., a full refund of rental fee toward conversion. Unless cr = 0, the firm
shall never prefer consumers to try and definitely convert rather to buy outright.
The condition pc ≥ p − r eliminates the consideration of already known dominated
pricing strategy for the firm. Therefore, we take p − r as the natural lower bound
on pc. Given a fixed (p, r) pair, pi(p, r, pc) has three critical points with respect to
pc, since
dpi(p,r,pc)
dpc
= 0 yields three solutions as 1) pc = pc ≡ p − r + (1 − α) and 2)
pc = p− r + cr2 + 18((1− α)±
√
(1− α)(8cr + (1− α))).
Computing the derivatives at lower and upper bound on pc, we have
dpi
dpc
|pc=p−r= +∞, dpidpc |pc=pc= 0 and dpi
2
d2pc
|pc=pc> 0 for cr < (1 − α) . These three
facts together prove that only one of the two remaining critical points could fall
in the feasible range [p − r, pc] and it should be a maximizer 1. Another way to
locate the maximizer is to examine dpi
2
d2pc
evaluated at the remaining critical points.
Plugging the best response function into the profit function and solving for first
1Both remaining critical points could not fall within the specified range, since the first critical
point is a minimizer and change of curvature in this range in possible only once.
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order conditions, we have:
dpi(p, r, pc(p, r))
dp
=
dpi(p, r, pc(p, r))
dr
= 0
leads to:
r∗ =
αM + cr
2
p∗ =
M + cb
2
p∗c = p
∗+
1
8
(
(1− α)+
√
(1− α)((1− α)+ 8cr)− 4αM
)
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